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This thesis shows how the perceptions of practitioners and other stakeholders in 
clinical research in India differ from how informed consent appears in the academic 
literature and the regulatory framework. My empirical research findings hint at 
apathy towards the purpose and process of informed consent. I argue that this apathy 
raises doubts as to the impact of prescriptive work on informed consent in clinical 
research.  
 I reach the above conclusion in three broad parts. First, I outline the 
conceptual framework of informed consent (what makes consent ethically and 
legally valid) and show how this conceptual framework appears in practice in India 
and what problems have arisen with regard to the way informed consent is dealt 
within this contemporary context. Second, I show how informed consent has been 
legally translated by courts in India and the limits of law in dealing with informed 
consent in clinical research. Third, I lay out the findings of an empirical research that 
I conducted in India (between April 2016-October 2016) that reflect stakeholder 
perspectives on informed consent.  
The empirical findings are analysed using the contrasting method where 
stakeholder perspectives are juxtaposed with how informed consent appears in the 
academic literature and law. What emerges from my data is a picture that presents a 
situation where the process of informed consent is oftentimes followed neither as an 
ethical compulsion nor strictly as a legal obligation. It is not uncommon that 
researchers consider the process of consent as a mere procedural necessity, thereby 
performing the action without affording much consideration to either law or ethics. 
This often leads to apathy towards the ‘larger cause’ (or end goal) of informed 
consent which, I suggest, is a major reason for the misalignment between ethics, law 
and the practice of informed consent. To mitigate this misalignment I suggest some 
non-traditional tools of behaviour regulation alongside the traditional ones.  
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Academic literature comprises the literature that focuses on defining the conceptual 
and prescriptive scope of informed consent. It includes work on the ethics of 
informed consent, what informed consent should look like, and how it should be 
taken (bearing in mind the capacity and voluntariness of the participant and the 
adequacy and comprehension of information disclosed to her).  
Ethics, for the purposes of this thesis, means broad normative standards that derive 
from moral principles and are also codified into professional ethical guidelines.
1
 
These include works of philosophers and practical ethicists on the scope of the 
concepts that are crucial in describing what informed consent entails.  
Legal doctrine (or law) of informed consent means the doctrine as developed 
through case law and statutes. This excludes pluralistic notions of law.  
Process of informed consent means the actions of stakeholders involved in acquiring 
and giving consent. 
Regulatory framework includes the laws, regulations, and ethical guidelines that deal 
with informed consent in human subject research.  
Social facts refer to things such as institutions, norms, values, cultures, etc., which 
exist external to the individual and affect the behaviour and attitudes of the 
individual in a given society. 
Stakeholders include people who are invested in the process of informed consent 
within the clinical research spectrum of India.  
Web of influences means the external situations or factors that affect a person’s 
behaviour rather than the internal traits of that person. 
 
                                                          
1
 It is important to clarify that while I am aware of the work of academics who have differentiated 
between the usage of ethics and morality within the context of medicine, I look at ethics as stemming 
from and incorporating morality for most parts of the thesis. This also includes references to ethical 
guidelines, which derive from ethics, except when I mention ethical guidelines or codes of conduct as 
part of the regulatory framework. For a further discussion on this and the relationship between 
medical ethics and law, see I. Brassington, On the Relationship between Medical Ethics and the Law, 
MEDICAL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 26, Issue No. 2, (2018), pp. 225-245.  
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This thesis is about differentiating informed consent as it appears in the academic 
literature and regulatory framework from how stakeholders understand it within the 
context of clinical research in India. Highlighting such differences is not only 
important to get a better contextual understanding of the practice of informed consent 
but also to inform prescriptive work on the matter.  
Informed consent appears in three different guises in the academic literature 
on clinical research: i) as an ethical doctrine, predominantly rooted in the values of 
autonomy and respect for persons, that aims to promote research subjects’ right of 
self-determination regarding trial participation;
1
  ii) as a legal doctrine that prescribes 
conduct for clinical researchers in their interactions with research subjects and 
provides penalties for deviations;
2
 and iii) as an interpersonal process through which 
researchers and subjects interact with each other to chart the course of trial 
participation and consent to such participation.
3
 As Berg and colleagues observe, 
“informed consent is each of these things, yet none of them alone.”
4
 Much of the 
academic literature on informed consent attempts to explain how i) and ii) should be 
understood to have a practical workable doctrine that best informs iii).
5
 I look at i), 
                                                          
1
 R. R. FADEN & T. L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT, (New York: 
Oxford University Press: 1986). 
2
 J. W. BERG, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE, (2
nd
 edn., Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 3. 
3
 A. Meisel & M. Kuczewiski, Legal and ethical myths about informed consent, ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MEDICINE, Vol. 156, Issue No. 22, (1966), p. 2522; A. Cambon-Thomsen, The Social and 
Ethical Issues of Post-Genomic Human Biobanks, NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS, Vol. 5, (2004), pp. 
866-873; L. E. ROZOVSKY, & F. A. ROZOVSKY, THE CANADIAN LAW OF CONSENT TO TREATMENT, 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1990), pp. 2-3; M. Sheehan, Can Broad Consent Be Informed Consent?, 
PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS, Vol. 4, (2011), pp. 226-235.  
4
 BERG, ET AL (2001), supra note 2. 
5
 Some influential works on the attempt to make informed consent a practical workable doctrine are: 
BERG, ET AL., (2001), supra note 2; J. S. King & B. W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE, Vol. 32, 
(2006), pp. 429-501; J. Katz, Informed Consent: Must It Remain a Fairy Tale, JOURNAL OF 
CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 10, (1994), p. 69; N. C. MANSON & O. O’NEILL, 
RETHINKING INFORMED CONSENT IN BIOETHICS, (Cambridge University Press, 1st edn., 2007); S. 
MACLEAN, AUTONOMY, CONSENT AND THE LAW, (Routledge, 2009); P. H. Schuck, Rethinking 
Informed Consent, YALE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 2765, (1994); R. 
Heywood, et al, Informed Consent in Hospital Practice: Health Professional’ Perspectives and Legal 
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ii), and iii), both individually and together within the Indian context to argue that 
much of the prescriptive work in the academic literature on informed consent will 
come to naught if the motivations and perceptions of researchers involved in 
acquiring informed consent are ignored.  
1. Research Problem 
The research question that this thesis seeks to address is:  
What are the differences between informed consent as outlined in the academic 
literature and regulatory framework and informed consent as understood by 
practitioners involved in human subject research in India?  
There is consensus in the academic literature on what informed consent entails. 
Informed consent is legally and ethically valid when competent participants 
voluntarily join a study after being fully informed of the particulars about the study 
that could affect their decision to participate in it.
6
 This means that there must be, at 
the very least, three elements present for consent to research participation to be 
informed and valid; these are voluntariness, adequate information disclosure, and 
capacity to consent.
7
 However, these three elements have different latitudes under 
ethics and law.  
It is important to appreciate that while law and ethics are related,
8
 they are 
both quite distinct fields of study. Both fields provide guidance to humans on how to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Reflections, MEDICAL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 18, Issue No. 2, (2010), pp. 152-184; J. Flory & E. 
Emanuel, Interventions to Improve Research Participants' Understanding in Informed Consent for 
Research: A Systematic Review, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. 292, Issue 
no. 13, (2004), pp. 1593-1601; and so on.  
6
 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP (1986), supra note 1. 
7
 Id.; these three essentials are also part of all the ethical guidelines and international instruments 
pertaining to the conduct of human subject research. See for example National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical 
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, [Bethesda, Md.]: The 
Commission, (1978); World Medical Association (WMA), Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles 
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (1964, recently revised in 2013). The said three 
features are also the legal essentials for consent, see Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda & Anr., 
(2008) 2 SCC 1.  
8
 As obvious as this claim seems to be, the specific ways in which law and ethics are related are 
subject to much controversy in legal philosophy. See M. S. Moore, The Various Relations between 
14 
 
conduct affairs with the larger community. But while ethics discusses what is right 
and wrong and how we should act to promote the good, law focuses on the minimum 
acceptable standard or what is institutionally required of each of us.
9
 Law may be 
informed by ethics, but it has to provide a “single standard of behaviour that provides 
consistent and coherent guidance”.
10
 Conversely, many interpretations of ethical 
standards can, and do, co-exist.
11
 The minimum standards laid down by law can only 
be breached at the risk of civil or criminal liability. However, ethics are geared 
towards aspirations and goals that we ought to meet, but without (institutionalised) 
penalties for failing to meet them.
12
 Therefore, the legal approach to informed 
consent is based on a different rationale from that of ethics and creates a different 
framework within which researchers have to act. The differences between the nature 
of the two disciplines often leads to the criticism that the legal approach does not 
have the same vision as that of the ethical approach that strives for the highest moral 
standard.
13
 This criticism is even stronger when courts translate the principle of 




Furthermore, informed consent is often criticised for being a concept that 
does not match up to its theoretical elucidation in real clinical research settings,
15
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, RATIO JURIS, Vol. 25, Issue No. 4, (2012), pp. 
435-471.  
9
 A. R. Maclean, Magic, Myths, and Fairy Tales: Consent and the Relationship Between Law and 
Ethics, In: M. FREEMAN (ED.), LAW AND BIOETHICS, (Oxford University Press, 2008).  
10
 Id. A. R. Maclean (2008). 
11
 See SATORI report, International differences in ethical standards and in the interpretation of legal 
frameworks, available at http://satoriproject.eu/media/D3.2-Int-differences-in-ethical-standards.pdf 
(last accessed on July 10, 2018) 
12
 See further G. Annas, Ethics Committees: From Ethical Comfort to Ethical Cover, HASTINGS 
CENTER REPORT, Vol. 21, (1999), pp. 18-21. 
13
 A. J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, NEBRASKA 
LAW REVIEW, Vol. 65, (1986); J. Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? - Law's Vision, Vol. 39, 
Issue no. 137, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW, (1977).  
14
 Some perspectives on why this is the case, see J. Waldron, Judges as Moral Reasoners, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. 7, Issue No. 1, (2009), pp. 2-24; C. Foster 
& J. Miola, Who's in Charge? The Relationship between Medical Law, Medical Ethics and Medical 
Morality, MEDICAL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 23, Issue No. 4, (2015), pp. 505-530. 
15
 See for example W. A. Silverman, The myth of informed consent: in daily practice and in clinical 
trials, JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Vol. 15, (1989), pp. 6-11; P. Alderson, Informed Consent: Ideal 
or Reality?, JOURNAL OF HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH & POLICY, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 124-126; A. 
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particularly so within the context of developing countries.
16
 Therefore, along with 
outlining the discrepancy between the ethical and legal approaches to informed 
consent, my research tries to find out how and where the practitioner perspectives 
differ from these approaches. This is important because only when we figure out 
where the discrepancies are strikingly evident, and how these affect the realisation of 
consent in practice, will we be able to think of newer and innovative ways to 
improve the process.  
Informed consent is a multifaceted concept that has been explored using 
different methods of analysis. The research question outlined here can be answered 
through different methods of research and analysis. In what follows, I first clarify the 
scope of this thesis and then justify the use of empirical research to answer the 
research question.  
1.1.  Scope of the thesis  
The following distinction between two senses of informed consent proposed by 
Faden and Beauchamp helps delimit the scope of the thesis: 
In one sense (…) “informed consent” is analysable as a particular kind 
of action by individual patients and subjects: an autonomous 
authorization. In the second sense (…) informed consent is analyzable 
in terms of the web of cultural and policy rules and requirements of 
consent that collectively form the social practice of informed consent 
in institutional contexts where groups of patients and subjects must be 
treated in accordance with rules, policies, and standard practices. 
Here, informed consents are not always autonomous acts, nor are they 
always in any meaningful respect authorizations.
17
  [My emphasis] 
This thesis predominantly relies on the second sense of informed consent. My goal is 
to understand the practice of informed consent in the context of clinical research in 
India. Legal and ethical theories of informed consent are extremely important to this 
thesis, but the aim here is not to challenge the view that informed consent is an act of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Dawson, Informed consent: Bioethical ideal and empirical reality, in: M. HAYRY ET AL., (EDS), 
BIOETHICS AND SOCIAL REALITY, (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2005), pp. 93-10; G. J. Annas, 
Informed Consent: Charade or Choice?, THE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Vol. 45, Issue 
No. 1, pp. 10-11.  
16
 See generally R. MACKLIN, DOUBLE STANDARDS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, (Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
17
 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP (1986), supra note 1, pp. 276 - 277.  
16 
 
autonomous authorisation. It is not even to propose a new theory of informed 
consent. The aim is to show how the principle of informed consent operates within 
the web of social and policy rules within a given institutional context. This, however, 
does not imply that I entirely ignore the first sense in my analysis. I do look at 
autonomy, but only as it appears within the data acquired from my interviewees. The 
use of autonomy in places before the empirical chapters carries the layperson 
understanding of it as reflecting a person’s capacity to make one’s decisions without 
any controlling influences. In the empirical chapters I use some conceptual 
formulations of autonomy to supplement stakeholders’ perceptions and my research 
findings. But I remain agnostic on whether protecting participant autonomy is the 
best justification for informed consent and on the best conceptual definition of it. 
Therefore, this thesis should not be assessed within the first sense of informed 
consent. 
1.1.1. Justification for empirical research  
Many enquiries based on ethical principles implicitly rely on empirical propositions. 
Empirical propositions frame the context of moral judgment and underwrite the 
justifications of these judgments.
18 
Informed consent provides a good illustration of 
this. Consent, based on the principle of respect for persons, is a fundamental 
requirement for human subject research.
19
 Empirical research has assessed numerous 
aspects of informed consent for clinical research; this also includes studies on 
whether subjects have the required understanding of the research study to provide 
informed consent to participation in the proposed research study.
20 
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Let us assume that an empirical study conducted to assess the comprehension 
of research participants finds that 57% subjects understand the method of 
randomisation (that their treatment arm will be selected through a random process 
and not based on a sound medical judgment for what is best for the participant) in 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs). The results of the study pose further ethical 
questions like should we be satisfied that more than half the trial participants 
understand randomisation or should we be perturbed that almost half the trial 
participants do not understand the basic study design? Although empirical research 
generates this question, it is not equipped to answer it. The answer depends on what 
is normatively considered necessary for consent to be valid in RCTs. Yet, because of 
the results of the first empirical study, some others might consider further empirical 
research on the methods through which understanding of information could be 
improved for prospective trial participants of RCTs. Thus, empirical assessments 
aimed at improving ethical conduct in clinical research are valuable to ethical 
inquiries. This thesis marks a step in the same direction, albeit the scope of empirical 
inquiry is different from the ones that I just outlined.  
This thesis acknowledges that principles do not exist in a vacuum. They 
function within a given society where beliefs, practices, perceptions, and attitudes 
matter. Therefore, my empirical research conducted in India seeks to narrate the 
perspectives of stakeholders on informed consent. I conducted a multi-stakeholder 
study that involved interviewing various people concerned with the larger contextual 
paradigm of consent, this included people who give and take consent (research 
subjects and researchers), people involved in the regulatory structure of consent, and 
other invested parties in the process like the civil society, the Clinical Research 
Organisations (CROs), the public health activists, etc. The interviews with these 
stakeholders reveal findings pertaining to what they think about informed consent or 
its various features. Note that not all findings are about how these stakeholders view 
consent in their given roles. The only stakeholders who talk about consent from their 
respective roles within the (biomedical research) paradigm are the researchers. 
Within the interpersonal process of consent, and as the duty-bearers, they are central 
to understanding the practice of informed consent. The other stakeholders that I 
interviewed are relevant to informed consent as sponsors of research, regulatory 
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authorities, and as watchdogs of societal interests, but only come into the frame when 
there is a problem with the process as performed by the researchers. Therefore, this 
thesis keeps researcher perspectives central to the empirical claim which is outlined 
in the next section.  
1.2. Grounded proposition of the thesis: central claim 
Inspired from the grounded theory methodology, where suppositions are grounded in 
data collected through systematic research, a grounded thesis was developed through 
the contrasting method of analysis where the perceptions of stakeholders were 
contrasted with informed consent as understood in the academic literature and the 
regulatory framework. The central claim/grounded proposition of this thesis is that 
scholars and regulators need to acknowledge and understand the perceptions of 
practitioners and stakeholders involved in acquiring informed consent as failure to 
address this dimension would render prescriptive work in this area highly 
questionable.  
This claim derives from a methodical process employed to answer the 
research question outlined in the section above. I answer the primary research 
question in three broad parts. First, I outline the conceptual framework of informed 
consent (what makes consent ethically and legally valid) and show how this 
conceptual framework pans out in India and what problems have arisen with regard 
to the way in which informed consent is dealt within this contemporary context.  
Second, I show how informed consent has been legally translated by courts in India 
and the limits of law in dealing with informed consent in clinical research. Third, I 
lay out the findings of an empirical research that I conducted in India (between April 
2016-October 2016) that reflect stakeholder perspectives on informed consent.  
 My empirical research findings suggest that the practitioners involved in the 
process of informed consent regard informed consent as a mere procedural necessity, 
thereby performing the action without giving much thought to what informed consent 
is meant to achieve. This disengagement with the purpose of informed consent is 
evidence of apathy towards the process of informed consent. This apathy, I argue, is 
possibly a reason why there has been resistance to heavy penalisation for lack of 
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informed consent in clinical research in India (as will be evident later in the thesis). 
The indifference to the purpose of consent partially explains why informed consent 
has largely been reduced to a mechanical process or a tick-box exercise. That is, 
researchers receive signatures on the consent form but do not engage with the 
research subjects/participants deeply to make them understand the purpose, risks and 
benefits, and design of the study. This is usually not a legal problem as there is 
evidence of consent on paper (unless otherwise challenged) but it is ethically 
problematic because the understanding and comprehension (of information) 
threshold is not achieved to make consent ethically valid.  
 Furthermore, I argue that the apathetic attitude towards the process of 
consent raises suspicion around the ethics of clinical research in developing 
countries. Informed consent is often portrayed as the biggest challenge in the ethics 
of clinical research in developing countries as there is widespread poverty and lack 
of access to health care.
21
 Though I argue that poverty and lack of access to medical 
care are not by themselves sufficient to vitiate consent, these harsh situations 
combined with the high cost of litigation and a lack of a well-defined legal remedy 
(as will be evident in Chapter 4) means that it is easier for researchers to get away 
with breaches of informed consent. I say so because the onus to prove a lack of 
informed consent lies upon the research participant and if the research participant is 
vulnerable, and does not effectively understand the consequences of trial 
participation, the chances of exploitation are higher. Therefore, if there is apathy 
towards the purpose of consent, which means indifference towards participant 
autonomy and respect for persons, then despite the bare minimum of consent having 
been reached, the doubt as to whether the research morally wrongs participants will 
always remain.  
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 My larger empirical research also suggests some reasons for this apathy. 
Conducting a clinical trial is “time-bound, financially restricted, a regulatory 
nightmare, and extremely stressful”
22
 for researchers. My research suggests that most 
researchers that I interviewed were inclined to prefer the bare minimum (meaning 
just enough to show that there was no violation of legal rights of the participants) of 
what would otherwise be an intensive process (meaning a process where researchers 
are more responsive to the ethical issues and to the informational requirements of the 
participants). Most prescriptive work on informed consent aims at getting researchers 
to accommodate the intensive process.
23
 The apathy towards the process of informed 
consent means researchers will likely not be responsive to any sound work on 
informed consent. They would most likely be unwilling to take into account 
prescriptive work that aims at improving the existing practice. My small sample size 
of inquiry cannot predict whether this apathy is widespread, but it shows an 
inclination towards apathy for the purpose and process of informed consent amongst 
the interviewed researchers. Such apathy, if widespread, would make it harder to 
implement newer ways to improve participant comprehension of information, 
embrace measures to assure participant voluntariness, use multimedia to improve 
dialogue between researchers-research subjects, and so on. This essentially means 
that any work on improving the process of informed consent, or how consent should 
be taken to ensure maximum protection of the trial participant, will come to naught if 
the practitioners are indifferent to improving the process and are content with the 
status quo. This is a critical consideration, one that this thesis seeks to address in its 
contribution to the academic literature, by giving a nuanced analysis of facts and 
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perspectives that may provide a more sustainable ethico-legal basis for future clinical 
research. 
 Until now, many scholars have written about the practice of informed 
consent not matching up to its theory,
24
 but few have sought empirical evidence to 
assess the reasons for the existence of such discrepancy. This particularly applies to 
studies on informed consent in the Indian context. The following section will address 
why I focus on India for this contextual inquiry into informed consent.  
1.3. Why India?  
I have taken the example of India to illustrate how the process of informed consent is 
heavily dependent on social facts that the legal and ethical approaches to informed 
consent often oversee due to their nature. Most academics measure the ethics of 
clinical trials, and particularly informed consent, against a country’s poverty and 
dismal health care indicators.
25
 This is why India, a developing country, provides an 
excellent background to observe the social practice of informed consent within an 
institutional context. It exemplifies the tensions of a growing economy, with a 
government that wants to make the global clinical research industry feel welcome in 
the country, even as a substantive proportion of the population does not have access 
to basic health care.
26
 This leaves the government vulnerable to the criticism that it 
values marketability and economics more than protecting its poor population who 
                                                          
24
 See for example E. G. Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION, Vol. 235, Issue No. 15, (1976), pp. 1579-1585; D. Leeb, et al., Observations on the 
Myth of “Informed Consent”, JOURNAL OF AMERICA SOCIETY OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, Vol. 58, Issue 
No. 3, (1976), pp. 280-282. See also supra note 15.  
25
 J. Schuman, Beyond Nuremberg, A critique of “Informed Consent” in third world human subject 
research, JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH, Vol. 25, (2012), pp. 123-153; L. P. Nijhawan, et al., 
Informed Consent: Issues and Challenges, JOURNAL OF ADVANCED PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY 
AND RESEARCH, Vol. 4, Issue no. 3, (2013), pp. 134-140;R. Fan, Self-Determination vs. Family-
Determination: Two Incommensurable Principles of Autonomy, BIOETHICS, Vol. 11, Issue No. 3-4, 
(1997), pp.309-322; A. T. ALORA & J. M. LUMITAO, BEYOND A WESTERN BIOETHICS: VOICES FROM 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD, (Georgetown University Press, 2001), p, 8.  
26
 Y. Balrajan, et al, Health care and equity in India, LANCET, Vol.  377, Issue No. 9764, (2011), pp. 
505–515; A. Kapoor, Why healthcare access eludes India, THE HINDU, (September 22, 2016), 
available at  
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Why-healthcare-access-eludes-India/article14634922.ece 
(last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
22 
 
can easily be lured into trial participation.
27
 A case study of India has been used to 
make the claim that each clinical research setting is unique and the process of 
informed consent will differ depending on the setting. Therefore, a homogenous, 
one-size-fits-all approach to the process of informed consent will not help in 
achieving its goals.  
A perusal of academic literature reveals that numerous justifications have 
been given for the principle of informed consent. For instance, it protects and 
promotes the autonomy of the research subject;
28
 it signifies the right of self-
determination over one’s body;
29
 it protects the participant from abusive conduct;
30
 it 
acts as a tool for restoration of trust;
31
 it promotes the health and welfare of the 
research participants,
32
 and so on. So if the purpose (or goals) of informed consent 
includes all these things, one might be curious as to how (any of) these aims are 
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realised in a country like India. Such an inquiry is not only timely but also 
academically relevant. It is timely considering the recent developments in the clinical 
research spectrum in India. It is also academically relevant because very few, if any, 
multi-stakeholder studies of the process of informed consent within clinical research 
have been undertaken in India. My thesis, therefore, adds to the existing literature on 
informed consent by giving a novel perspective on the process of informed consent 
in a developing country like India.  
1.3.1. The Indian Context 
Developing countries, such as India, have become involved in a phenomenon known 
as the ‘globalisation of clinical trials’ (GCTs). Globalisation (also called off-shoring 
or outsourcing) of clinical trials refers to the phenomenon where different parts of a 
drug development process are carried out in different places of the world.
33
 In this 
process, India became one of the preferred destinations for GCTs because conducting 
a trial in India can potentially reduce the cost of trial by up to 60% due to cheap 
labour, low infrastructure costs, and easier access to participants.
34
  
To attract international companies, India amended its law to make it more 
amenable to multinationals. It did so by reforming its patent law in 2005 to align its 
‘process patent system’ with the ‘product patent system’ for pharmaceuticals.
35
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When India accepted the product patent system, it granted a higher level of patent 
protection to the inventor. The amended legislation brought about increased access 
by innovator companies to the Indian market.
36
 Along with changes in the patent law, 
the government allowed drug trials without a ‘phase lag’ in the country, which meant 
that the government removed the earlier requirement of allowing, for instance, a 
phase II clinical trial in India only if a phase III trial of the drug had been completed 
outside India.
37
 The new rule permitted concurrent trials of the same phase in India 
that led to an increase in outsourced laboratory work and clinical trials. With 
increasing policy support from the Indian government, the global pharmaceutical 
industry became interested in moving its trial operations to India; the move also 
facilitated easier access to domestic market for the marketing of drugs. All of this 
made it more appealing for these companies to bring their clinical trials to India.
38
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
patent system, where a patent is granted for a particular manufacturing process, and not for the 
product itself. This means that the same product can be produced through another process. Such a 
system led to reverse engineering of a number of products that were already patented elsewhere, 
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In 2005, the government amended Schedule Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics 
Rules, 1945, appended to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. This statute regulates 
the import, manufacture, distribution, and sale of drugs and cosmetics in India. The 
amendment of Schedule Y, in 2005, established the guidelines for the conduct of 
clinical trials in the country.
39
 Provisions were made in the Schedule to ensure that 
patients and volunteers participate in studies only after a complete and proper 
understanding of the investigative study. An elaborate informed consent process, 
along with the responsibilities of Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs), clinical 
investigators, and trial sponsors, was outlined in Schedule Y. However, the rapid 
growth of the clinical research industry soon posed certain problems for the 
government and the regulatory bodies.  
1.3.2. Growth in global clinical trials: opening Pandora’s box  
Before 2005, one finds only a few documented instances of research conducted 
without the informed consent of research subjects in India.
40
 However, post 2005, 
after the sudden growth of the clinical research industry;
41
 numerous commentators 
started alleging regulatory problems in clinical trial regulation in India and casting 
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doubt over the ethics of some of the trials.
42
 Some even went so far as to call the 
practice of trials in India by foreign pharmaceuticals and research centres as the “new 
colonialism”.
43
 A number of incidents of unethically conducted clinical trials came to 
be reported in the Indian and the international media between the years 2000-2010.
44
 
Despite the media storm, other commentators called the national and international 
media coverage of “guinea pig” trials in India as “sensationalism”, and pointed out 
that about 90-95% of trials in India were quality/process compliant.
45
 These 
commentators asserted that even if a few “outliers” could be identified in the clinical 
trial spectrum in India, similar ethical lapses could be found in the US or Europe.
46
 
Nonetheless, the public outrage culminated in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
47
  
In the year 2012, prompted by a series of unethically conducted trials 
reported in the media, the NGO ‘Swasthya Adhikar Manch’ (Health Rights Forum) 
filed a petition in the Supreme Court of India. The PIL titled Swasthya Adhikar 
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Manch v. Union of India
48
 (hereafter called the SAM case) was brought before the 
Supreme Court of India asking the Court to intervene in the matter of illegal and 
unethical trials being conducted on adults, children, and mentally ill people in the 
country. The interim orders of the Supreme Court in this case have led to an overhaul 
in the legal and regulatory provisions related to the conduct of clinical trials in the 
country. In January 2013, after hearing the SAM case, the Supreme Court observed 
that the “uncontrolled” clinical trials of drugs on human subjects by multinational 
companies were wreaking “havoc” in the country, noting that the government had 
slipped into “deep slumber” regarding this “menace.”
49
 The interim orders of the 
Supreme Court
50
 made the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), 
which is the national regulatory body for Indian pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, issue a notification making audio-video recording of informed consent 
proceedings during trials mandatory for all clinical trials.
51
 The audio-video 
requirement for informed consent was later restricted to only ‘vulnerable subjects’,
52
 
but the notification did not carry a definition for vulnerable subjects. Moreover, the 
regulatory bodies decided that to protect the privacy of the participants in anti-HIV 
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In the aftermath of the SAM case, clinical research in India is still governed 
under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. However, an amended Schedule Y has 
introduced the requirement to make an audio-video recording (hereafter AVR) of 
informed consent mandatory for vulnerable subjects. Some guidelines were released 
by the CDSCO on how AVR is to be done in order to comply with rules regarding 
privacy and confidentiality of the research subjects.
54
 However, there is ambiguity 
surrounding the vetting of the consent tapes and the definition of vulnerable subjects. 
No strict penalties have been introduced for the violation of ethical guidelines during 
the conduct of research, not even for the violation of informed consent. Post the 
SAM case, new regulations pertaining to the conduct of trials were released, which 
led to a brief lull and a negative impact on the growth of the clinical research 
industry.
55
 But as of 2017, commentators suggest that the period of regulatory 
uncertainty is over and the environment is once again conducive for the conduct of 
clinical research. Nonetheless, some commentators are cautious about this optimism 
as they warn against the overselling of the “hyped potential”
56
 of the Indian market. 
Some advise that the future of trials should be about “human protection” and not just 
about attracting more research sponsors to India.
57
  
1.3. The Inquiry in Context 
Given this background, one could make a long list of issues that merit scholarly 
inquiry. However, inadequate informed consent procedures were at the heart of the 
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series of unethical trials that led to the SAM case. Although this case prompted major 
changes in the clinical research regulation in India, it had some flawed premises and 
generalisations. The petitioners in the SAM case made no distinctions and termed all 
foreign sponsored trials conducted in India as “guinea-pig” trials that have no respect 
for participant rights.
58
 This led to notoriety for the clinical research industry. The 
media reports also lacked a nuanced approach to debate. All this led to the 
condemnation of GCTs, a subject that has been discussed in numerous books, papers, 
and articles as a phenomenon that is inherently exploitative.
59
 However, one article 
stands out for its careful consideration in addressing the globalisation of biomedical 
trials. Lang and Siribaddana lay out multiple reasons why such globalisation is 
necessary.
60
 They note that there is an under-representation of populations of 
developing countries in clinical research. They also note that research sites in 
developing countries benefit extensively from externally sponsored trials in terms of 
capacity development and much-needed investment. They stress the need for newer 
and different approaches to tackling diseases and health issues particularly in low-
income settings.  
Lang and Siribaddana take due note of the possibility of exploitation of 
vulnerable population groups in developing countries. Even so, they think that such a 
possibility for exploitation can be reduced if the trials in developing countries 
contribute to the development of clinical trial research methodology by having trial 
operations that are specific to the risk and complexity of each trial.
61
 Such nuance is 
lacking in much of the literature on informed consent in developing countries, as 
conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and poor health care are usually the starting point 
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for discussion. In order to adopt a nuanced approach and to find newer ways to 
improve the process of informed consent, it is important to understand the 
perspectives of different stakeholders involved in the process.  
 One must bear in mind that in between the interim Supreme Court orders on 
the SAM case and the new regulations released by the CDSCO, there was a period of 
uncertainty in the regulatory infrastructure related to clinical trials. This period lasted 
about two years and led to a significant decrease in clinical trials in India.
62
 This was 
detrimental to the growth of the clinical research capacity of the country. To put this 
into perspective, India spends less than 3% of its GDP on health (it rose from 1.1. to 
2.5% in the 2017 annual budget).
63
 This leaves very little for spending on health and 
clinical research. Investment by foreign sponsors could provide the necessary funds 
to sustain and promote biomedical research in the country. Certainly, such promotion 
should not come at the cost of lives and health of Indian citizens. This is why 
biomedical research ethics and stringent regulations are important. But despite the 
fact that the Supreme Court issued bona fide interim orders based on the, somewhat 
broad, claims made by petitioners in the SAM case, it is important that we at least 
attempt to determine the precision of those claims. This is why the views of the 
practitioners are central to this thesis. 
Furthermore, examples of unethical trials from India, which I will discuss in 
the next chapter, reveal that while there have been problems with the informed 
consent procedures, these have not usually given rise to formal legal action. 
Nevertheless, informed consent is often regarded as not merely an ethical necessity 
but also a legal one. Although informed consent is not the only requirement to make 
clinical research ethical, it has a status akin to a non-derogable right in international 
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 Yet, despite the large academic literature surrounding informed consent, it 
remains an enigma, the practice of which rarely lives up to its theory.  
 Albeit there are rules pertaining to informed consent in the form of statutory 
and ethical guidelines, the biggest question that remains unanswered is why these 
rules are sometimes disregarded or unenforced. Is the problem as simple as lax 
enforcement of rules or are there deeper issues underlying the attitude towards 
informed consent? As noted above, after conducting my fieldwork and having 
completed my literature review, I come to the conclusion that informed consent is 
mostly viewed as a procedural necessity and practitioners barely think about what the 
process purports to achieve. The question of informed consent then is not just about 
the ethics or law; it is about the individual’s motivation to fulfil its requirements. 
However, in reaching this conclusion I went through a systematic research process. 
The following section will outline the structure and the research process that went 
into addressing the research question as outlined in Section 1. 
1.4.  Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 2 contextualises the thesis within the larger debates on globalisation of 
clinical research. The chapter is supplemental to the central argument of this thesis, 
but it does the important job of placing the content of this thesis within a global 
context.  
Chapter 3 is divided into two parts. Part 1 defines the idea of informed consent (IC) 
in research. It gives a brief history of IC, and outlines the differences between the 
research and the treatment context. It goes on to give a brief conceptual framework 
of IC (i.e., the three essentials as legally and ethically understood by outlining the 
theoretical consensus on what voluntariness, information, and capacity entails). Part 
2 describes how this conceptual framework is transplanted into the larger contextual 
setting of India. It looks at what IC looks like within the Indian context and what 
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problems regarding informed consent have arisen in the past. It uses some examples 
of unethical trials cited in the SAM case to discuss how these examples reflect the 
differences between informed consent in academic literature and the clinical research 
practice in India. This chapter ends on the note that the elucidation of consent 
operating within the Indian context will not be complete till we take account of law’s 
role in regulating informed consent as well as the limitations of law in regulating this 
field.  
Chapter 4 is divided into three parts. Part 1 talks about the law of informed consent 
in India. The focus is on the treatment context since the legal doctrine on informed 
consent has been shaped around it. It looks at how India borrows IC law from other 
common law jurisdictions and employs socio-economic reasoning to choose between 
standards. It shows how the legal standards set in the treatment context would not be 
conducive to clinical research settings. Part 2 looks at the IC law within the research 
context. In the absence of an established legal doctrine specific to the research 
context, it looks at the possible legal avenues under which a claim for lack of IC in 
research can be entertained. It also looks at how the law in other common law 
countries has developed around IC in clinical research, and how similar cases could 
be dealt with by the Indian courts. Part 3 highlights the limits of the law in dealing 
with IC as a process. It talks about legalism as a potential problem which elevates the 
legal standards to the level of ethical standards, thereby adding to the apathy towards 
the purpose of informed consent. The chapter ends by highlighting the need for 
empirical data to look at how IC translates to real clinical research practice and to 
inquire if legalism is prevalent in the Indian clinical research spectrum. It places 
emphasis on the fact that the legal and ethical frameworks give a partial 
understanding of informed consent within any given context. The perceptions of 
stakeholders involved in the process are crucial not only to gathering a more 
comprehensive contextual understanding but also to formulate any prescriptive 
methods to better the IC procedures.  
Chapter 5 describes the research methodology chosen for the empirical component 
of the thesis. It leads the reader through the step-by-step process of collecting, 
33 
 
organising, coding, and analysing the perspectives of various stakeholders involved 
with clinical research in India.   
Chapters 6 and 7 enumerate the research findings under five themes; these include 
the three essentials of informed consent - voluntariness, information disclosure, and 
capacity (in chapter 6) - and supplementary themes on the justifications for informed 
consent and the role of law and ethics (in chapter 7). The analysis is presented 
alongside the research findings with theoretical, doctrinal, and empirical works on 
informed consent pitched against the views of the stakeholders.  
Chapter 8 contains a reflective analysis and creates a grounded proposition based on 
the research findings which suggest that, amongst the stakeholders involved in 
acquiring consent in India, there is a degree of apathy towards the process of 
informed consent. In response to this, I suggest the use of incentives and nudging in 
addition to the more traditional forms of regulating human conduct like clearer laws, 
stronger enforcement, rigorous ethics training, and better oversight of IC procedures.  
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CONTEXTUALISING THE THESIS 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter places the thesis within the larger context of clinical research in 
developing countries. This chapter, although important to grasp the bigger picture, is 
supplementary to the central argument of the thesis which focuses on a much 
narrower research question, that is, on the interactions between the principle, 
doctrine, and practice of informed consent within the Indian clinical research context. 
Nevertheless, a more general contextualisation is warranted to understand the place 
of this thesis within the larger debates on globalisation of clinical research.  
The chapter begins by detailing the problems that arose when global 
pharmaceutical corporations started moving their clinical trials from the global north 
to the global south. It then elaborates upon the global responses to these problems in 
the form of additions made to the existing international normative instruments on 
human subject research. The chapter ends by reiterating the scope of the thesis and 
positioning it within a global context.  
2.1. Clinical Research in the Global South 
Globalization of clinical research has arisen for many reasons, but chiefly due to the 
need for quicker and economically efficient studies.
1
 Globalisation has enabled the 
conduct of multinational studies with sponsors, investigators, and participants spread 
across different locations around the world. A 2014 study analysing the geographic 
distribution of multinational trials found that globalisation of trials started its slow 
and steady rise around the 1980s.
2
 Although Europe with a 58.1% share in 
multinational trials and North America with 18.5% were revealed to be the dominant 
players in terms of participation in such trials, the study showed a marked increase in 
trials conducted in the non-traditional markets of Latin America (from 2.5 in the 
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1990s to 5.3% in 2014) and Asia (from 4.3% to 12.1%).
3
  
 The increase in multisite trials in non-traditional markets, particularly in 
developing countries, has led to numerous instances that have called the ethics of 
such trials into question.
4
 For instance, during the Nevirapine (anti-transmission HIV 
drug) clinical trials conducted in Uganda between 1997 and 2003, and sponsored by 
Boehringer Inglheim, the investigators allegedly failed to obtain the consent of 
participants regarding changes in the design of the study and also administered 
incorrect doses of the drug.
5
 In Hyderabad, India during the 2003 trials of the anti-
clotting drug Streptokinase, it was alleged that the subjects were uninformed of their 
participation in the trial and the mandatory regulatory permissions were not taken by 
the multinational sponsors.
6
 The 1996 Trovaflaxin (Trovan for meningococcal 
meningitis) trials by Pfizer in Nigeria, during the course of which 11 children died 
and many others were left disabled,
7
 also garnered much scholarly and media 
attention.
8
 The survivors of the Trovan trials brought four law suits against Pfizer in 
the US alleging that the trials were done without ethical approval, without informed 
consent of the guardians of the children, and without due standard of care.
9
 Three of 
these lawsuits were dismissed on procedural grounds
10
 and Pfizer eventually settled 
the rest out-of-court.
11
 The DART trials conducted in Uganda, Ivory Coast, and 
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Zimbabwe in 2003 were meant to compare the different methods to administer the 
anti-retroviral therapy for the treatment of HIV. These trials highlighted the unethical 
conduct of the researchers when it was found that the patients on the less successful 
treatment arm were not switched back to the successful one despite a regulatory body 
associating the former with a higher risk of disease.
12
  
But perhaps the most prominent trials that started the international discourse 
on the ethics of clinical research in developing countries were the AZT trials. A 
number of controversies came to be associated with the placebo-controlled AZT 
trials conducted in the 1990s across 15 sites including Thailand, Dominican 
Republic, and 9 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
13
 Due permissions and approvals 
were taken in each of the trial sites before the commencement of the trials. Trials for 
a short-duration regimen of the AZT drug were conducted on pregnant women who 
were seropositive for HIV and were randomized so that the women received either 
AZT or a placebo in the final weeks of pregnancy and during labour. It must be noted 
that the AZT drug with a successfully trialled and proven 076 regimen was already 
considered the de facto standard of care in most developed countries. These placebo-
controlled trials were conducted to assess a modified regimen of 076 which would be 
of shorter duration, simpler, similarly effective, more cost-effective, and therefore, 
affordable in developing countries.  
Being a placebo-controlled trial, neither the pregnant woman nor any 
clinician was aware of what each woman was receiving. The woman’s new-born was 
tested several times for HIV over a period of 18 months. New mothers in some of the 
trials were instructed not to breastfeed prior to testing the new-borns since breast 
milk can also transmit the virus. This was done to reduce cases of HIV transmission 
that had the possibility to render the trials inconclusive. The participants received 
free medical care for the entire period of the study. But after the completion of the 
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The AZT trials faced enormous scholarly backlash.
15
 Some critics questioned 
the procedure for recruiting trial participants at the research sites.
16
 They argued that 
widespread poverty, illiteracy, and poor access to health care in most of the research 
sites meant that for most participants the only way to get any medical care was to 
enrol in the trial.
17
 Others raised the issue of the ultimate beneficiaries of these trials, 
as the high cost of the approved drug was likely to preclude the population of these 
countries from accessing the benefits of the drug.
18
 Some considered the design of 
placebo-controlled trials as contrary to international human rights instruments that 
require every patient to receive the best available medical care.
19
 A different critique 
invoked the international guidelines on placebo-controlled trials and argued that 
placebo trials were discouraged where effective therapies existed, and because 
proven therapies existed there was no need to conduct the AZT trials.
20
 The 
supporters of the AZT trials, however, asserted that no existing therapies were sold 
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The articles critiquing the AZT trials made international headlines
22
 and as 
more people began writing about the controversy, comparisons began being drawn 
between the AZT trials and the notorious Nuremberg and Tuskegee trials.
23
 With 
such dire comparisons, the Gambian government (one of the 9 sub-Saharan research 
sites) responded by asserting that: 
Research ethics committees in developing countries can learn from 
debates elsewhere. However, if commentators from affluent societies 
dismiss the decisions of these local committees as unethical the 
developing world will make the justifiable charge of ethical 
imperialism. Ethics cannot be owned by affluent countries alone. 
Ethics committees such as The Gambia's are just as capable of 




On the heels of the controversies surrounding the AZT trials, bioethicists and 
researchers involved in the working groups and committees of the organisations 
governing research updated the international research ethics guidelines and other 
international normative instruments guiding human subject research. Due focus came 
to be placed on multinational trials with developing countries as partners. In the next 
section I will look at how the global clinical research community responded to the 
many instances of unethical research being conducted in developing countries.  
2.2. Global response to off-shoring of clinical trials  
Born from the history of abuses in human subject research,
25
 The Declaration of 
Helsinki (DoH), originally issued by the World Medical Association (WMA) in 
1964,
26
 has undergone seven revisions with the most recent one in 2013. With every 
revision of the Declaration newer ethical obligations were added depending on the 
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technological and methodological advancements in biomedical research. Despite it 
not being a legally binding instrument, the DoH is considered the most influential 
instrument in biomedical research ethics alongside the Nuremberg Code (which is 
discussed in the next Chapter). The first three revisions to the DoH were general 
revisions, but the fourth revision in 1996 was undertaken in the aftermath of the AZT 
trial controversy.  
 It must also be noted that a few years before the AZT controversy in 1993, 
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), which 
was established jointly by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1949, 
released the updated International Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research 
Involving Humans (hereafter CIOMS guidelines).
27
 These guidelines stated that “the 
ethical standards applied [in other countries] should be no less exacting than they 
would be in the case of research carried out in [sponsoring or trial initiating] 
country”
28
 Critics of the AZT trials asserted that since the AZT 076 regimen was the 
de facto standard of care in the developed countries it ought to have been the 
standard of care given to trial participants in the AZT trials in the low and middle 
income research sites. They argued that since the trial sponsors neglected to afford 
the participants on placebo the best proven standard of care (as opposed to the best 
available)
29
, they had violated the CIOMS ethical guidelines.
30
  
The WMA took note of this criticism and in its fourth revision in 1996 added 
the phrase “[t]his does not exclude the use of inert placebo in studies where no 
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proven diagnostic or therapeutic method exists” to Article II.3 of DoH that said “[i]n 
any medical study, every patient - including those of a control group, if any - should 
be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.” However, this 
addition was not acceptable to some states and the US Food and Drug 
Administration, for example, has not accepted the changes, continuing to refer to the 
previous versions of DoH in its reports.
31
   
With calls to revise the Declaration again,
32
 the fifth revision in 2000, along 
with other structural changes and additions,
33
 introduced the idea of distributive 
justice by shifting the scope from the individual to the community on the whole. The 
new Article 19 stated that “research is only justified if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the populations in which the research is carried out stand to benefit 
from the results of the research”. Article 29 stated “[t]he benefits, risks, burdens and 
effectiveness of a new method should be tested against those of the best current 
prophylactic, diagnostic, and therapeutic methods. This does not exclude the use of 
placebo, or no treatment, in studies where no proven prophylactic, diagnostic or 
therapeutic method exists” [my emphasis]. Since discussions on the ethics of 
placebo-controlled trials are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is sufficient to say that 
scholars have usually interpreted this Article depending on whichever ethical 
position they support on placebo-controlled trials.
34
 In the same revision, Article 30 
of the DoH courted further controversy when it introduced the idea of post-trial 
access to the trial drugs to the research participants. It said that “[a]t the conclusion 
of the study, every patient entered into the study should be assured of access to the 
best proven prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic methods identified by the 
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study.” Critics thought that this placed an unfair burden on the research sponsors, 
while the supporters argued that trial subjects were owed their dues because 
participants are usually worse off after a trial than they were before.
35
  
 Even after the new additions the debates regarding these were far from 
settled.
36
 Notes of clarification were added to Articles 29 and 30 in 2002 and 2004 
respectively. The WMA resignedly (and allegedly under pressure from the US)
37
 
took a middle ground on placebos and outlined circumstances under which they 
would be ethically acceptable.
38
 The clarification on the issue of post-trial care came 
as something that ought to be considered and not an absolute requirement from the 
sponsors. Despite these clarifications the debates on these two paragraphs (now 
paragraphs 33 and 34 in the latest version of the DoH) raged on.
39
  
  But the most important change, at least for the purposes of this thesis, brought 
about in the fifth revision of the DoH, was the addition of Paragraph 9, which reads:  
Research investigators should be aware of the ethical, legal and 
regulatory requirements for research on subjects in their own 
countries as well as applicable international requirements. No national 
ethical, legal or regulatory requirement should be allowed to reduce or 
eliminate any of the protections for human subjects set forth in this 
Declaration. 
To understand its importance this paragraph must be distinguished from the 
paragraph that was included in all the previous versions of the DoH, the previous 
versions said: 
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It must be stressed that the standards as drafted are only a guide to 
physicians all over the world. Physicians are not relieved from 
criminal, civil and ethical responsibilities under the laws of their own 
countries. [My emphasis] 
While the framers previously regarded the DoH as a guidance document which could 
not supersede national regulations, the revision claimed the DoH to be an authority 
on the minimum set of international standards that are binding on research 
investigators worldwide. With the addition of this paragraph, the WMA and the 
revisers of the DoH have attempted to convert an ethical code into (soft) law, their 
intent belying their subsequent statement on the relationship between law and ethics: 
In some cases the law mandates unethical conduct. The fact that a 
physician has complied with the law does not necessarily mean that 
the physician has acted ethically. When the law is in conflict with 
medical ethics, physicians should work to change the law. In 




Perhaps not much must be read into the phrasing of Paragraph 9 (Para 10 in the latest 
version) of the DoH, but it does speak to the complicated relationship between law 
and ethics. This relationship is explored in detail for the principle and doctrine of 
informed consent in this thesis. Law and ethics are quite distinct, although 
interconnected, fields. Paragraph 9 shows that the revisers of the DoH forgot these 
differences when they reframed the status of DoH as binding upon (instead of merely 
guiding) research investigators world over.   
 In the most recent (seventh) revision to the DoH in 2013, the revisers (i.e. the 
revision committee members of the World Medical Association)
41
 added other 
provisions relevant to clinical research in developing countries. For the first time, the 
DoH included the requirement for research participants who are injured during the 
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course of a trial to be treated and compensated.
42
 The new version also calls for 
greater protection of vulnerable groups, increased measures to inform trial 
participants of the results of the study, and access to any beneficial treatments that 
emerge from the research studies.  
 The multiple revisions of the DoH have led some to question the relevance of 
the Declaration.
43
 After the 2000 revision, the US refused to accept any further 
revisions of the DoH and continues to cite the 1989 version in its reports. In 2006 it 
announced that it would eliminate all references to the Declaration. Good to its word, 
the US FDA issued a formal rule that replaced the DoH with Good Clinical Practices 
(GCP) in 2008.
44
 GCP guidelines were a product of harmonisation of regulatory 
requirements between EU, Japan, and the US. The International Council for 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use 
(ICH) is a project that brings together the regulatory authorities of the three countries 
and experts from the pharmaceutical industry in the three regions to discuss scientific 
and technical aspects of pharmaceutical product registration. GCP is the international 
quality standard that focuses on detailing the procedure of a clinical study, including 
such details as quality standards on clinical protocol, ethical reviews, training, record 
keeping, and trial facilities including computers and software. It also provides for 
quality assurance and inspections to ensure that these standards are achieved.  
Scholars have argued that the GCP is a less morally authoritative document 
than the DoH because it remains silent on issues like restrictions on placebo, post-
trial access to treatment, benefit of populations of research sites, public disclosure of 
study design, publication of negative results, and disclosure of conflict of interest.
45
 
However, the criticism seems a bit unfair as the document is not meant to merely 
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communicate ethical principles but to lay down procedures pertaining to modalities 
involved in clinical research and to harmonize regulatory requirements. These 
modalities are derived from the ethical principles, for instance, the GCP standards on 
informed consent and responsibilities of investigators are firmly rooted in ethical 
principles. In fact the GCP standards seem to have more acceptances into national 
regulatory systems than the DoH, which is mostly referred to as the influence behind 
the national ethical guidelines along with the Nuremberg Code. The GCP standards 
have been adopted (with or without minor revisions) by many regulatory authorities 
in the world (including India’s CDSCO).
46
 This is also the case because both the US 
and EU expect the clinical trial data received from trial sites in third countries to 
abide by the GCP and Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) standards for market 
authorisation of the trialled products.  
In the European Union (EU), the requirements for the conduct of clinical 
trials, including GCP and GMP and their inspections, were implemented in the GCP 
Directive (Directive 2005/28/EC) and the Clinical Trial Directive (Directive 
2001/20/EC, hereafter CTD) which was replaced by the Clinical Trial Regulation 
(CTR) in 2014.
47
 The CTR provides that clinical trials conducted in third countries 
that provide data used in an application for market authorisation in the EU are 
subject to standards (like GCP and GMP) that are equivalent to (which is notably 




The CIOMS guidelines have also undergone revisions since they first came 
out in 1982. Revisions were made in 1993, 2002 and, most recently in 2016. The 
2016 revisions pertaining to developing countries include the obligation upon 
research sponsors to make available the interventions that are proven to be effective 
in research as part of a more general obligation to care for research participants’ 
health needs (Guideline 6). This general obligation also requires that the researchers 
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and sponsors make adequate provisions to transition participants who need treatment 
after their participation in research to appropriate health care services.
49
 
But perhaps the most important change made to the Guidelines was that the 
CIOMS finally recognised that:  
Low-resource settings should not be interpreted narrowly as low-
resource countries. These settings might also exist in middle- and 
high- income countries. Moreover, a setting can change over time and 
no longer be considered low-resource.
50
  
This guideline particularly applies to the discussions and underlying ethos of this 
thesis. The thesis recognises that some aspects of the clinical research industry in 
India mirror those of high-income countries, while some aspects are similar to low-
resource settings. The ethical problems with comprehension, reduced autonomy, 
healthy volunteers in need of money, etc., faced by research participants and research 
investigators while dealing with informed consent in India have been similar to (if 
not entirely the same) to those faced by these stakeholders in high income countries. 
Therefore, a conscious decision underlies the analytical framework chosen for this 
thesis, which excludes critical literature on off-shoring of clinical research to the 
global south. I will discuss these exclusions and explain the scope of this thesis in the 
next section. 
2.3.  Scope of the thesis: how it fits in the global and what it excludes 
Having outlined the more general, more global, background, it is important to note 
that the thesis engages with a more limited question, namely: What are the 
differences between informed consent as outlined in the academic literature and 
regulatory framework and informed consent as understood by practitioners involved 
in human subject research in India?  
The question evidently suggests the focal point of the thesis is informed 
consent and that is why most generic debates on clinical research in developing 
countries or globally have been kept outside the scope of this thesis. If one merely 
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skims through the literature on consent, one would find that informed consent is a 
fairly large topic in and by itself, and it has taken some discipline to contain the 
subject matter of this thesis. The focus is solely on informed consent - the principle, 
the doctrine, and the practice of it within a given context. And when I use the word 
context, I mean the clinical research context in India and not just any developing 
country context. This is because I am wary of generalising the findings of this thesis 
to countries that are economically, socially, or politically similar to India. Moreover, 
some of the generic literature on “informed consent in developing countries” has 
been used to contrast the findings from this thesis as a cautionary tale against 
generalisations pertaining to the global south.  
There are many interesting themes and modes of analysis that this thesis 
could have explored and used, but owing to space constraints some strategic choices 
had to be made. To keep the thesis focused on informed consent every effort has 
been made to eliminate discussions not relevant to informed consent. Although many 
interesting themes within informed consent were also left unexplored, there were a 
few outside of it, existing on the periphery, which need to be mentioned to show how 
this thesis fits within the larger debates. 
2.3.1. On the periphery  
Some peripheral themes inform the global debates that take place around ethical 
issues in clinical research. The work done in this thesis could potentially serve as a 
footnote in the larger texts on the following:   
i) Critical scholarship 
The literature on the political economy of clinical trials has been explicit about the 
links between pharmaceutical neoliberalism
51
 and the recruitment of vulnerable 
population groups into potentially exploitative regimes of for-profit 
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 Fisher holds that the practice of contract research, in which an 
individual medical practitioner or an organisation takes on trial contracts on behalf of 
a pharmaceutical corporation, is directly motivated by the effects of neo-liberal 
reform on the health care system as a whole.
53
 Contractual trial work is often an 
alternative form of income for medical practitioners with diminishing sources of 
revenue. This is fairly common in the US where uninsured or underinsured patients 
often represent one variety of high-risk and casual labour amongst other vulnerable 




The pharmaceutical industry has also had to work hard to maximise the 
advantages that they receive from the neoliberal health reforms of decentralisation 
and privatisation. Cooper takes note of the routine complaints by the pharmaceutical 
industry about the high costs of contract work in US and Europe, the time spent in 
recruiting suitable participants, the high drop-out rates, lack of clinical readability, 
and non-compliance.
55
 She comments that the neo-liberal hallmarking of the de-
collectivization of labour and flexibilities of sub-contracting have ironically also 
posed the problem of excessive flexibility and fewer ways of confining it. This is 
why even when the pharmaceutical industry has intensified its outsourcing contracts 
(with medical practitioners and CROs) in the US and Europe, the drive to push 
clinical trials offshore is perhaps a way of resolving the dilemma of excessive 
reliance on unpredictable casual labour in the more advanced economies.
56
 As it is, 
the “ready-to-recruit”
57
 population groups in developing countries seem to come at a 
lesser political and economic cost than those in developed ones.
58
     
For Petryna, the trial work outsourced to CROs in developing countries is 
                                                          
52
 K. Sunder Rajan, Experimental Values: Indian Clinical Trials and Surplus Health, NEW LEFT 
REVIEW, Vol. 45, (2007).  
53
 Fisher (2007), supra note 51.  
54
 M. Shuchman, Commercializing clinical trials risks and benefits of the CRO boom, THE NEW 
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, Vol. 357, Issue No.14, (2007), pp. 1365-1368. 
55
 M. Cooper, Experimental Labour – Offshoring clinical trials to China, East Asian Science, 




 J. A. Fisher, “Ready-to-Recruit” or “Ready-to-Consent” Populations?: Informed Consent and the 
Limits of Subject Autonomy, QUALITATIVE INQUIRY, Vol. 13, Issue No. 6, (2007) 
58
 Cooper (2008), supra note 55. See generally, J. A. FISHER, MEDICAL RESEARCH FOR HIRE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PHARMACEUTICAL CLINICAL TRIALS, (Rutgers University Press, 2009).  
48 
 
problematic for the “ethical variability” approach employed in their ethical reviews. 
She says:  
The new clinical trial environments that CROs help to tailor are 
adaptable, mobile and to some extent, parasitic…Ethics and method 
are modified to fit the local context and experimental data required. 
And this ‘ethical variability’ becomes the core value and a presumed 
course of action in the global testing of pharmaceuticals.
59
 
The CROs responsible for recruiting participants for multisite trials are often accused 
of utilizing variability and uncertainty in the enactment and execution of laws to 
become “data production sweatshops”
60
 for the pharmaceutical industry. In fact 
ethical reviews are generally lamented across the political economy scholarship for:  
[T]he narrow focus on individual “autonomy” and choice” and the 
bureaucratization of ethical review, [due to which] structural 
inequalities tend to fall beyond the purview of ethical scrutiny.
61
  
Petryna's groundbreaking anthropological work on the outsourcing of clinical 
research to CROs showed that situations of health crisis could turn into opportunities 
for pharmaceutical companies to bypass regulatory systems and gain access to 
research participants whose lack of treatment history (along with lack of education 
and resources) makes them more likely to produce “cleaner results”.
62
  
Sunder Rajan, who theorises extensively from his anthropological work in 
India, looks at GCTs through the lens of appropriation and exploitation of bodily 
potential by global capital. He argues that multisite trials conducted on poorly 
informed vulnerable population groups in India could “legitimately be seen as 
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Western exploitation of Indian bodies”.
63
 He asserts that the global proliferation of 
pharmaceuticals has restructured the economic value of health. Patients who are seen 
as possible consumers of newer therapies and treatments are exploited for their 
“surplus health”, meaning that their health is no longer the basis for a workforce but 
rather for pharmaceutical capital.  
This thesis has some data that could interest some critical scholars who work 
on clinical research in India. In the conclusion of the thesis, when talking about 
issues beyond informed consent, I show how some findings of this thesis can be 
interpreted within different frameworks. However, it is important to understand that 
this thesis is not necessarily concerned with globalised clinical research; the trials 
conducted by some investigators interviewed in this thesis were entirely home-grown 
trials (with no external sponsors or collaborators). The trial participants interviewed 
for this research were also appearing for Indian trials and not for the multinational 
ones. To put it simply, this thesis is not about ‘globalised clinical research’ but about 
‘clinical research in India’, which includes some multinational trials. For this reason 
most critical scholarship on globalised clinical research has been kept outside the 
scope of this thesis.  
ii) Wider Clinical Research Ethics  
There are many other ethical issues in clinical research in developing countries, like 
those of placebo-controlled trials, ethical variability in ethical reviews, post-trial 
access to trialled and proven drug, publication of negative results, etc., all of which 
are as equally important as questions of informed consent. Yet these have been left 
outside the scope of the thesis because they are independent issues; the discussions 
on these do not have much bearing upon the questions on informed consent that this 
thesis seeks to address. As noted in the introductory chapter, in order to understand 
the reasons why a series of unethical trials with problematic informed consent 
procedures have taken place in India in the past few years, the thesis focuses at the 
heart of the problem. The intention here is to identify the normative content of 
informed consent and to look at how the practice of it in India deviates or matches 
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our theoretical understandings of consent. Moreover, these broader issues in clinical 
research in developing countries are almost entirely ethical in nature. Informed 
consent, on the other hand, traverses three domains - that of ethics, law, and practice 
- and that makes it arguably the most contentious topic in the Medical Law and 
Ethics literature.  
iii) International Normative Instruments  
This thesis predominantly looks at the legal doctrine of informed consent as it 
developed through case law. It forgoes lengthy discussions on international 
normative instruments on clinical research like the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration 
of Helsinki, CIOMS guidelines, ICH GCP and GMP standards, and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. This, however, does not imply that the 
international normative instruments have had no impact on the development of the 
legal doctrine of informed consent in clinical research, particularly in India. In fact 
the developments and updates in the international normative instruments have been 
reflected in the regulatory requirements and the ethical guidelines pertaining to 
human subject research in India. 
 Other than the internationally mandated requirement of informed consent and 
its usual requirements reflected in the Indian regulatory framework, Paragraph 15 of 
the Declaration of Helsinki and Guideline 14 of the CIOMS Guidelines also require 
research participants to be given appropriate compensation for trial-related harm. 
This requirement is now treated as a legal mandate in Schedule Y of the Indian 
Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.
64
 The Rules place the responsibility upon the trial 
investigator to inform the trial participants of their right and on the procedure to 
receive compensation upon injury or death. This is now treated as an essential 
informational requirement for the process of informed consent. While the scope of 
trial-related harms has not been specified in either the Declaration of Helsinki or the 
Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, it has been given some substance in Guideline 14 
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of CIOMS and Section 2.6 of ICMR Guidelines
65
 as physical, psychological, legal, 
economic, or social harms that occur as a consequence of interventions performed 
solely to accomplish the purposes of research.
66
 The Indian law does not define the 
scope of harm (which is problematic for fixing liabilities) but mention of the 
disclosure of compensation during the informed consent process shows that it is 
responsive to updates in the international normative instruments on clinical research.  
 Nevertheless, this thesis is not concerned with detailing the legal framework 
of informed consent or how international normative instruments have impacted the 
Indian regulatory requirements on informed consent. Such information is easily 
available
67
 and adds little to the existing knowledge on informed consent.
68
 This 
thesis looks at all legal avenues that make it possible to bring a claim of lack of 
informed consent in India. Given the jurisdiction-specific nature of this research it 
was important to discuss the law of informed consent as applicable to India, the 
lacunae therein, and the manner in which aggrieved parties could claim sufficient 
remedy for lack of informed consent in research. In Chapter 4 the thesis shows an 
absence of a well-defined legal doctrine to deal with a lack of informed consent in 
research in India. Chapter 4 demonstrates that a legal doctrine is in its early stage of 
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DETERMINATION, DIGNITY AND END-OF-LIFE CARE, (Brill: Leiden, The Netherlands, 2011); A. M. 
Capron, Where Did Informed Consent for Research Come From?, THE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE 
& ETHICS, Vol. 46, Issue No. 1, pp. 12-29; J. F. Merz, The Nuremberg Code and Informed Consent 
for Research, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. 319, Issue No. 1, (2018), pp. 85-
86; J. P. Vandenbroucke & J. Olsen, Informed Consent and the New EU Regulation on Data 
Protection, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, Vol. 42, Issue No. 6, (2013); See also A. 
Krajewska, International Biomedical Law in Search for its Normative Status, Revista de Derecho y 
Genoma Humano [Law and the Human Genome Review], Vol. 36 , (2012), pp. 121-146; P. G. 
Moreno & Y. Joly, Informed consent in International Normative Texts and Biobanking Policies, 
MEDICAL LAW INTERNATIONAL, Vol. 15, Issue No. 4, (2015). 
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 In order to add something new and of value to the academic literature on informed consent this 
thesis attempts to be less descriptive and more analytical. The analytical framework has been adopted 
to best tell the story of the place of informed consent within India’s clinical research paradigm. 
Furthermore, in terms of the normative impact of research a discussion on “which legal position must 
the Indian courts take on informed consent” seems to be greater than discussing “the role of 
international normative instruments on Indian regulatory system” as issues in clinical research in India 
have recently reached Indian courts and there is lack of precedent on such issues.   
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development by charting the Anglo-American case law on informed consent in 
clinical research. This is done to show possible recourse for an Indian court when 
handling a claim arising out of a lack of informed consent in research given that 
Indian courts often rely on Anglo-American precedents to determine legal positions.  
Some might critique the reliance on Anglo-American case law for 
determining cases in India owing to the differences in health care and clinical 
research systems between India and the US/UK. But such critique overlooks the fact 
that courts determine when informed consent was violated given certain 
circumstances, as in when a person’s autonomy, bodily integrity, and dignity were 
violated owing to what action or omission of a clinical researcher (or sponsor) and 
what is owed to the aggrieved party. How advanced or poor a health care or clinical 
research system is, is irrelevant to determining when informed consent is deemed to 
be violated (see further discussion in Chapter 4). Furthermore, despite the social, 
economic, and political conditions of other common law countries being different 
than India, Indian courts have often cited foreign legal precedents while pronouncing 
progressive decisions on Constitutional and fundamental rights.
69
 Social, political, 
and economic conditions have almost always been different in India than in countries 
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 Indian courts have frequently cited decisions from other common law jurisdictions, increasingly so 
from the US than from the UK, when domestic legal position has been unclear. For instance, when the 
Supreme Court of India dealt with a case [Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963) A.I.R. S.C. 
1295] involving unauthorized police surveillance, based on the facts presented, it held that such 
surveillance was a violation of the right to privacy. While upholding this right, the Supreme Court 
relied on many decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court [Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)]. The political and social 
conditions in India were very different than those in the US at that time and privacy is understood 
differently in India than elsewhere owing to community-oriented norms. Nonetheless the Court relied 
on these US precedents to uphold a fundamental right of the citizens. In another case involving 
freedom of the press [Bennett & Coleman v. Union of India, A.I.R. S.C. 106 (1973)] the Indian 
Supreme Court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kovacs v. Cooper [336 U.S. 77 (1949)] 
despite the differences in the political contexts in the two countries as India was on the brink of an 
Emergency at the time. And this is arguably not one of the progressive decisions that I talk about in 
the text, but for the sake of argument, the Indian Supreme Court relied on the US cases of Furman v. 
Georgia, Arnold v. Georgia, and Proffitt v. Florida [408 U.S. 238 (1972); 224 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1976); 
428 U.S. 242 (1976) respectively] while upholding capital punishment for rarest of the rare cases. 
This despite the fact that Indian religious context does not support capital punishment in any form. 
And most recently the Indian Supreme Court decriminalised homosexuality [in Navtej Singh Johar v. 
Union of India, W.P. (Crimial) No. 76 of 2016] while relying on foreign precedents [Law v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1999 1 S.C.R. 497; Planned Parenthood of South Eastern 
PA. v. Casey, U.S. 833 (1992); Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et 
al, 576 US (2015), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), amongst many others] despite counter 
arguments that Indian society was not ready to accept such changes in sexual norms.   
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whose courts have inspired many legal changes in India.
70
  
Ethical principles like informed consent are fundamental to conducting 
clinical research and protecting the basic rights of a research participant. These rights 
cannot be simply disregarded because a legal doctrine, based on a universal ethical 
principle, was developed in a different society. Naturally the differences in cultural 
and social practices determine how a process, like that of consent, is realised in 
settings like India, and for that I insist on a case-by-case strategy for tackling cases 
arising from a lack of informed consent. But the differences in practices or social 
conditions must not diminish the values that informed consent is in place to uphold.  
2.4. Conclusion  
This chapter touches upon the larger issues surrounding globalisation of clinical 
research, but these have been excluded from the analytical framework that is used to 
answer the principal research question later in the thesis. This chapter explains why 
this was done while simultaneously acknowledging the larger literature on globalised 
clinical research which frames the global background to this thesis.   
The next chapter brings the focus back on the research question and on 
informed consent. To identify the normative content of informed consent, the next 
chapter will discuss the general conceptual framework of informed consent. It will 
then identify how this conceptual framework fits within the Indian context.   
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THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN CONTEXT 
3.0.   Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with the idea of informed consent 
in research. It clarifies the differences between the research and the treatment 
context, gives a brief history of informed consent in research, and elaborates upon 
the essential requirements for consent to be ethically and legally valid. Part 2 shows 
how the conceptual framework fits within the Indian context.  
Part 1. The idea of informed consent in research 
Before we look at what informed consent entails, it is important to understand the 
differences between the treatment and the research context. Doing so will help us 
understand that the process of informed consent varies with the context in which it is 
carried out.  
3.1. Treatment and Research: different contexts 
It is common knowledge that while the treatment context deals with the doctor-
patient relationship, the research context deals with the relationship between a study 
investigator/researcher and the research subject who volunteers to be part of a study. 




In treatment, also referred to as the doctor-patient relationship, the doctor 
owes a primary duty to the patient’s well-being. This duty has been termed “personal 
care”.
2
 The primary obligation of a physician is to provide optimal care to the patient 
in her best interests. But clinical researchers, despite sometimes possessing the best 
intentions towards their research subjects, have different and competing obligations. 
                                                          
1
 The Encyclopaedia of Bioethics notes that the histories of informed consent in research and in 
clinical medicine developed largely as separate pieces in a larger mosaic of biomedical ethics, and that 
these pieces never integrated well despite having developed simultaneously. S. G. POST (ED.), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, Vol. 3 (3
rd
 edn., New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), p. 
1274.  
2
 C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY: NEW EDITION 
(Oxford University Press, 2016), Chapter 3.  
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Their primary obligation is that their study must generate valid data. If the data so 
generated is not valid, there was no need to undertake the study in the first place.
3
 
The source of this obligation lies in the ethical justification of clinical research itself. 
When is it ethically justifiable to put some research subjects at risk of harm in order 
to benefit others? This question opens the floor to a long-standing philosophical 
debate, which is outside the scope of this thesis.
4
 Those who hold a utilitarian 
approach to morality, for example, would (roughly) defend that subjecting 
participants to harm for research purposes is justifiable when it increases the overall 
welfare or happiness of a particular society.
5
  
  Nevertheless, clinical research often involves physicians who act as 
investigators (physician-investigators) and conduct clinical trials to evaluate 
experimental treatments in groups of patients who act as subjects of research 
(patient-subjects). These are the trickier cases for informed consent as the patient-
subjects can expect individualised optimal care from the physician-investigator, 
thereby leading to “therapeutic misconception”. Therapeutic misconception is the 
failure to appreciate that the elements of a particular research design may limit the 
degree of individualised care.
6
 Simply put, it means that there is a possibility that the 
patient-subjects might confuse the goals of research (production of data) with 
                                                          
3
 See D. Schatz, Randomized clinical trials and the problem of suboptimal care: An overview of the 
Controversy, CANCER INVESTIGATION, Vol. 8, (1990), pp. 191–205. Of course, this comes with the 
obligation to not cause harm to the participant, but here I am talking of the primary obligation in terms 
of the object of the activity.   
4
 The literature on this debate is vast. See for example C. Fethe, Beyond voluntary consent: Hans 
Jonas on the moral requirements of human experimentation, JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Vol. 19, 
Issue No. 2, (June, 1993), pp. 99-103; A. Schafer, Experimentation with human subjects: a critique of 
the views of Hans Jonas, JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Vol. 9, Issue No. 2, (June, 1983), pp. 76-9; 
G.O. Schaefer et al., The Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research, THE JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. 302, Issue No. 1, (2009), pp. 67-72; A. L. Caplan, Is there 
an obligation to participate in biomedical research?: The Use of Human Beings in Research, 
PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE, Vol. 28, (1988), pp. 229-248; J. Harris, Scientific research is a moral 
duty, JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Vol. 31, Issue No. 4, (2005), pp. 242-248; R. Rhodes, Rethinking 
Research Ethics, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS, Vol. 5, Issue No. 1, (2005), pp. 7-28.  
5
 F. G. Miller & D. L. Rosenstein, The therapeutic orientation to clinical trials, NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, Vol. 384, Issue No. 14, (2003), pp. 1383–1386. 
6
 P. Appelbaum, et al., The therapeutic misconception: Informed consent in psychiatric research, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, 5, (1982), pp. 319–329. 
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treatment (personal care) and make an uninformed decision.
7
 A situation in which the 
doctor is the investigator, and where the regular patient of this doctor is also a 
research subject, could lead to therapeutic misconception. Unlike a clinical trial 
conducted by clinicians in a research centre or a facility where there is no ongoing 
doctor-patient relationship between the participant and the investigator of the trial, 
this situation creates a more complex ethical relationship. Some scholars opine that 
the therapeutic misconception is often encouraged by ‘a predominant ethical view’ 
that research initiated by physician-investigators should be conducted with 
therapeutic intent.
8
 Nevertheless, it is highly improbable that one can conduct good 
research with a predominant therapeutic intent towards the research subjects. This is 
because to realise the goals of clinical research, the investigator often acts contrary to 
the ‘best interests’ of the subjects by concealing important information, depending on 
the study design. 
The treatment context is vastly different from research because in clinical 
research the need to produce valid data can sometimes override the best interests of 
the subjects. Lidz has employed some usually found features of clinical trials to 
illustrate this point further.
9
 The features employed in his analysis are: 
1) Randomized controlled trials: In such trials, the research subjects (also called 
trial participants) are assigned a research arm randomly. This is done in trials 
where the treatments being randomised are in collective equipoise (which 
means that there is genuine uncertainty in the medical community over which 
treatment is beneficial).
10
 To test which treatment is better, the subjects are 
                                                          
7
 An uninformed decision based on therapeutic misconception can be counteracted to a certain extent 
by clear information dissemination and dialogue between the investigator and the research subject, but 
it is often hard to measure this misconception in real settings. Scholars have opined that there are no 
adequate measures yet to define and study therapeutic misconception in clinical research settings, see 
G. E. Henderson, et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 
PLOS MEDICINE, Vol. 4, Issue No. 11, (2007).  
8
 F. Miller & H. Brody, A critique of clinical equipoise: therapeutic misconception in the ethics of 
clinical trials, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Vol. 33, (2003), pp. 19–28. 
9
 C. W. Lidz, The Therapeutic Misconception and our models of competency and Informed Consent, 
BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW, Vol. 24 (2006), pp. 535–546.  
10
 See generally S. J. L. Edwards, The ethics of randomised controlled trials from the perspectives of 
patients, the public, and healthcare professionals, THE BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, Vol. 317, Issue 
No. 7167, (October 1998), pp. 1209-1212.  
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randomly assigned different treatment arms. This undermines the interest of 
the subject as the subject does not get to choose the arm of the treatment and 
cannot control the potential side effects of the drug that she could have 
managed.
11
 In terms of generating data, randomization is only stopped when 
there is sufficient evidence that one arm of treatment is much superior to the 
other and future health professionals can base treatment decisions on it.   
2) Double-blind clinical trials: In such trials, neither the investigator nor the 
subjects know which subject is going to receive which of the several 
treatments. The essential condition of informed consent, of giving full 
information to the research subject, is violated by the very nature of the trial.    
3) Placebo controlled trials: A placebo is an inactive drug. In such trials, the 
subjects are given either the active drug or a placebo. Placebo controls are 
only used if there is no convincing evidence for the effectiveness of standard 
treatment.
12
 They are widely employed to improve the scientific assessment 
                                                          
11
 Lidz (2006), supra note 9. Lidz writes that some trial participants may have strong preferences for 
the predictable side effects of one medication or another. For instance, “a young single man with an 
active sex life may find impotence a much more troubling side-effect than a woman whose sexuality is 
unaffected by the same medication.” 
12
 The ethics of placebo controlled trials have been a subject of intense scrutiny. The CIOMS 
guidelines lay down that placebo is acceptable “when there is no established effective intervention for 
the condition under study, or when placebo is added on to an established effective intervention...as a 
comparator...if there are compelling scientific reasons for using placebo; and if delaying  or  
withholding  the  established effective  intervention  will  result  in  no  more than a minor increase 
above minimal risk to the participant and risks are minimized, including through the use of effective 
mitigation procedures.” Placebo intervention is also justified in trials of new treatments for conditions 
whose response to both established treatments and placebo is highly variable, for example, anti-
depressants have a high placebo response rate and sometimes there is inconsistent evidence on 
efficacy of such drugs because of it. See E. J. Emanuel & F. G. Miller, The ethics of placebo-
controlled trials-a middle ground, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, Vol. 345, Issue No. 
12, (2001), pp. 915–919; J. Millum & C. Grady, The Ethics of Placebo-controlled Trials: 
Methodological Justifications, CONTEMPORARY CLINICAL TRIALS, Vol. 36, Issue No. 2, (November, 
2013), See also Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, (Geneva, 2016), available at 
http://www.cioms.ch/index.php/12-newsflash/400-cioms-inernational-ethical-guidelines (last accessed 
on June 2, 2018)  
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of studies in depression and other psychological disorders, even though 
medicines for such disorders are widely available.
13
  
The above-mentioned features are pointed out not to insinuate that clinical 
researchers are not inclined to care for the research subjects. Lidz mentioned these 
features in his essay on therapeutic misconception to prove that the “compromises on 
personal care that are built into the design of a clinical trial are an important risk that 




The demarcation between the two contexts is enormously important to 
appreciate that despite the same principle operating in both the settings; the overall 
process significantly varies in both. Most non-therapeutic research involves 
conducting trials on healthy volunteers (who generally receive no direct medical 
benefit); and the risk taken by the research subject is oftentimes much higher than in 
treatment. Due to this aspect of clinical research, not only are the consent forms more 
elaborate, but the responsibility on investigators to adhere to the essential 
requirements of informed consent is also stronger.
15
 Moreover, the processes in 
research also vary depending on which aspect of clinical design the study opts for. 
For instance, the process of taking consent is different for randomisation than for 
placebo-controlled trials.  
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 See further W. Carpenter, W, et al., The declaration of Helsinki and clinical trials: A focus on 
placebo-controlled trials in schizophrenia, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY, Vol. 160, Issue No. 
2, (2003), pp. 356–362. 
14
 Lidz (2006), supra note 9. 
15
 The consent form for treatment is usually a single page generic document where the diagnosis of the 
patient is written along with intervention or procedure to be performed by the doctor; this is followed 
by a declaration and signature from the patient. It does not go through an ethical review. Conversely, 
the consent form for research is a multi-page document that has to include all the particulars in the 
form as outlined in the ethical guidelines. This document goes through ethical review and can only be 
used after passing such review. see Essential and additional elements of an informed consent 
document, in: Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR), National Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical and Health Research Involving Human Participants,  2017, (hereafter ICMR Ethical 
Guidelines 2017) p. 50, available at https://icmr.nic.in/guidelines/ICMR_Ethical_Guidelines_2017.pdf  
(last accessed on June 29, 2018). 
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Having made the important distinction between the research and treatment 
context, the discussion on the idea of informed consent can be taken further by 
briefly looking at the history of informed consent in research.  
3.1.1.  Tracing the history of informed consent in research 
Almost every account of the history of informed consent in research begins with the 
aftermath of human experimentation in the Second World War and the codes of 
practice that emerged from the Nuremberg trials.
16
 There is evidence of consent-like 
practices in research prior to the Nuremberg trials, for instance, in Walter Reed’s 
yellow fever experiments.
17
 There is also evidence of guidelines existing in Germany 
in 1931 that were similar in content to the Nuremberg Code,
18
 but in this thesis I will 
adhere to the modern (post World War II) understanding and practice of informed 
consent in research.
19
 The Nuremberg Code was set out as part of the judgment in the 
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 R. R. FADEN & T. L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT, (New York: 
Oxford University Press: 1986), p. 152; J. W. BERG, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE, (2nd edn., New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); W. T. REICH (ED.), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, (Simon and Schuster MacMillan, New York: 1995). 
17
 Research shows that the American military had made some significant efforts to ensure voluntary 
consent in infectious diseases experimentation like those conducted by Army surgeon Walter Reed for 
yellow fever in the early 1900s. The study involved infecting healthy human volunteers with “loaded 
mosquitoes”, however, these studies included a written contract to be signed by the subject, which is 
perhaps the first example of written informed consent in research, see S. E. LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO 
SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR, (Baltimore 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
18
 In terms of a written ethical code incorporating informed consent, new research has shown that 
ethical regulation in the tradition of informed consent was documented prior to the Nuremberg Code. 
This came in a circular issued by the Reich minister of interior in Germany in 1931 titled “guidelines 
for new therapy and human experimentation” [translated] which made a clear distinction between 
therapeutic (new therapy benefiting the participant) and non-therapeutic research (experimentation). 
This step came after public outcry over the Neisser case, where Albert Neisser conducted serum trials 
by infecting healthy people with Syphilis to test a vaccine, and other  similar unethical cases of 
experimentation, see J. Vollmann & R. Winau, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation before 
the Nuremberg Code, THE BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, Vol. 313, Issue No. 7070, (December 1996), 
pp. 1445-1449. Six of the ten guidelines in the Nuremberg Code are said to be based on the 1931 
Guidelines introduced by the Reich, see R. B. Ghooi, The Nuremberg Code – a critique, 
PERSPECTIVES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 2, Issue No. 2, (2011).  
19
 While tracing the history of informed consent in research, Faden and Beauchamp state that despite 
there being events in research ethics before the end of World War II, rarely any could be deemed 
significant enough to have had a major impact on later developments, FADEN & BEAUCHAMP (1986), 
supra note 16, p. 151. It seems fitting to mention here that the pre-eminence of the rights and safety of 
patients has been recognized since the time of Hippocrates. It has been also been supposed that the 
rights of trial subjects were first enunciated in the context of experimental therapy by Claude Bernard. 
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case U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al (also known as the Doctor’s Trial),
20
 in which twenty 
doctors and three administrators were indicted for organizing and participating in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of medical experiments and medical 
procedures conducted on prisoners and civilians. The Code laid down ten principles 
of which the first principle reads: “the voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential.”
21
 Elaborating the requirement further, it stated: 
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to 
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power 
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, 
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or 
coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension 
of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to 
make an understanding and enlightened decision.
22
 
It is important to note that no nation or key medical association has officially adopted 
the Nuremberg Code as law, but it has had a profound influence on the development 
of international human rights law and medical ethics.
23
 The requirement of consent 
for experimentation was incorporated into Article 7 of the United Nations 
                                                                                                                                                                    
See generally W.H.S. JONES, HIPPOCRATIC CORPUS, OATH AND EPIDEMICS 1, VOLS. 1-2, [citing 
Hippocratis Coi Medicorum Omnium Longe Principis, 1555 edition] (Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press, 1923). See also C. BERNARD, translated by HENRY COPLEY GREENE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE, (2nd edn., New York: Dover Publications, 
1957) at p. 102 “Among the experiments that may be tried on man, those that can only harm are 
forbidden, those that are innocent are permissible, and those that may do good are obligatory…It is 
immoral then, to make an experiment on man when it is dangerous to him, even though the result may 
be useful to others. It is essentially moral to make experiments on an animal, even though painful and 
dangerous, if they may be useful to man”. See generally P. RABINOW, ESSAYS ON THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF REASON, Princeton University Press, 1996), at p. 159, where the author cites 
Claire Ambroselli’s argument that Bernard’s conception of experimental medicine was somewhat a  
mutually non-dissolvable relationship between claims of scientific medicine and those of individual 
patients. 
20
 The United States of America v. Karl Brandt et al., November 21, 1946 - August 20, 1947, National 
Archives and Records Service, General Service Administration, Washington: 1974,  
available at https://www.archives.gov/research/captured-german-records/microfilm/m887.pdf (last 
accessed on June 2, 2018) 
21
 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 
10, Vol. 2, pp. 181-182, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949). 
22
 Id.  
23
 M. A. Grodin & G. J. Annas, Legacies of Nuremberg: Medical Ethics and Human Rights, JOURNAL 
OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. 276, (1996), pp. 1682-1683. Moreover, the tenets of the 
Code have recently been incorporated into the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
adopted in 2005, the most recent international instrument to be adopted at the global stage.  
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1996.
24
 The Code also 
became the basis for the Declaration of Helsinki released by the World Medical 
Association (WMA) in 1964, with the most recent amendment in 2013,
25
 and the 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 
released by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) in collaboration with the World Health Organisation (WHO).
26
 Both these 
documents are widely regarded as the cornerstone documents in human research 
ethics.
27
 The Nuremberg Code, being a by-product of case law, laid down the moral 
standards for conducting research on human subjects. The moral standards, though 
often conceptually debated, are firmly established in the general ethical theory of 
informed consent, but the legal doctrine has been slow to catch up to the ideal. The 
next section will lead into this ethical-legal interaction further.   
3.1.2.  The initial point of departure between legal and ethical approaches 
Unlike the above instruments that are formulated based on ethical considerations that 
relate to informed consent in clinical research, the legal doctrine of informed consent 
is primarily a creature of case law pertaining to doctor-patient relationships. Not 
many research-based cases have come before the courts; therefore, the legal doctrine 
that has developed around the treatment context is often extended to the research 
context; this caveat is provided to help avoid confusion whenever the treatment 
context is brought up below while talking about the legal doctrine of informed 
consent.  
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 Article 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 
999, p. 171. 
25
 World Medical Association (WMA), Declaration of Helsinki, last amended at the 64th WMA 
General Assembly, Fortaleza, Brazil, October 2013, available at 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/1760318 (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
26
 CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 12.  
27
 B. Snezana, The Declaration of Helsinki: The Cornerstone of Research Ethics, ARCHIVE OF 
ONCOLOGY, Vol. 9, Issue No. 3, (2001), pp. 179–84; B. Hepple, The Framework of Guidance, in: B. 
HEPPLE, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO HEALTHCARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (A Follow-
up Discussion Paper Based on the Workshop Held in Cape Town, South Africa 12-14th February 
2004), p. 58; J. V. Lavery, Putting International Research Ethics Guidelines to Work for the Benefit of 




Even though the Nuremberg Code provided for the idea of voluntary and 
knowledgeable consent in research, the term ‘informed consent’ first appeared in 
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees in 1957.
28
 In this case,
29
 
the California Court of Appeals held that “a physician violates his duty to his patient 
and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form 
the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.”
30
 
Regarding the element of risk, pertaining to disclosure that could psychologically or 
emotionally affect a patient and influence her choice to her detriment, Justice Bray 
wrote, “in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be 
employed consistent with full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent”
31
 
[my emphasis]. This is how the term ‘informed consent’ was introduced to the world. 
Ever since its first use in case law governing the doctor-patient relationship, the law 
of informed consent has almost exclusively focused on treatment rather than the 
research context. Such exclusivity has led commentators to suggest that the ethical 
understanding of informed consent seems to do more justice to the context of clinical 
research than the legal definition, as the former better understands the relational 
process between the researcher and the research subject. 
32
 
On the other hand, informed consent, from a legal point of view, means that a 
physician has a duty to inform the patients of the foreseeable risks in treatment and to 
obtain their consent. This will be detailed in the next chapter, but the gist of it would 
be that if a patient is injured as a result of a failure on the part of a physician to 
disclose information about a procedure, then the patient may collect monetary 
damages from the physician for causing the injury. The focus, evidently, is entirely 
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 ENCYCLOPEDIA, p. 1271, supra note 1. The term was first used in the case Salgo v. Leland Stanford 
Jr. University Board of Trustees, 54 C.A. 2d 560; 317 P. 2d 170 [1957], see also FADEN AND 
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PRINCIPLES, (Oxford University Press: 2010), p. 68, where Beauchamp has argued that the heart of 
informed consent is moral not legal as informed consent has less to do with the liability of 
professionals and more to do with the autonomous authorization of individuals.  
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on an inquiry post-injury, fixing liabilities, and compensation. While the ethics of 
informed consent are universally applicable and guide the entire process of consent, 
the law of informed consent is territorially defined and normally only deals with post 
fact remedy. This is primarily the reason for why the legal understanding of informed 
consent falls behind its ethical underpinnings. The courts rarely ponder over 
questions of what the idea of voluntariness entails, or whether comprehension is an 
essential element of informed consent. They consider material facts of the case, facts 
that are crucial to fixing liabilities, and leave the pondering to the theorists. The legal 
description of informed consent, though effective for remedial purposes, thus fails to 
capture the relationship between an investigator and a research subject and the 
context of clinical research. This will become clearer as the thesis progresses. The 
next few sections will explain the essential features of informed consent by 
contrasting their understanding in ethics and in law.  
3.1.3.  The essentials of informed consent 
The most important role of informed consent is that it is required to legitimise any 
intervention done on the human body. But an intervention can only become 
legitimate when the essential requirements of informed consent are met. A study of 
literature from various disciplines shows that informed consent has three essential 
requirements,
33
 which are: 
a) Voluntariness,  
b)  Adequate Information Disclosure, and  
c)    Competence/Capacity  
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These essential elements are also the parameters on which the validity of consent is 
measured. The following sections will elaborate each constitutive element of 
informed consent in order to show that informed consent is not as simple a concept 
as it appears to be at first glance.  
a) Voluntariness 
If we were to understand voluntariness in broad legal terms, it would mean an act 
proceeding from the “free and unrestrained will” of a person.
34
 Voluntariness is 
arguably the most frequent ground for the contestation of the validity of informed 
consent. In medical law, three factors have been identified which serve to vitiate 
voluntariness in medical contexts: coercion, undue influence, and mistake.
35
 Each of 
these factors is important enough to warrant their own themed projects. For the sake 
of this inquiry, I will not adjudicate between the different theories of these factors. 
Instead, I will adopt an existing theory, explain why I have adopted it, and show the 
implications of the theoretical framework adopted.  
Faden and Beauchamp note that voluntariness is perhaps the most frequently 
mentioned principle in the literature of informed consent.
36
 Frequency, however, 
does not entail clarity. Much of the literature discussing voluntariness in clinical 
research comes from philosophers and bioethicists who seek to define and find 
measures to assess voluntariness.
37
 For some scholars, voluntariness means consent 
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that is “free from controlling influences or conditions”.
38
 Such a definition not only 
includes the influence of people, but also the circumstances or conditions that lead to 
consent. However, this is a point of contention amongst commentators.  
Some consider circumstantial influences like those of poverty and lack of 
access to basic health care as harsh circumstances.
39
 They argue that despite the 
circumstances having led to the choice made by the participants, it was still their 
choice. As such, circumstances and conditions should be kept outside the purview of 
a more helpful definition of voluntariness.
40
 Some scholars bring in the concept of 
‘coercion’ while talking about harsh choice circumstances. This concept is useful to 
understand because consent is generally defined as voluntary when it is not coerced; 
hence, the two concepts are frequently mentioned together. A few commentators 
argue that some potential research subjects, particularly those in developing 
countries, are so disadvantaged that large payments given to them would unduly 
induce them to participate in a clinical trial despite the risks involved. They argue 
that such offers of payment are potentially coercive.
41
 This leads to the conclusion 
that poor or disadvantaged people are coerced into trial participation through such 
offers, therefore, their consent becomes non-voluntary, hence, invalid. However, 
such a notion does not pass the test of coercion. To explain this, I will take 
Wertheimer’s account of coercion.  
Wertheimer proposes, “only threats coerce, but not all threats do”.
42
 Under 
this account, an act is not coercive unless the choice forced upon the coercee leaves 
her with no reasonable choice but to yield. Wertheimer and Miller have argued that 
sometimes having no reasonable choice or alternative might naturally be viewed as a 
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necessary condition for coercion, which it is, but not all offers where people have no 
reasonable alternatives lead to coercion, as there are no threats
43
 involved. The 
authors compellingly argue that the need for money does not preclude voluntary 
consent. According to Wertheimer and Miller, genuine offers do not coerce, and 
some other prominent theorists in the field have supported this view.
44
 According to 
the Belmont Report, that is a leading commentary on the rights and protection of 
research subjects, coercion must include some kind of ‘threat’ of harm which is 
absent in payment for research participation.
45
 Moreover, English law has maintained 
that certain unfavourable circumstances (such as being in prison) cannot be said to 
vitiate consent in medical treatment unless a ‘real threat’ can be determined to have 
diminished the patient’s free choice.
46
 This includes situations where the political or 
social context of the patient might significantly alter this range of options.
47
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Having discussed coercion as the antonym concept of voluntariness, one still 
seeks conceptual clarity on voluntariness. This is mainly because the requirement of 
voluntariness as “free and unrestrained will” sheds light on one of the oldest 
dilemmas of consent theory and its application. While talking about the applicability 
of consent theory to politics, the political theorist Kann, wrote the following: 
If we are social beings, how can we consent ‘voluntarily’? Do our 
desires and reasons reveal our ‘true’ selves or do they merely reflect 
social prejudices? Herbert Marcuse’s challenge that consent 
procedures are vacuous if our desires and reasons are socially 
determined is a serious one.
48
 
It is easy to dismiss this dilemma as a recondite philosophical inquiry, but the 
difficulty lies in matching the ideal situation of a consenting individual with the lived 
realities of actual people. An average individual, while performing an action, is 
influenced by a web of social and other influences. Therefore, this dilemma has been 
drawn out in much of the literature on informed consent as well.
49
 A definition of 
voluntariness, which requires a completely ‘free and unrestrained will’, would mean 
that very few modern human actions are truly voluntary. Therefore, as impractical as 
it seems to expect perfectly free will or perfect voluntariness, it should indubitably 
also mean that perfect consent does not exist.  
The crux of this section is that voluntariness is an essential requirement for 
informed consent, but what the term encompasses and what negates voluntariness in 
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research, has been the subject of much academic debate. The differing academic 
opinions make it harder to empirically assess situations that might be considered 
voluntary. Therefore, I assess my empirical findings in the later chapters keeping in 
mind the debates that surround its conceptualisation.  
As enquiries in bioethics are gearing towards basing themselves in empirical 
claims, concepts like voluntariness are being remodelled to stand rigorous empirical 
assessments.
50
 There are no adequate measures of voluntariness yet, but it is a 
constantly evolving research field.
51
 Furthermore, voluntariness is not a stand-alone 
requirement for valid informed consent. For an act of consent to be voluntary, the 
person must have reasonably assessed the information about risks and benefits 
arising out of the study and made a fully informed decision. The requirement of 
adequate information disclosure and assessing comprehension of that information 
will be discussed in the following section. 
b) Information Disclosure and Comprehension 
Adequate information disclosure for valid informed consent means disclosure of all 
the relevant information that may have an impact on the voluntary decision making 
of the subject regarding participation in research. The Declaration of Helsinki (as 
amended in 2013) lays down that: 
[E]ach potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims, 
methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, 
institutional affiliations of the researcher, the anticipated benefits and 
potential risks of the study and the discomfort it may entail, post-
study provisions and any other relevant aspects of the study. The 
potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to participate 
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Some commentators suggest that it is not realistic to communicate all the study 
details to the potential participants of research.
53
 The reasons range from the 
technicality and quantity of the information to the disinterest of the research 
participants. So how do we determine what information is adequate for potential trial 
participants to make a truly informed decision? 
In case law pertaining to treatment (as developed by the English and US 
courts) the adequacy of information disclosure is assessed on three standards: the 
professional practice standard, the reasonable person standard, and the - less 
commonly used - subjective standard.
54
 The professional practice standard holds that 
the criteria of adequate disclosure are properly determined by the customary 
practices of the professional medical community.
55
 This standard would imply that 
the patient or subject is unqualified to determine the adequacy of information 
required for her to make a decision regarding treatment or research. The reasonable 
person standard would assess adequacy of information based on what a reasonable 
person would need to know about a procedure/study, viz., the risks, alternatives, and 
results.
56
 The subjective patient standard would require the physician to disclose 
whatever information is material to the particular patient. The legal test of adequate 
disclosure is ‘materiality’ of information, meaning what is material or significant to 
the decision-making of the person.
 
The subjective standard, though often regarded as 
the standard closest to the ethical ideal, has been criticised for placing an unfair legal 
burden on physicians to perceive the “idiosyncratic values and interests of their 
patients and leaving the physicians at the mercy of their patients' self-serving 
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 Nevertheless, other commentators suggest that the subjective 
standard would best protect the autonomy of the research subjects in clinical research 
because it focuses on information that is relevant to them rather than the researcher;
58
 
hence, it helps in promoting the decisional autonomy of the participants.  
Herein lies another difference between the legal doctrine and the ethical 
approach to informed consent. The ethical requirement of information disclosure is 
not just about how much or what is disclosed. It places significant importance on the 
comprehension of the information for the consent to be truly informed. However, 
assessing comprehension is not as easy or even as practicable as it may seem. Unless 
the researchers are willing to conduct tests or assessments on the information 
imparted to the subjects, there is hardly another way of knowing what the research 
subjects really understood. Nevertheless, as some teachers instinctively know that 
someone’s ability to regurgitate technical information does not equal the ability to 
truly understand that information, similarly a test conducted along those lines would 
not really prove a research subject’s comprehension of the study design.  
It is also extensively believed that comprehension of information is much less 
in developing countries because of socio-economic factors, like illiteracy, cultural 
variations, lack of familiarity with biomedical procedures, and so on.
59
 This is a 
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widely popular generalisation pertaining to developing countries. However, studies 
conducted to empirically assess comprehension of information in clinical trials 
across developed and developing countries have shown similar problems with 
informed consent procedures in different settings.
60
 In fact, recent studies comparing 
the levels of comprehension between participants in developed and developing 
countries have found a similar quality of informed consent in both developing and 
developed countries.
61
 These studies show that most ethical issues involving 
informed consent in research, including comprehension of information, correspond 
more or less equally to both developing and developed countries.  
It is important to note that assessing comprehension of information is not a 
legal requirement for valid informed consent.
62
 However, ensuring that the 
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participant also understands the information conveyed is an important ethical 
requirement.
63
 Some argue that it is an ethical aspiration and should not be confused 
with a minimum ethical standard, and that research with a low level of risk does not 
require a high level of comprehension.
64
 Some argue that a lot more information 
ought to be disclosed than what can be easily understood in order to have valid 
consent.
65
 This essentially means that information disclosure has to be full and 
complete, irrespective of the percentage of information comprehended by the 
research subject.  
Comprehension of information marks the difference between what some 
scholars call ‘understood consent’ versus ‘informed consent’.
66
 The former is a 
growing sub-field with scholars searching for innovative solutions, like the use of 
multimedia to help participants understand the information better.
67
 Numerous 
studies have already been conducted to suggest methods to maximise comprehension 
in clinical research.
68
 However, these studies are geared towards improving the 
process of imparting information rather than figuring out methods that best assess 
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comprehension, thereby confirming that assessing comprehension is not as 
straightforward as it may seem.  
No matter what the level of comprehension, whether assessed during the 
informed consent process or not, assuring that the participant has enough information 
to be able to reasonably assess the risks and benefits to her person before consenting 
is an essential requirement of valid informed consent. This capacity to reasonably 
assess risks and benefits of research is the third requirement and will be discussed in 
the next section.  
c) Capacity/Competence 
A person’s capacity to consent is often defined in relation to the information or 
knowledge that he or she has about the intended treatment or intervention. Simply 
put, a person is deemed competent to consent if she is able to understand what she is 
consenting to. The decision-making ability is sometimes referred to as ‘competence’ 
because what is at issue is ‘the ability to perform a task’.
69
 At other times, it is 
referred to as ‘capacity’ because the task in question involves the capacity to make a 
decision.
70
 I will be using the term interchangeably even though I am aware that 
“capacity [usually] denotes a clinical status as judged by a health care professional 
whereas competence denotes a legal status as judged by a legal professional, i.e., a 
judge.”
71
   
Appelbaum and Grisso analysed the legal assessment of patient’s capacities 
to consent to treatment,
72
 and found that most features of competence could be 
categorised as follows:  
i) The ability to communicate choices 
ii) The ability to understand information 
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iii) Appreciating the situation and its consequences 
iv) Rational manipulation of information.  
In bioethical and philosophical literature, each of these categories have elucidations 
and theories of their own, especially the concept of rationality.
73
 Tackling these 
concepts individually would be beyond the scope of this thesis. For now, we will 
assume a layperson’s understanding of these categories. Nevertheless, it would help 
our empirical analysis later to note the difference between categories ii) and iii), 
which is the ability to understand information and the ability to appreciate the 
situation and its consequences. Sometimes a person can understand what she is told 
without fully understanding the implications that it carries for one's future. The 
ability to appreciate the circumstances and their consequences is an important 
measure for determining the capacity to consent. In the clinical research context, the 
ability to appreciate the risks and benefits of research is a defining feature of 
competence.
74
 The level of capacity required for legal competence rises with the 
extent to which the risks outweigh the benefits. The same rule applies in the 
treatment context, as Lord Donaldson wrote: 
What matters is that the doctors should consider whether at that time 
he had a capacity which was commensurate with the gravity of the 




In law, a person is presumed to have capacity unless it is established that the person 
lacks capacity.
76
 Physicians, psychiatrists, and other scholars have developed 
numerous capacity assessment tools and standards in the past years.
77
 Appelbaum 
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and Roth suggest that when a court or a clinician makes an assessment, the standards 
that are eventually chosen to assess capacity are the product of competing societal 
values and the goals of the researchers.
78
 For example, if encouragement of 
autonomy is the goal, the standard for capacity will be relatively lax. However, if the 
ethical imperative of beneficence and non-maleficence
79
 were to be achieved, then 
capacity assessment would require a strict set of standards, such as rationality or 
appreciation of emotions and values.
80
 Here lies a major difference between the 
theory and practice of informed consent: while the courts might consider assessment 
standards based on the different goals of informed consent, the participant recruiters 
for human subject research barely employ such standards. There is little evidence 
suggesting that trials carried out across the world employ capacity assessments for all 
research studies and not just for studies on incapacitated individuals. My research 
findings, discussed in Chapter 6, will show that if a study has nothing to do with 
minor children or people of unsound mind, a recruiter’s usual test for capacity to 
consent is the legal age of majority.  
 Part 1 looked at the essentials of informed consent and the conceptual debates 
that surround them. It gave a brief overview of how law and ethics approach the 
fundamentals of consent differently. Part 2 will show how the essential features of 
informed consent look like withi the clinical research context of India. 
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Part 2. Informed consent in India 
Ethical codes of conduct in medicine and research were not new to India. Before 
Europeans brought modern medicine to India, India had its own ancient tradition of 
medicine. The corpus of Hindu literature pertaining to health and medicine is called 
Ayurveda (knowledge of long life).
81
 The texts of Ayurveda, particularly Charaka 
Saṃhitā (written between the fourth century BCE and the second century CE),
82
 
were the reference texts for medical morality and conduct in treatment as well as in 
research.
83
 Charaka advises physicians to take into confidence the relatives of the 
patients, the elders in the community, and the state officials before performing 
interventions that could result in the patient’s death.
84
 Arthashastra, a treatise on 
statecraft from around the third century BC, suggested capital punishment for 
physicians who did not obtain the prior permission of the state before performing a 
life-threatening surgery.
85
 However, patients’ preferences for decision-making 
regarding their own treatment are not mentioned in the ancient texts.
86
 In the 
centuries preceding European colonialism, many different medical traditions were 
practiced in India and each prescribed their own codes of conduct for physicians and 
                                                          
81
 P. N. Desai, Medical Ethics in India, THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 13, 
(1988), 231-255; See generally DAGMAR WUJASTYK, WELL-MANNERED MEDICINE: MEDICAL ETHICS 
AND ETIQUETTE IN CLASSICAL AYURVEDA (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
82
 The exact date of the composition of this text is unknown, but it falls within this timeline according 
to historians, see G. J. Meulenbeld, Caraka, his identity and date, in: A HISTORY OF INDIAN MEDICAL 
LITERATURE, (Groningen: 1999).  
83
 Desai (1988), supra note 81. Moreover, the concept of Dharma, which has different meanings in 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism, has been a constant in governing morality in India since 
ancient times. It could mean, inter alia, duty, morality, virtue, religion, or the power which upholds the 
society and, in turn, the Universe. See D. R. Davis (Jr.), An Indian Philosophy of Law: Vijñāneśvara’s 
Epitome of the Law, in: J. GANERI (ED), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, (2015).  
84
 C. M. Francis, Medical ethics in India: ancient and modern (I), INDIAN JOURNAL OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS, Vol. 4, Issue No. 4, (1996).  
85
 “Physicians undertaking medical treatment without intimating (to the government) the dangerous 
nature of the disease shall, if the patient dies, be punished with the first amercement. If the death of a 
patient under treatment is due to carelessness in the treatment, the physician shall be punished with the 
middle-most amercement. Growth of disease due to negligence or indifference (karmavadha) of a 
physician shall be regarded as assault or violence.” See KAUTILYA'S ARTHASHASTRA: BOOK IV, THE 
REMOVAL OF THORNS, as translated from Sanskrit by R. Shamasastry, (Bangalore: Government Press, 
1915), pp.253-296. See also M. S. Valiathan, Bioethics and Ayurveda, INDIAN JOURNAL OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS, Vol. 5, Issue no. 1, (2008).  
86
 N. Kumar, Informed Consent; Past and Present, PERSPECTIVES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 4, 





 European colonialism brought with itself modern medicine and a new 
legal system that intermixed with the existing systems.  
The modern medical research history in India dates back to the first meeting 
of the Indian Research Fund Association (IRFA) in 1911. This association initiated 
several projects between 1918-1920 to find indigenous cures for diseases like 
malaria, beriberi, and kala azar.
88
 The first Clinical Research Unit (CRU) in India 
was established at the Indian Cancer Research Centre in Bombay in 1945.
89
 The 
IRFA was re-designated as the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) in 1949 
and it became the apex body for the formulation, coordination, and promotion of 
biomedical research. Over the past seven decades, the ICMR has established many 
national research centres in the fields of nutrition, genetics, AIDS, tuberculosis, 
toxicology, cancer, traditional medicine, leprosy, viral diseases, enteric diseases, 
cholera, reproductive disorders, gas disaster, genetics, and so on. ICMR is an arm of 
the government that co-ordinates (not-for-profit) research into diseases that 
encompass the public health needs of the nation. Privatisation in treatment and 
research in India started around the 1980s and became stronger after the 
liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991.
90
 With the onset of globalisation, the 
private sector mostly focused on innovation and profit rather than on unmet health 
needs of populations
91
 (discounting instances of public-private partnership models in 
research where a pharmaceutical corporation is involved in a not-for-profit capacity). 
This meant that regulation of clinical research needed to be different to encompass 
private actors.  
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Human subject research regulation in India, particularly regulation of 
informed consent procedures, is a recent occurrence. The ICMR released a Policy 
Statement on Ethical Considerations Involved in Research on Human Subjects in the 
year 1980. This policy statement acted as a predecessor for ethical guidelines 
governing human subject research in India and made informed consent mandatory 
for research conducted on human subjects.
92
 Following this, the Central Drugs 
Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), which is the central regulatory authority 
for discharging functions assigned to the central government under the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act, 1940, introduced certain provisions on the conduct of clinical trials.   
The year 1988 saw the introduction of requirements and guidelines on clinical 
trials for import and manufacture of new drugs as Schedule Y in the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Rules of 1945.
93
 The first Central Ethics Committee (CEC) was 
established in 1996 to look into ethical matters pertaining to medical and health 
research and the ethical guidelines for human subject research were first released by 
the ICMR in 2000, which were updated in 2006 and 2017.
94
 India adopted the Good 
Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines (originally released by the ICH) in 2001; these 
guidelines prescribe the ethical and scientific quality standards for designing, 
conducting, and recording trials that involve the participation of human subjects.
95
 




Despite being the primary sources for governing the ethics of clinical 
research in India, the ICMR and GCP guidelines lack enforceability. Schedule Y is 
the lone legal source that makes informed consent mandatory for clinical research in 
India. As noted in the previous chapter, it was amended in 2005
97
 to eliminate earlier 
limitations and to encourage clinical trials while also protecting the rights of the trial 
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subjects. Where the amended schedule outlines the process for informed consent and 
the responsibilities of the investigators, such clarity was lacking when the schedule 
was first introduced in 1988. Pursuant to the SAM case (filed in 2012), this schedule 
was further amended between 2013-2015 to bring in newer rules pertaining to 
compensating trial participants in case of injury and death from trial participation and 
for making audio-video recording of informed consent mandatory for vulnerable trial 
participants.
98
 As evident, informed consent has been the subject of multiple 
regulatory interventions since the 1980s. However, the ground realities are often 
slow to reflect regulatory changes. In the next few sections, the focus will be on how 
the informed consent process has advanced over time on the ground.  
3.2. The face of informed consent in India 
In a 2016 survey that aimed to assess the quality of ethics of clinical research 
processes the surveyors found that even if the average informed consent document 
used in research was to be designed as per the regulatory requirements, it was 
unlikely to produce the level of “informed consent as ethically required”.
99
 Let us 
examine this further by looking at the three essentials as discussed in Part 1.   
In a study conducted by DeCosta and colleagues on community-based trials 
in rural north India the authors found: 
An important finding of our study was that the majority of the 
community interviewed could decide about participation only after 
discussing it with other community members. Only about a third of all 
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respondents could take an exclusively independent, non-consultative 
decision. In the case of the few women interviewed, this proportion 




Such findings, where people’s decisions regarding trial participation are not entirely 
their own, have been repeated in other empirical studies from India.
101
 This provides 
a challenge to the conceptual understanding of voluntariness as “free and 
unrestrained will” as outlined in Part 1 above. In a 2010 survey conducted on 
investigator perceptions regarding research ethics in clinical trials in India, only 18% 
of the surveyed investigators believed that their participants were “truly 




 Yet the primary problem with the informed consent processes in India 
appears to be the inadequacy of information disclosure. Most empirical studies 
conducted in this area suggest that participants are either not fully informed
103
 of 
important particulars about the study or they do not understand the information 
adequately.
104
 This is additionally problematic when researchers adopt a paternalistic 
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attitude towards their participants, as was revealed in a study conducted on informed 
consent in genetic research and biobanking studies on participants in rural India. One 
doctor/investigator from the study is quoted as saying:  
What’s the use of informed consent when many are suffering and 
dying of diseases? We need to screen them to know their status and 
take appropriate action for treatment or counselling to ensure that the 
disease burden is reduced in the society. A mere informed consent 
will only add to their misery. Do the people who prepared ethical 
guidelines understand the situation at grass-roots level? (Dr D., 




Researchers have found standard informed consent procedures to be deficient in 
terms of allowing participants to comprehend the nature, design, and risks and 
benefits of the study.
106
 This is particularly the case for participants with low or no 
formal education. Moreover, despite there being India-specific research suggesting 
methods, like the use of culturally appropriate visual aid tools, which could be used 
to improve comprehension of participants with low education,
107




 As for the essential requirement of capacity to consent, India lacks a statue 
akin to the Mental Capacity Act, (MCA) 2005 in the UK. This means that there is no 
separate legislation outlining codes of practice through which mental capacity can be 
assessed such as the two-stage test laid out by the MCA.
109
 The Indian legislature 
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recently passed the Mental Health Care Act, 2017 (MHCA) that acknowledged that 
capacity for decision-making in treatment was to be presumed unless it was 
otherwise established that such capacity was lacking.
110
 However, provisions for the 
assessment of capacity remain unclear in the MHCA
111
 and are also absent from the 
ethical guidelines that govern human subject research.
112
 Furthermore, capacity is not 
just restricted to sanity or mental health. According to the ethical approach to 
informed consent, it includes the ability to make sound decisions and the ability to 
weigh the consequences of such decisions.
113
 Age is an indicator of having reached 
such capacity, and therefore, people of minor years need a legally authorised 
representative (LAR) to authorise research participation on their behalf. However, 
there have been instances where the LAR for a participant was not the appropriate 
representative or was not capable of understanding the information pertaining to the 
study.
114
 There have also been instances where research has been carried out on 




The general situation is such that many researchers have raised concerns over 
the dubious nature of informed consent procedures in research studies conducted in 
different parts of India.
116
 A few such ethically dubious studies led to the filing of the 
SAM case that brought to the fore the ethical violations and regulatory loopholes in 
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clinical research and led the government to strengthen regulations pertaining to 
informed consent. I will outline a few of these in the next section. 
3.2.1. Specific instances of dubious informed consent procedures 
The SAM case changed the narrative of clinical research ethics and regulation in 
India. This case led to further amendments (between 2013-2015) in Schedule Y 
pertaining to the rights of the trial participants.
117
 The SAM case’s original petition, 
(a copy of which I procured from the Supreme Court Registry in India, relevant 
portions highlighted in Appendix I) gives examples of numerous unethically 
conducted trials conducted in India. These specific cases highlight how informed 
consent norms can be, and have been, violated in rural/semi-urban resource-poor 
settings. I will outline three pertinent cases hereunder: 
1) Unethical Trials in Indore: The petitioners of the SAM case submitted a report 
of the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) dated 24.06.2011, where a complaint was 
filed by Dr. Anand Singh Raje, against unsupervised clinical trials conducted in 
M.Y. Hospital of M.G.M. Medical College. Allegations were made against six 
doctors of the hospital that they had received Crores of Indian Rupees
118
 from multi-
national drug companies. The complaint also alleged that the government doctors 
were conducting private trials while holding their official positions and without 
obtaining consent from the administration, and that they were “committing fraud” on 
the patients and their relatives. An investigation was conducted into the complaint. 
The investigative inquiry found that the Principal Investigators (PIs) were members 
or Secretaries of the Ethics Committees (ECs) and that these ECs rarely followed 
standard procedures. It was found that the Contract Research Organisations (CROs), 
PIs, and ECs regularly violated ethical guidelines and that the core principle relating 
to obtaining voluntary informed consent from the participants was completely 
disregarded. They found that the PI contravened Section 20 A of the Medical 
Council Act, 1956,
119
 and committed professional misconduct. They also found that 
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there was no transparency in the trial process. The trial participants were denied their 
entitlements and financial safeguards, like insurance, in instances of Serious and 
Adverse Events (SAEs).  
Despite the verification of the complaint, a sufficient basis was not found to 
initiate criminal proceedings against the doctors who were in the employment of the 
government. However, the EOW made certain recommendations asking the 
government to take appropriate action against the doctors for violating the ICMR 
Guidelines, specifically for violating the principle of informed consent. The report 
urged the government to take disciplinary action against the doctors under the Code 
of Medical Ethics Regulation of 2002 (amended in 2009) and to ask the doctors to 
deposit 10% of the money received from the trials in the Medical Education 
Department of M.G.M. Medical College, Indore.
120
  
Media reports suggested that departmental action was taken against twelve 
doctors and they were asked to pay fines for violation of the ethical guidelines.
121
 
However, in a reply to the Lancet’s report on this case, the doctors involved in this 
trial stressed that the trials that they were involved in were legal and ethically done as 
per the ICMR Guidelines.
122
 They decried the “partisan coverage” of this case and 
said the fines imposed on the doctors were for a “trivial technicality of failing to 
provide information to (another part of) the health department about some details of 
the clinical trials.” They stressed that the fines had “nothing do with the legality, 
ethics, or proper conduct of the trials as per norms of good clinical practice.”
123
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
violations thereof shall constitute infamous conduct in any professional respect, that is to say, 
professional misconduct, and such provision shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in 
any law for the time being in force.” 
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The next example, also cited in the SAM PIL, highlights the issue of conducting 
trials on patients with reduced autonomy and is also from a city in Madhya Pradesh, 
which is the state where the petitioner NGO is based.  
2) Trials on the Bhopal Gas Victims in Bhopal: The petitioners submitted records 
of trials conducted on Bhopal Gas Tragedy victims in Bhopal. The petitioners 
claimed that in these trials most of the patients could barely form a signature and had 
no understanding of the particulars of the informed consent form.
124
 The Bhopal 
Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was built to help victims of the 
Bhopal Gas Disaster that occurred in 1984.
125
 Between the years 2004-2008, over 
160 patients in this hospital were subjected to trials of study drugs including New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs).
126
 The petitioners claimed that the trials were unethical 
because a trial cannot be ethically conducted on people with reduced autonomy and 
the patients at BMHRC had “zero autonomy” since they were completely dependent 
on the treatment provided by the hospital.  
The petitioners submitted a CD of the Al Jazeera documentary ‘Faultline: 
Outsourced Clinical Trials Overseas’ as supplementary evidence of the unethical 
trials conducted at BMHRC.
127
 The petitioners claimed that in the three inspections 
done by the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI), it had been found that new 
drugs, like Fondaparinux and Tigecyline, and NCEs, like Prasugrel and Telavancin, 
were tested on patients, the majority of whom were disaster victims. However, the 
deaths that ensued were dismissed by the DCGI as “not related to the drug being 
tested”, without any independent verification. It must be noted that the exact details 
of this case study are hard to find from more authoritative sources, as the case was 
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mostly reported in the news media.
128
 Nonetheless, it is important because it shows 
how trial sponsors and investigators have been reported to have recruited disaster 
victims with compromised autonomy for trials.  
The previous two cases from Madhya Pradesh do not have authoritative 
information on what transpired after allegations of violation of informed consent 
rules took place. However, the next case was a large-scale vaccination project that 
was reported to have flouted the informed consent procedures and a Parliamentary 
Committee was set up to look into the allegations. I will reproduce some findings 
from the inquiry report discussed below that demonstrate concerns about trialling on 
young girls below the age of majority.  
3) The HPV vaccine (Gardasil and Cervarix) clinical trial (hereafter the HPV 
vaccine case): 
The background to this case is set in the year 2009 when a vaccination project was 
launched in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat against Human Papilloma 
Virus (HPV), some types of which can cause cervical cancer. Girls between 10-14 
years of age were given the vaccination. The project had two components - a Phase 
IV clinical trial of the HPV vaccination
129
 and observational research on the delivery 
of the vaccine to establish if it would suit India’s mass immunization program. The 
drugs had already been approved in the US and India. The project was designed and 
executed by PATH (Program for Appropriate Technology in Health), a US-based 
NGO, in collaboration with the Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR), and 
the State Governments of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat. The pharmaceutical company 
Merck developed and provided the vaccine Gardasil and GlaxoSmithKline 
developed and provided the vaccine Cervarix. The project was funded by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. In April 2010, the Government of India suspended 
the program after health rights activists, women’s rights groups, and some doctors 
                                                          
128
 N. Lakhani, From tragedy to travesty: Drugs tested on survivors of Bhopal, THE INDEPENDENT, 
(November 15, 2011), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/from-tragedy-to-
travesty-drugs-tested-on-survivors-of-bhopal-6262412.html (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
129
 Phase IV trials are done after a drug has proven efficacy and has been granted a licence, these are 
usually conducted after marketing approval to assess long term risks and benefits of the drug when 
used widely.  
87 
 
questioned its motivation, ethics, and informed consent procedures, especially after 
reports of the deaths of some of the vaccinated girls surfaced in the media. At the 
time of the suspension of the vaccination project, about 25,000 girls had already been 
vaccinated.
130
   
The Indian Government set up a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee to look 
into the “alleged irregularities in the conduct of studies using HPV vaccine” by 
PATH in India.
131
  The Committee concluded that the deaths of girls from amongst 
the trial participants were likely not related to the vaccine. But the committee found 
that the process of informed consent was inadequate. It described the process 
whereby school principals signed consent forms on behalf of the children as 
“wrongful authorization.” It found that: 
...in  Andhra  Pradesh  out  of  the  9543  forms,  1948  forms  have  
thumb impressions  while  hostel  wardens  have  signed  2763  forms.  
In  Gujarat,  out  of  the  6217  forms 3944  have  thumb  impressions  
and  5454  either  signed  or  carried  thumb  impressions  of 
guardians.  The  data  also  revealed  that  a  very  large  number  of  
parents/guardians  are illiterate  and  could  not  even  write  in  their  
local  languages  viz.  Telugu  or  Gujarati...out  of  100  consent  
forms for  Andhra  Pradesh  project  signatures  of  witnesses  were  
missing  in  69  forms.  In many forms there were no dates. One 
particular person had signed seven forms. In fact the legality of 
Andhra Pradesh State Government directing headmasters in all 
private/Government/ashram/schools to sign the consent form on 
behalf of parents/guardians is highly questionable. The absence of 
photographs  of  parents/guardians/wardens on consent forms, the 
absence of signatures of investigators; the signatures of  
parents/guardians not matching with their names; the date of 
vaccination being much earlier than the date of signature of  




The report and recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee did not lead to any 
significant governmental action or sanction. This inaction on the part of the 
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government led some women’s health rights activists to take the case to court 
(hereafter called the Kalpana Mehta case). In 2010-2011, the women’s rights 
activists and some lawyers organized a fact-finding mission in the two States where 
the HPV vaccination project was conducted. They visited schools where vaccinations 
were administered and conducted interviews with the wardens, teachers, students, 
and families. They investigated the informed consent process in a secondary school 
run by the government, where approximately 300 girls were vaccinated. The findings 
were reported in their PIL petition: 
The girls were not informed of the nature or purpose of the vaccine. 
The girls did not know where the cervix is located and this had not 
been explained to them. The girls believed the vaccination was being 
administered by the government. Many girls felt it was compulsory to 




When the Supreme Court, in one hearing of the Kalpana Mehta case, asked the 
government to explain why no action had been taken against PATH or against the 
Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, the government furnished the following 
response:   
As of now, there are no specific penalties for provisions relating to 
clinical trials under the Act. Therefore, as per the legal provisions 
prevalent at the point of time under the Act and pertinent rules, ICMR 
has already taken action admissible under these rules.
134
 
ICMR’s action was to suspend the trial. To some commentators, the lack of 
penalising provisions for failure to adhere to ethical guidelines in clinical research 
was proof of the inadequacy of the Indian regulatory system in protecting research 
participants.
135
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PATH had conducted the vaccination project in four developing countries, 
including India, Peru, Uganda and Vietnam. PATH employees asserted that the 
vaccination project was not a clinical trial for an untested drug. The aim of the study 
was to explore suitable strategies for vaccine delivery and to help national authorities 
in low and middle-income countries gain information regarding the feasibility of 
introducing the HPV vaccine to protect girls against HPV, which is the main cause 
for cervical cancer.
136
 They also sought to clarify the “misreporting” done by 
commentators writing about the HPV case and asserted that the deaths that took 
place during the vaccination project were not caused due to the vaccine.
137
 The study 
was conducted in collaboration with the Indian Council of Medical Research 
(ICMR), which is the apex body in India for the formulation, coordination, and 
promotion of biomedical research. The ICMR is responsible for the drafting and 
release of the guidelines for the ethical conduct of human subject research in India. 
When the irregularities in the HPV vaccination project became known, they 
suspended the project. The ICMR conducted its own inquiry and reported that: 
[A]  lot  of  negative  vibe  has  been generated  against  this  project  
due to  mal-handling  of  the  entire  situation,  but  the  committee has  
not  been  able  to  identify  a  single  event,  individual  or  agency  
which  can  be  held  entirely accountable for it.
138
 
ICMR found some discrepancies in the study, referring to inadequate consent 
procedures, which they said did not “appear to be wilful or fully anticipatable” but 
could be seen as a “learning experience”. They stressed the need for separate 
legislation covering all aspects of Biomedical and Health Research involving Human 
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The averments made in the SAM petition were that the three aforementioned 
trials, amongst others, were being conducted in the country because either they were 
not allowed outside India or because such trials were cost-prohibitive in the country 
of origin. The petition claimed that the poor, illiterate, and vulnerable sections of the 
society became subjects of these illegal trials. The petition also alleged that the 
doctors conducted these trials with the sole aim of making money and that the trials 
were conducted without any regard for the consent of the subjects. The petitioners 
asserted that the manner in which certain trials are conducted in India is in violation 
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which states that “[n]o person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by 
law”. The petition also claimed that the “inaction of the government” in not 
restricting these clinical trials is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution which 
states that “[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the 
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.  
3.2.2.  Relevance of these specific instances 
In the three cases mentioned above, there was an issue with informed consent and the 
manner in which it was handled.  
In 1) Unethical Trials in Indore the EOW case failed due to lack of a sufficient 
basis for a criminal proceeding. Nonetheless, the EOW report found discrepancies 
with the informed consent procedure and the doctors were punished in the form of a 
fine, even though the doctors involved refuted the allegations that the fines were for 
violating ethical procedures. However, no other action was taken against the doctors 
involved.  
In 2) Trials on the Bhopal Gas Victims in Bhopal the trials were allegedly carried 
out on disaster victims who, according to the petitioners, had reduced autonomy 
because of their dependency on the hospital for the medical treatment that they 
needed as victims of the disaster. It was also alleged that they could not sign their 
own names. Here, the DCGI inquiry found that trials were conducted on disaster 
victims but trial casualties were not related to the trial. The petitioners challenged the 
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report findings because they were not independently verified. Again, no legal or 
other action was taken for violating informed consent procedures.  
In 3) The HPV vaccine (Gardasil and Cervarix) clinical trial the petitioners 
alleged that PATH and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, along with the drug 
producers, were involved in an unethical trial where informed consent procedures 
were violated. However, despite the fact that the Parliamentary Committee inquiry 
report also revealed irregularities in the informed consent procedures, no action was 
taken beyond a temporary suspension of the project.  
It is evident that because of the lack of a clear law and regulatory practice it 
has been hard to apportion any blame or wrongdoing in legal terms, although in all 
the cases there was recognition that best practice had not been followed. All these 
cases suggest that ethical considerations and rules pertaining to informed consent fall 
outside the bounds of Indian law and enforcement. Although, as noted earlier, during 
the hearing of the SAM case the Supreme Court issued interim orders that prompted 
the CDSCO to introduce the requirement to make audio-video recording of informed 
consent mandatory for vulnerable subjects. Nevertheless, the success or failure of 
such a mandate is yet to be ascertained as the regulations are silent on the definition 
of vulnerable subjects, the vetting of consent tapes, and the repercussions if 
regulations are ignored or unmet.  
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to show how the idea of informed consent translates to the Indian 
context. This, however, is an incomplete elucidation of how informed consent looks 
like within the Indian context. As noted above, problems with informed consent 
procedures exist partly because of the inadequacy of the existing regulatory 
framework to effectuate the idea of informed consent. The existing framework, i.e., 
the Indian law on informed consent, will be assessed in the next chapter.  
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LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT IN INDIA & ABROAD 
4.0.    Introduction 
The idea of informed consent is made effective through the law of informed consent. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the legal doctrine of informed consent largely 
developed around the doctor-patient relationship in relation to the treatment context. 
In this chapter, I will assess the appropriateness of its applicability to the research 
context. This chapter aims to answer three questions: How does the law in India deal 
with informed consent in treatment and in clinical research? How can courts deal 
with instances of lack of informed consent in research? What are the limits of law in 
dealing with the informed consent process? To answer these, the chapter is divided 
into three parts. Part 1 gives a brief overview of the current Indian precedent dealing 
with the lack of informed consent within the treatment context. It also considers the 
feasibility of its applicability to the research context. Part 2 outlines the legal avenues 
available in India for addressing lack of informed consent in research. Due to the 
absence of case law on lack of informed consent in research in India, it also engages 
in a normative discussion, that is, a discussion on how the Indian legal doctrine of 
informed consent in clinical research can be developed around clinical research. Part 
3 discusses the limits of law in dealing with informed consent in research within the 
larger social context of India.  
Part 1. Law of Informed Consent in Treatment 
4.1.  Indian Law and the Treatment Context 
Before we look at the specific legal cases dealing with informed consent in India, it 
is important to have a general idea of the Indian legal system. India follows the 
common law tradition like most of the countries that were a part of the British 
Commonwealth. The jurisprudence is said to mirror that of England, but one that is 
‘cross-fertilized’ by Indian values that are reflected in the Constitution of India.
1
 
There is an established practice by the Indian courts, especially the Supreme Court of 
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India, to consider foreign precedents for settling various conflicts in law, for 
interpreting identical provisions in law, or for establishing good practice.
2
 It is 
crucial to note that the value of these precedents is ‘persuasive’ and not ‘binding’.
3
 In 
the past few years reliance on foreign precedents has become quite commonplace in 
common law jurisdictions like South Africa, India, and Canada. Some scholars have 
dubbed this trend as “trans-judicial communication”.
4
 This kind of communication 
involves judges citing relevant passages from both international and comparative law 
in their judgments. Indian courts have also referred to certain academic writings that 
have appeared in various law reviews of the American universities.
5
 Consequently, 
the law on informed consent in India has largely been shaped around judicial 
precedents from the UK and the US. 
Here I will analyse how informed consent is understood in tort law in India. 
This is because other than the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (CPA), where doctors 
are treated as service providers and patients as consumers of such services and lack 
of informed consent as deficiency in service, there is no other statutory basis for a 
lack of informed consent claim in treatment.
6
 The standards for information 
disclosure as developed in the torts of medical negligence and battery form the 
corpus of the legal doctrine of informed consent.  
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In tort law, a liability arises if a doctor fails in her duty to disclose the 
material risks inherent in the proposed therapeutic treatment or surgery.
7
 Thus, the 
patient has the common law right to recover damages against the physician for 
failure to provide adequate informed consent.
8
 A claim for lack of informed consent 
calls for the same elements required to establish a traditional negligence claim under 
tort law, viz.,  
i) a duty of care owed by a doctor to use reasonable care to prevent 
harm to the plaintiff,  
ii) breach of this duty of care,  
iii) harm or injury caused to the patient, and  
iv) a proximate causal link between the injury and the breach of duty.9  
In this chapter I will predominantly focus on i), ii), and iii) - the duty owed by the 
doctor/investigator (this duty being duty to inform the individual of all material 
risks), breach of that duty in performing a medical/clinical intervention on the 
individual, and the resulting harm to the individual.  
 Lack of informed consent cases may also fall under the tort of trespass to 
persons, which is the tort of battery in India. Most torts fall under two categories - 
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intentional and unintentional torts.
10
 To put it simply, negligence is an unintentional 
tort where a patient is not sufficiently informed about the risks inherent in the 
treatment and alternatives to the treatment. Assault and battery are intentional torts 
where the doctor intended to cause contact with the patient without the patient’s 
consent. A claim can be brought under the tort of battery if it involves any non-
consensual touching. It is important to note the difference between these torts 
because there have been situations where a claim was erroneously identified under 
battery instead of negligence.
11
 This often leads to dismissal of the case for 
inappropriate cause of action.   
4.1.1.  Indian case law on informed consent in treatment 
The current binding precedent on informed consent in India is Samira Kohli v. Dr. 
Prabha Manchanda & Another
12
 (hereafter the Kohli case). The brief facts of the 
case are that Samira Kohli, the petitioner, consulted with Dr. Prabha Manchanda, the 
respondent, regarding her prolonged menstrual bleeding. She was admitted to the 
respondent’s clinic where she signed the consent form for hospital admission, 
medical treatment, and for surgery. The consent form for surgery described the 
procedure to be undergone by the petitioner as “diagnostic and operative 
laparoscopy. Laparotomy may be needed”. The petitioner was subjected to a 
laparoscopic examination under general anaesthesia. While the petitioner was 
unconscious during her examination, the respondent’s assistant took the consent of 
the patient’s mother for a hysterectomy. After which the respondent removed the 
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patient’s uterus (abdominal hysterectomy, AH), ovaries, and fallopian tubes (bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomy, BSO). The petitioner filed a complaint before the National 
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) under the CPA, claiming 
compensation of INR 25 lakh
13
 from the respondent. Her complaint said that the 
doctor had been negligent, and that the radical surgery, by which her uterus, ovaries, 
and fallopian tubes had been removed, had been performed without her consent. The 
petitioner claimed compensation for the loss of her reproductive organs, irreversible 
damage to the body, loss of the opportunity to become a mother, diminished 
prospects of matrimony, and for emotional trauma. The NCDRC dismissed the 
complaint on the grounds that the hysterectomy had been performed with adequate 
care and that the patient had voluntarily sought treatment at the respondent’s clinic. 
Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India. 
The court overruled the order passed by the NCDRC and held that: 
...there was no consent by the appellant for performing hysterectomy 
and salpingo-oopherectomy, performance of such surgery was an 
unauthorized invasion and interference with appellant's body which 




The court, however, observed that even though the respondent’s act was in “excess 
of consent”,
15
 the act was done in good faith and for the benefit of the petitioner. 
Consequently, the compensation amount that was directed to be paid to the petitioner 
was significantly less than claimed.
16
 The next section will look at the relevance of 
this case to the research context.  
4.1.2.   Importance of the Kohli case and its applicability to the research context  
As noted in the previous chapter, adequate information disclosure is one of the three 
essential elements of informed consent. The chapter also detailed three distinct 
standards used by courts in different common law jurisdictions to assess information 
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disclosure - the professional practice standard, the reasonable person standard, and 
the less commonly used subjective standard. The Kohli case dealt with two of these 
standards: the professional practice standard, also known as the Bolam test, and the 
reasonable person standard, called the Canterbury principle. Let us look at these 
standards before evaluating the Kohli case.  
The US Courts of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in 
Canterbury v. Spence
17
 laid down the ‘reasonable person standard’, also called the 
Canterbury principle, which mandated the doctor to disclose all ‘material risks’ to a 
patient to indicate that the consent was ‘informed’. The US court held that: 
 [t]rue consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise 
of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably 
the options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average 
patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and 
ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for 
enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From these 
almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn the 
requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to 
make such a decision possible.
18
  
Thereafter the court laid down that the doctors had a duty to disclose all material 
risks to the patient with the exception of where disclosure of risks would pose a 
threat to the well-being of the patient. The court also defined ‘material’ risk; it held 
that a risk was material: 
…when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should 
know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to 
forego the proposed therapy.
19
  
In contrast, the Bolam case (discussed below) took the view that a reasonable 
practitioner was in a better position to decide what information was relevant to be 
disclosed to the patient for her decision to proceed with the medical procedure.  
                                                          
17 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this case the plaintiff, Canterbury, claimed 
that prior to his spinal surgery, the defendant, surgeon Spence did not disclose the probable 




 Supra note 17, Canterbury case. 
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The ‘professional practice standard’ for determining negligence and for 
assessing information disclosure was first developed in the UK case, Bolam v. Friern 
Hospital Management Committee.
20
 In this case, the English High Court endorsed 
medical paternalism through its “doctor knows best” ratio. While discussing the issue 
of negligence in failing to obtain a minimum standard of care while treating the 
patient, Judge McNair wrote: 
A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with 
the practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men 
skilled in that particular art 
While determining if the doctors were negligent in failing to warn the patient of the 
risks involved in the treatment, the English court upheld the verdict of Lord President 
Clyde in Hunter v. Hanley,
21
 which was: 
That in determining whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to 
succeed on his allegation of failure to warn, the material 
considerations were, first, whether or not the defendants, in not 
warning him of the risks involved in the treatment, had fallen below a 
standard of practice recognized as proper by a competent body of 
professional opinion 
The ratio decidendi in this case came to be known as the Bolam test and was 
cemented further in the House of Lord’s decision in Sidaway v. Board of Governors 
of the Bethlem Royal Hospital.
22
 (hereafter Sidaway case) 
In Sidaway case, the claimant, Mrs. Sidaway, was left paralysed after a spinal 
surgery and she sued the hospital for not having been informed about the risk of 
complication, which was around 1-2%. The majority of the House of Lords applied 
the Bolam test and stated that it was the accepted medical practice to not disclose a 
paralysis risk in spinal surgeries because the risk was extremely low.
23
 This case, 
                                                          
20
 Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, [1957] 1 WLR 582. In this case the claimant, 
Bolam, was undergoing electro convulsive therapy (ECT) as treatment for his mental illness. The 
doctor from the defendant Hospital did not give the claimant any relaxant drugs. During the ECT the 
claimant suffered a serious fracture. There was a divided opinion amongst medical professionals 
regarding administration of relaxant drugs during ECT. When relaxants were given there was a very 
small risk of death, but when they were not given there was a small risk of fracture. The claimant 
claimed that the doctor was in breach of duty for not using relaxant drugs during his ECT. 
21 1955 S.L.T. 213, 217.  
22
 Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, [1985] AC 871. 
23
 Id., pp. 904-905. 
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even though rejected by the courts in the US, Canada, and Australia, prevailed in the 
UK for over 30 years. The position it upheld was that the Bolam test applied not only 
to a doctor’s decisions about diagnosis and treatment but also to a doctor’s advice 
and disclosure for the purpose of patient’s consent. However, the case became well-
known for Lord Scarman’s dissenting opinion, which was heavily influenced by the 
views of his transatlantic counterparts,
24
 and read: 
That [Bolam] test, while correct with regard to diagnosis and 
treatment—matters of professional skill and competence—is not 
correct with regard to warnings. Having ascertained the risks 
attendant upon proposed treatment, the duty to give information as to 
those risks is an adjunct of the patient's right to decide. The duty is to 
tell the patient the material risks and the choices open to him. Where 
an operation is on the fringe of necessity, the duty of disclosure of 
risks should be greater.
25
 
He suggested that the appropriate test would be the one propounded by Judge 
Bristow in Chatterson v. Gerson,
26
 who had adopted the position of the Canadian 
case, Reibl v. Hughes.
27
 Judge Bristow wrote of the duty of the doctor that:   
[h]e ought to warn of what may happen by misfortune however well 
the operation is done, if there is a real risk of a misfortune inherent in 
the procedure. 
It is pertinent to note that the English courts have now moved beyond the Bolam test 
and the Sidaway decision. In a 2015 case, Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health 
Board,
28
 the UK Supreme Court, while deciding on the issue of whether a consultant 
obstetrician and gynaecologist was negligent in managing the pregnancy of Mrs. 
Montgomery, made way for a fresh legal understanding of the concept of informed 
consent. The seven Judge Bench allowed Mrs Montgomery’s appeal and after a 
                                                          
24
 He referred to the US case Canterbury v. Spence, supra note 17, and the Canadian case Reibl v.  
Hughes, infra note 27. 
25 
Supra note 21, p. 874.  
26 
Supra note 12. 
27
 In Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880, the Canadian Supreme Court, other than laying down the 
difference between battery and negligence, rejected the “accepted medical practice” test for disclosure 
of information and held that the test to ascertain if enough information has been given to a patient was 
to objectively consider if a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have decided to have the 
surgery if they were given all of the information and to also consider if this answer was different than 
the original answer with only the amount of information that was given.  
28
 [2015] 2 WLR 768. 
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careful analysis of the post-Bolam cases on informed consent overturned the Sidaway 
judgment. Following Montgomery, “the Bolam test will no longer apply to disclosure 
for consent and is replaced with quite another, namely the so-called patient-centred 
test.”
29
  This means that, in the UK, the standard has shifted from the paternalistic 
‘what a reasonable practitioner would do’ to a patient-autonomy enhancing ‘what a 
reasonable person would want to know?’ 
The Kohli case is noteworthy for the jurisprudence on informed consent in 
India for two reasons: 1) It rejects the Canterbury principle, or the reasonable person 
standard, for information disclosure that most leading common law jurisdictions have 
now accepted and 2) it adopts a socio-economic line of reasoning to prefer the Bolam 
test over Canterbury. The judges in this case noted: 
In India, [the] majority of citizens requiring medical care and 
treatment fall below the poverty line. Most of them are illiterate or 
semi-literate. They cannot comprehend medical terms, concepts, and 
treatment procedures. They cannot understand the functions of 
various organs or the effect of removal of such organs. They do not 
have access to effective but costly diagnostic procedures. Poor 
patients lying in the corridors of hospitals after admission for want of 
beds or patients waiting for days on the roadside for an admission or a 
mere examination, is a common sight. For them, any treatment with 
reference to rough and ready diagnosis based on their outward 
symptoms and doctor's experience or intuition is acceptable and 
welcome so long as it is free or cheap; and whatever the doctor 
decides as being in their interest, is usually unquestioningly accepted. 
They are a passive, ignorant and uninvolved in treatment 
procedures.
30
 [My emphasis] 
This line of reasoning, where poverty and poor conditions of literacy are 
automatically assumed to render an individual ‘passive’ and ‘ignorant’ about one’s 
treatment decisions, is dangerously paternalistic. Although the judges in the Kohli 
case have shown great awareness and sympathy for the real conditions of patients in 
India, they have reiterated the support for paternalism that the Bolam test seemed to 
                                                          
29
 J. Badanoch QC, A doctor’s duty of disclosure and the decline of ‘The Bolam Test’: A dramatic 
change in the law on patient consent, MEDICO-LEGAL JOURNAL, Vol. 84, Issue No. 1, (2016).  
30
 Kohli case, supra note 12, ¶ 26. 
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exemplify with its “doctors know best” approach.
31
 While making observations about 
the appalling conditions of patients in India, the judges in this case also questioned 
the relevance of informed consent in a country like India. They opined: 
The poor and needy face a hostile medical environment inadequacy in 
the number of hospitals and beds, non-availability of adequate 
treatment facilities, utter lack of qualitative treatment, corruption, 
callousness and apathy. Many poor patients with serious ailments (e.g. 
heart patients and cancer patients) have to wait for months for their 
turn even for diagnosis, and due to limited treatment facilities, many 
die even before their turn comes for treatment. What choice do these 
poor patients have? Any treatment of whatever degree, is a boon or a 
favour, for them. The stark reality is that for a vast majority in the 
country, the concepts of informed consent or any form of consent, and 
choice in treatment, have no meaning or relevance.
32
 [My emphasis] 
The conclusion of the Court here is problematic on at least two grounds. First, 
informed consent is not a conditional right. Saying that informed consent has “no 
meaning or relevance” for the poor owing to the lack of treatment facilities implies 
that informed consent is a luxury afforded to those who are not poor and have access 
to medical facilities. Yet all patients and research subjects, whether rich or poor, 
have the right to be informed about the treatment or study and have the right to either 
consent or to not consent depending on that information. Second, the judges in this 
case lost an excellent opportunity to reaffirm the duty of care owed to patients 
irrespective of their backgrounds. Even though the premise of the entire paragraph is 
true, and shows that the judges are aware of the ground realities in India, the 
conclusion ought to have been in favour of the protection of every patient’s 
autonomy. If this reasoning were to be extended to the research context, it would not 
stand, as no one would condone a position that informed consent has no meaning or 
relevance for the poor people volunteering for clinical research. In fact, the situation 
is quite the opposite for research; there is a need for bettering the informed consent 
process to protect the poor and vulnerable. For now, when the time comes for the 
                                                          
31
 The Bolam test has been derided in its support for medical paternalism in almost all scholarly works 
pertaining to the evolution of the law of informed consent, see K. McCombe, Paternalism and 
consent: has the law finally caught up with the profession?, ANAESTHESIA, Vol. 70, (2015), pp. 1016–
1019; A. Lee, ‘Bolam’ to ‘Montgomery’ is result of evolutionary change of medical practice towards 
patient-centred care, POSTGRADUATE MEDICAL JOURNAL, (2016), pp. 1-5. 
32
 Supra note 12.  
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courts to deal with cases arising out of lack of informed consent in research in India, 
they will first look at the law of informed consent within the treatment context to 
draw parallels with the research context, and here they would find an obiter that 
called informed consent meaningless and irrelevant for poor patients.  
On the matter of informed consent from the perspective of the ‘takers of 
consent’, the judges in the Kohli case opined:  
The position of doctors in government and charitable hospitals, who 
treat them, is also unenviable. They are overworked, understaffed, 
with little or no diagnostic or surgical facilities and limited choice of 
medicines and treatment procedures. They have to improvise with 
virtual non-existent facilities and limited dubious medicines. They are 
required to be committed, service oriented and non-commercial in 
outlook. What choice of treatment can these doctors give to the poor 




Although the premise of this paragraph is sympathetic, the Court’s observations lead 
to unsound implications. If this rhetorical observation by the court were to be 
advanced further, it would mean that the lack of resources available to a doctor 
would absolve the doctor from the duty to take informed consent from her patients. If 
this reasoning were to be extended to the research context, it would mean absolving 
researchers from their duty to take informed consent because of time constraints, 
funding problems, lack of administrative support, etc. This, however, is neither the 
established legal position, nor the ethical one. Fortunately, these observations were 
made as obiter dicta, subsequent to which the court chose Bolam over Canterbury 
citing the “ground realities” in India. It said: 
We have, however, consciously preferred the ‘real consent’ concept 
evolved in Bolam and Sidaway in preference to the ‘reasonably 
prudent patient test’ in Canterbury, having regard to the ground 
realities in medical and health-care in India. But if medical 
practitioners and private hospitals become more and more 
commercialized, and if there is a corresponding increase in the 
awareness of patient's rights among the public, inevitably, a day may 
come when we may have to move towards Canterbury. But not for the 
present.
34
 [My emphasis] 
                                                          
33
 Id., ¶ 27.  
34
 Id., ¶ 33.  
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This reasoning is equally questionable. This implies that for the court to have 
considered an autonomy-enhancing standard of information disclosure there would 
need to be some evidence that Indian citizens were more aware of their rights as 
patients. This leads to the implication that poor and unaware patients do not require a 
stronger protection of their right to autonomy and informed consent unless 
commercialisation of medicine become commonplace. If we look at the research 
context in India, we will find that most privately sponsored clinical research is 
commercial by nature and not all participants are aware of their rights.
35
 
Nevertheless, the difference between research and treatment is such that the unaware 
participants need to be given more information related to the study by the researcher. 
The Bolam test in affirming that the “doctor knows best” is quite redundant 
for the research context as it goes both against the ethical guidelines as well as 
informed consent process required by the statute.
36
 Albeit the researcher/investigator 
of a study might “know best” he is nonetheless required to disclose all relevant 
information about the study to the participant. Such disclosure cannot be measured 
against what other professionals in the field do considering that every research study 
is different. Furthermore, the risks involved in most studies are unknown; in fact, 
most studies are conducted on human subjects to uncover risks involved in 
procedures or drugs. Therefore, the potential risks that are generally disclosed in a 
similar study of a similar drug might be completely different from potential risks 
involved in the study of another. As such, and by the farthest stretch, if the courts 
were to consider the Bolam test as applicable to the research context, they could look 
at the ICMR or GCP ethical guidelines as the professionally accepted standards in 
human subject research. Given that most guidelines are released by professional 
bodies headed by people from a given profession, they can safely be regarded as the 
                                                          
35
 See V. D. Joshi, et al., Public awareness and perception of clinical trials: Quantitative study in 
Pune, PERSPECTIVES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 4, Issue No. 3, (2013); S. Nadimpally & D. 
Bhagianadh, “The invisible”: Participant's experiences in clinical trials, PERSPECTIVES IN CLINICAL 
RESEARCH, Vol. 8, Issue No. 1, (2017).  
36
 The purpose of informed consent in research is to diminish power asymmetries where the researcher 
has all the information regarding a particular study and the research subject has none and where the 
research subject often receives no direct benefit from participation in the study (in cases of non-
therapeutic research). See ICMR, Ethical Guidelines on Medical and Health Research on Human 
Participants, 2017, available at https://icmr.nic.in/guidelines/ICMR_Ethical_Guidelines_2017.pdf 
(last accessed on July 5, 2018) and Schedule Y of Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.  
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codified norms that ought to govern the behaviour of those professionals. This is 
perhaps the only approach that could somehow accommodate the Bolam test within 
the research context.  
Let us now look at another reason given by the court in the Kohli case to 
prefer the Bolam test to the Canterbury principle, the court noted: 
People in India still have great regard and respect for Doctors…There 
is an atmosphere of trust and implicit faith in the advice given by the 
Doctor. The Indian psyche rarely questions or challenges the medical 
advice. Having regard to the conditions obtaining in India, as also the 
settled and recognized practices of medical fraternity in India, we are 
of the view that to nurture the doctor-patient relationship on the basis 
of trust, the extent and nature of information required to be given by 
doctors should continue to be governed by the Bolam test rather than 
the 'reasonably prudential patient' test evolved in Canterbury. It is for 
the doctor to decide, with reference to the condition of the patient, 
nature of illness, and the prevailing established practices, how much 
information regarding risks and consequences should be given to the 




All the justifications given by ethical theorists to strengthen informed consent by 
increasing dialogue between doctor-patient/researcher-research subject, such as 
protection of patients/subjects and restoration of trust, were taken by the judges in 
this judgment and formulated into reasons for supporting the paternalistic Bolam test. 
The court reiterated the paternalism, that has been now been rejected by most 
common law jurisdictions, in stating that for the Indian patient a doctor should make 
decisions as other doctors see fit. One cannot help but note that there was not one 
sound legal reason given by the Supreme Court not to opt for the pro-patient 
Canterbury principle. Perchance the judges should have taken note of the comments 
made by Shepherd et al, regarding legal justice in favour of patient rights; they 
wrote:  
Law, especially in the realm of litigation, involves questions of 
justice. It can be no more pro-patient than it can be pro-plaintiff or 
pro-defendant. But if we return to the idea of patients generally - 
rather than the specific patient - being benefited or at least not harmed 
by a particular ruling, or to the idea of law that supports healing 
                                                          
37
 Supra note 12, ¶ 31. 
105 
 
relationships, then an explicit normative stance in favour of patients 




A final aspect of the Kohli case worthy of note is that the court used this case as an 
opportunity to clarify its position on medical negligence and the test for information 
disclosure, but it imposed liability on the respondent under the tort of battery.  
The tort of battery can be defined as a “direct act of the defendant which has 
the effect of causing contact with the body of the plaintiff without the latter's 
consent.”
39
 Thus, in order for a tort of battery to be established two conditions must 
be met, viz., i) intentional unauthorised contact with the patient (trespass to person) 
and ii) lack of patient's consent. It is pertinent to note that ‘harm’ is not a necessary 
condition for an action under battery. A patient can recover for battery even if she is 
not harmed, provided that the doctor performs the medical intervention without the 
patient's knowledge.
40
 Referring to some established precedents regarding the tort of 
battery,
41
 the judges in the Kohli case held that: 
Consent given only for a diagnostic procedure, cannot be considered 
as consent for therapeutic treatment. Consent given for a specific 
                                                          
38
 L. Shepherd & M. A. Hall, Patient-Centered Heath law and Ethics, WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW, 
Vol. 45, (2010), p.1450, while also citing J. H.  Krause, Can Health Law Truly Become Patient-
Centered?, WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW, Vol. 45, Issue No. 107, (2010), pp. 1490-1492.  
39
 F. A. Trindale, Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery, OXFORD JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES, Vol. 2, (1982), pp. 211-237, p. 216. 
40
 D. B. DOBBS, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS, (2
nd
 edn., West 2014). 
41
 The court referred to the Canterbury case , supra note 17, and also to the book, A. Grubb, Principles 
of Medical Law, (2
nd
 edn., Oxford University Press), ¶ 3.04, p. 133, which explained that “[a]ny 
intentional touching of a person is unlawful and amounts to the tort of battery unless it is justified by 
consent or other lawful authority.” The judges cite Murray v. McMurchy, 1949 (2) DLR 442, BC, 
where the supreme court of British Columbia in Canada, was looking at a claim under battery. In this 
case, during the course of a patient undergoing caesarian section, the doctor found fibroid tumours in 
the patient's uterus. Concluding that such tumours would be a danger in case of a future pregnancy, 
the doctor performed a sterilization operation. The court upheld the claim for damages for battery and 
held that sterilization could not be justified under the principle of necessity, as there was no immediate 
threat or danger to the patient's health or life, and there only consent for C section not for sterilization. 
Similarly it considered the case, Marshall v. Curry, 1933 (3) DLR 260, in Canada. In this case the 
doctor discovered a diseased testicle while performing a hernia operation. The doctor considered the 
testicle to be gangrenous, which posed a threat to patient's life and health. The doctor removed the 
testicle without consent. Here the claim under battery failed because it was necessary to save the 
person’s life despite no consent for the act. 
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Thus, the court in the Kohli case held that the lack of consent for hysterectomy and 
SPO was “an unauthorized invasion and interference with appellant's body”, thereby 
holding the respondent liable under the tort of battery.  
The Kohli case is the current precedent that stands as the law of informed 
consent in India; so far, it has not been challenged.
43
 Briefly, the court held that a 
reasonable practitioner should decide what a patient must know regarding her 
treatment rather than the patient herself because Indian patients are poor and deeply 
trust their doctors. Therefore, in order to nurture the trust between the poor Indian 
patient, who is lucky enough to get any treatment, and the doctor, who is 
overworked, the Bolam test was more suited to the Indian reality.  
Bearing in mind the law of informed consent in the treatment context in 
India, I will now analyse the legal avenues available for dealing with lack of 
informed consent in the research context in India.  
Part 2. Law of Informed Consent for Research 
There is no established legal doctrine of informed consent in research yet in India. 
Not the kind where courts have established comprehensive tests or standards for 
adjudicating claims arising from lack of informed consent in research. Nevertheless, 
if case law from other leading common law jurisdictions is taken into consideration, 
it can be said that the development of such doctrine is at its nascent stage. Therefore, 
in the absence of an established doctrine, I will first look at the possible legal 
avenues that are available to deal with lack of informed consent in research within 
the Indian context. After this, I will look at how the doctrine is being developed in 
other common law jurisdictions and how this could apply in India.  
                                                          
42
 Kohli case, supra note 12, ¶ 32 (iii). 
43
 Most recently, this case was used as the standard for medical negligence cases arriving before the 
National Commission in: Vimhans Hospital and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Jha and Ors. (2015), brought 
before the NCDRC. 
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4.2. Legal Avenues For Lack of Informed Consent in Research 
Within the context of globalised clinical trials (GCTs), the multiplicity of parties 
involved in the process of clinical research poses a major problem - on whom must 
the liability rest? Should it rest on the global research sponsors, the Contract 
Research Organisations (CROs), the Ethics Committees (ECs), the hospitals or 
physicians involved, the investigators, and/or on all of them? Once the bearer(s) of 
liability is/are recognised, under what law does one challenge a violation of informed 
consent? Must it be a tort claim, a violation of a fundamental right, a criminal 
offence, or a breach of legal rights under administrative law
44
 (that may arise where 
‘public servants’ involved)? I do not discuss fixation of liability in this thesis, but as 
investigator/researcher perspectives are central to this thesis, I will assume that the 
investigator of a trial is the duty-bearer and a breach of duty to fully inform the trial 
participant could lead to a cause of action against her. The legal treatment of 
informed consent, in terms of post-fact remedy, is quite ambiguous despite it being a 
seemingly well-defined legal right. Listed hereunder (Sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.6) are the 
legal avenues that deal with informed consent in research. I will assess the legal 
treatment afforded to lack of informed consent cases under each.  
4.2.1. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940  
As noted in the introductory chapter, the statute dealing with clinical trials in India is 
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (read with the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 
1945). Schedule Y of the Act lays down the procedure for informed consent, which it 
considers as a necessary condition for conducting trials.
45
 It says informed consent 
must be: 
i) Freely given and must be obtained in writing on an informed consent form. 
                                                          
44
 Administrative law mainly deals with the legal control of the government or of administrative 
authorities by the court. Articles 32 and 226, Constitution of India, deal with the power of the 
Supreme Court and High Courts respectively to issue orders or writs against administrative bodies.  
See further V. S. Deshpande (revised by V. Vahini), Administrative Law, in: J. MINATTUR (ED.), THE 
INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, (2
nd
 edn., Indian Law Institute, 2006),  p. 333-390.  
45
 Schedule Y, The Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.  
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iii) The patient information sheet as well as the informed consent form should 
have been approved by the ethics committee and furnished to the 
Licensing Authority (DGCI). 




v) If the trial participant or his/her legally acceptable representative is unable to 
read/write, an impartial witness should be present during the entire 
informed consent process who must append his/her signatures to the 
consent form. 
Although Schedule Y talks about the procedure of informed consent in clinical trials, 
it does not specify the penalty or the repercussions to be meted out if the rule were to 
be ignored. The Government of India introduced penal provisions in the Drugs and 
Cosmetics (Amendment Bill) 2013, which prescribed imprisonment of up to two 
years for failing to conduct trial with the “conditions and permissions” of the central 
licensing authority and for not compensating trial related injuries.
49
 However, the 
government withdrew the Amendment bill in 2016.
50
 As of now, the old Act of 1940 
still stands with no penal provisions. 
                                                          
46
 The Rules say that the Investigator must have informed the study subject verbally and through the 
patient information sheet (PIS).  
47
 The Rules give example of an unconscious person or a minor or those suffering from severe mental 
illness or disability.  
48
 The Rules says that a legally acceptable representative is a person who is able to give consent for or 
authorize an intervention in the patient as provided by the law(s) of India, viz., guardian for a minor 
and legal curator for the mentally ill and disabled.  
49
 “Under section 4ZE of the Bill, any clinical researcher (including the sponsor, institution or 
investigator and anyone who works on their behalf) who fails to conduct a clinical trial in accordance 
with “the conditions of permission” imposed by the central licensing authority would be punishable 
with a minimum of two years’ imprisonment and a fine of ₹5 lakh. Additionally, under section 4ZG of 
the Bill, any researcher who fails to provide compensation to a subject suffering a trial-related injury 
shall be punishable with “imprisonment which may extend to two years and a fine which shall not be 
less than twice the amount of the compensation””, see M. Barnes, et al., Clinical Trial Research Is No 
Crime, THE HINDU BUSINESSLINE, (December 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/clinical-trial-research-is-no-crime/article6652150.ece  
50
 The old bill was withdrawn to review the old law to “facilitate ease of doing business” in the 
country and to enhance the “quality and efficacy of the products”. The Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare (MoHFW) is set to “frame separate rules under the existing Act for regulating medical 
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If there are no penal provisions under the Act, one might then wonder how 
ethical lapses in research are usually dealt with. For that we will have to turn to the 
Code of Medical Ethics Regulation released by the Medical Council of India. 
4.2.2.  Ethical Misconduct 
Given that the principal statute governing clinical trials in India does not have a 
penalty clause for lack of informed consent, it is necessary to look to other legal 
avenues available under related laws and regulations. Provision 7.22 of the Code of 
Medical Ethics Regulation, 2002, states: 
Clinical drug trials or other research involving patients or volunteers 
as per the guidelines of ICMR can be undertaken, provided ethical 
considerations are borne in mind. Violation of existing ICMR 
guidelines in this regard shall constitute misconduct. Consent taken 
from the patient for trial of drug or therapy which is not as per the 
guidelines shall also be construed as misconduct.
51
 
This means that if a registered doctor conducting a clinical trial in India fails to 
adhere to the ICMR Guidelines
52
 on ethical conduct for human subject research, 
including informed consent requirements, she could be deemed guilty of 
‘professional misconduct’. As noted in the introductory chapter, disciplinary action 
has been taken by the Medical Council of India (MCI) against doctor-investigators 
guilty of ethical misconduct in clinical research.
53
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
devices; and (ii) to bring out separate legislations for regulating medical devices and Drugs and 
Cosmetics. See Press Information Bureau, Government of India Cabinet, Withdrawal of the Drugs and 
Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill, 2013 (June 22, 2016), available at 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=146413 (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
51
 Medical Council of India, Code of Medical Ethics Regulation, 2002, (Amended upto 8
th
 October, 
2016), Part III, Section 4 of the Gazette of India, dated 6th April, 2002) 
https://www.mciindia.org/ActivitiWebClient/rulesnregulations/codeofMedicalEthicsRegulations2002 
(last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
52
 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on 
Human Participants, 2006, (although an updated version was released in 2016, it is not available on 
the ICMR website yet), http://www.icmr.nic.in/ethical_guidelines.pdf (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
53
 Times News Network, Two GMC docs suspended for illegal clinical trials, (September 25, 2015), 
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/Two-GMC-docs-suspended-for-illegal-
clinical-trials/articleshow/49096661.cms  (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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 Nevertheless, for some instances of unethical research disciplinary action 
might not be enough. So is there any scope for criminal prosecution? The next 
section will briefly address this possibility. 
4.2.3.  Criminal Prosecution  
If trial investigators were to use ‘criminal force’ to recruit trial participants in trials 
without their consent, a criminal liability could arise under Section 350 of the IPC.
54
 
A trespass to person, without a person’s consent can also be treated as a crime of 
‘assault’ under Section 351 of the IPC.
55
 No criminal liability arises in case of death 
or injury to participants, who duly consented, during the course of a clinical trial.
56
 In 
cases where trial participation with the consent of the participant causes death or 
injury, or serious and adverse events (SAEs), due compensation has to be paid to the 
victim’s family under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and in 
accordance with the compensation guidelines released by the CDSCO.
57
 However, 
criminal liability could conceivably arise where trial participation, without the 
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 § 350, Indian Penal Code, 1860, defines Criminal Force as, “[w]hoever intentionally uses force to 
any person, without that person’s consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by 
the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause 
injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that 
other” 
55
 § 351, Indian Penal Code, 1860, says “[w]hoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending 
or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend 
that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to 
commit an assault” 
56
 This aspect led Richardson to argue for considering criminal punishment for medical researchers 
involved in human experimentation, as according to him their “exalted social status and the perceived 
social benefit” of their research immunises them from criminal sanctions. For him, this negatively 
affects the value of autonomy and human dignity in research because alternative sanctions lack the 
same expressive impact as a criminal sanction. See L. S. Richardson, When Human Experimentation 
is Criminal, JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, Vol. 99, Issue No. 1, (2008-2009). 
57
 Vide notification G.S.R. 53 (E) dated 30/01/2013 an amendment was made to Rule 122DAB and a 
new Appendix-XII was added to Schedule Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The amendment 
specified the procedure to arrive at the cause of death or injury to the subject, and to determine the 
quantum of compensation. A formula for compensation was later released by the CDSCO, available at 
http://www.cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/formula2013SAE.pdf (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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consent of a person, and/or conducted by unregistered sponsors/investigators as a 
fraud trial, leads to the death of the trial participant.
58
  
 Criminal liability aside, for unethically conducted trials the narrative is often 
framed in terms of violation of rights; something like due to improper informed 
consent procedure the right of the research participant was violated in a trial. The 
next section will examine this as a potential violation of a fundamental right as 
enshrined in the Constitution of India. 
4.2.4. Violation of a fundamental right under the Constitution of India 
If we frame informed consent within the narrative of rights, a research participant’s 
right to informed consent can broadly be placed under the right to autonomy.
59
 The 
Constitution of India provides for protection of ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21,
60
 
which also includes protection of personal autonomy. The Supreme Court has held 
personal liberty and autonomy to include “both the negative right of not to be subject 
to interference by others and the positive right of individuals to make decisions about 
their life, to express themselves and to choose which activities to take part in.”
61
 
Constitutional rights are usually enforceable by an individual ‘vertically’ against 
state authorities. But constitutional courts in different jurisdictions have allowed for 
application of rights ‘horizontally’, which means that an individual may enforce 
constitutional rights against non-state private bodies.
62
 I make this point to suggest 
that if a claim based on the violation of the right to informed consent were brought 
before the courts
63
 in India, as a violation of right to life and personal liberty, it 
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 This is slightly a hedging bets kind of a scenario, it could happen that in a fraud trial where the 
death of a non-consenting participant takes place, the provisions of the Indian Penal Code related to 
culpable homicide, murder, and fraud would be invoked.  
59
 Of course, such a right to autonomy or the right to informed consent are not absolute. See C. P. 
Selinger, The right to consent: Is it absolute?, BRITISH JOURNAL OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS, Vol. 2, 
Issue No. 2, (2009), pp. 50-54.  
60
 Article 21, Constitution of India, 1949, says “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to a procedure established by law.” 
61
 Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1, ¶34-35 [My emphasis]. 
62
 See S. Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 
102, Issue 387, (2003). 
63
 In India, the High Courts of various states and the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to hear cases 
on violation of fundamental rights. See S. CHOUDHARY, ET AL., (EDS.),  OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
INDIAN CONSTITUTION, (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
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would, in the first instance, only be maintainable against ‘state’ actors.
64
 However, 
the Supreme Court could impose an obligation upon the ‘state’ to take necessary 
steps to ensure the observation of fundamental rights by other private individuals. 
Therefore, it is important that we understand what ‘state’ means within the purview 
of this thread.  
Article 12 of the Constitution of India defines ‘State’. It provides that “[s]tate 
includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the 
Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory 
of India or under the control of the Government of India.”
65
 But if ‘horizontality’ is 
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 Unless otherwise the claimants could prove that the body they brought the claim against was so 
close to a state body in structure and function that it be regarded as ‘state’ for purposes of enforcement 
of fundamental rights, see infra note 65. As far as maintainability of such a claim is concerned, it 
could fall under a tort claim of suing the state via vicarious liability. The Supreme Court has 
recognised in State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, AIR 1962 SC 933, that State is liable for the tort or 
wrongs committed by its officials. Moreover, in Rudal Shah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086, the 
court held that the violation of right to life and personal liberty could end in civil liability. In fact, 
some commentators claim that it could be more expedient to make tort claims in India under Article 
32 of the Constitution of India, (the provision whereby individuals may seek redressal for the 
violation of their fundamental rights), provided a government official has violated the fundamental 
right of occurred. See N. Mitra, Chapter 54: Sovereign Immunity, in: CHOUDHARY, ET AL., (EDS.), 
(2016), p. 996, Id. 
65
 Article 12, Constitution of India, 1949, [My emphasis]. The Supreme Court has applied 
horizontality by including certain private bodies under ‘other authorities’, these bodies, in order to be 
considered ‘state’, ought to resemble state bodies in either their ‘structure’ or ‘function’ and should be 
closely connected to the State. Fundamental rights are generally regarded as negative rights; this 
means that they cast some constraints upon the actions of the State. They normally do not impose 
positive obligations upon the State to act in a particular way. However, the Supreme Court of India 
has imposed positive obligations upon the State to regulate acts of private individuals. This could be 
regarded as an application of horizontality through imposition of positive obligations. For instance, in 
the case of Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241, where the court held that 
the State’s failure to pass a sexual harassment legislation for regulating public and private workplaces 
violated the constitutional and fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The 
Court issued a set of guidelines that were supposed to stand-in till the Parliament passed a legislation 
against sexual harassment. The guidelines imposed a positive obligation upon the state to enforce a 
negatively worded right and regulate actions of private workplaces. It is noteworthy that in this case, 
and in all other cases where obligations have been extended to private actors, the respondent has 
always been the State. The Indian Constitution allows for direct horizontality under three Articles 
protecting fundamental rights of the citizens; Article 15(2), wherein no citizen may be restricted from 
access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, as well as places of 
public resort dedicated to the use of the general public, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
place of birth, or any of them. Article 17 prohibits the practice of untouchability and Article 23 which 
prohibits trafficking in human beings, as well as bonded labour. See further Indian Medical 
Assosication. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179,where private schools were ruled to be subject to 
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applied, which the Supreme Court has shown an inclination towards
66
 but not quite 
fully endorsed for some rights,
67
 the enforcement of fundamental rights could 
perhaps, someday, be directly extended to private non-state actors. As for now, the 
remedial avenue available by invoking fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution of India is two-fold - (A) to plead a writ against the state,
68
 or (B) 
demand compensation from a government official, who in the process of doing her 
official duty, violated a right that harmed the individual.
69
  
The first avenue, (A), was chosen by the petitioners in the SAM case, as was 
mentioned in the introductory chapter. It must be noted that a violation of informed 
consent norms was not a cause of action in the SAM case and the petitioners sought a 
writ, in public interest, against the state bodies.
70
 It remains to be seen what a court 
would do where an individual (or a single person’s) petition claimed a violation of 
the right to life due to a lack of informed consent in clinical trial participation. The 
court could, and probably might, direct the state to take steps towards controlling 
further violation of fundamental rights. Under the second avenue, (B), damages can 
be claimed by a broader application of tort law against the state (via vicarious 
liability). But such a claim would require the proof that the violator was performing 
an act in her official capacity, in the employment of the state, and her act in such 
capacity violated the fundamental right of the individual which led to harm or 
injury.
71
 This claim would be impossible to bring in a clinical trial organised and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the non-discrimination guarantees given by the Constitution, and P.U.D.R. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 
1982 S.C. 1473, begar” under Article 23 did not simply refer to “bonded labour” in its technical sense, 




 Id. Which is wise because a badly reasoned constitutional interpretation could be termed judicial 
‘overreach’, lest the courts forget Justice Bhagwati’s statement in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 
(1987) 1 SCC 378, where he stated that “[i]t is settled law that a constitutional authority cannot do 
indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly. If there is a constitutional provision inhibiting the 
constitutional authority from doing an act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by 
adoption of any subterfuge.” 
68
 See Article 32 (Supreme Court) & Article 226 (High Courts), Constitution of India. 
69
 See National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, A consultation paper on: 
Liability of the State in Tort, (January 8, 2001), available at 
http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v2b1-13.htmv (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
70
 And therefore, not private ‘individual’ interest. See Chapter 3 of this thesis for a discussion on the 
Swasthya Adhikar Manch v Union of India, (SAM case).  
71
 Article 300, Constitution of India provides for the State to be sued as juristic personality. But for a 
tortious action brought against the state for the act of its servants, the basic elements that must be 
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executed entirely by private actors. (B) would only be possible in a government-run 
(or government-sponsored) trial or where an investigator was working in the capacity 
of an employee of the state. There is much to be discussed here in terms of 
constitutional theory and practice in India, but for brevity, I will limit the discussion 
to these particulars, as it is just one of the remedial avenues for claims arising out of 
lack of informed consent in research. I will now look at the treatment of lack of 
informed consent under the Human Rights Act, 1993. 
4.2.5.  Violation of the Human Rights Act, 1993 
India passed the Protection of Human Rights Act in 1993. Under this Act, there were 
provisions to set up the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and State 
Human Rights Commissions (SHRCs) in the states.
72
 The mandate of this Act is 
extended only to the acts of public servants,
73
 which means that, as with 
constitutional law, the ‘verticality’ of rights is observed. Human rights
74
 are therefore 
enforceable only against the state and private parties are kept outside the purview of 
this Act.  
In 2011, upon receiving complaints by various groups that drug companies 
were conducting clinical trials of new medicines on the poor without their informed 
consent, the NHRC issued notices to the Union Health Secretary, ICMR, and DCGI, 
calling for reports on allegations of fatal drug trials in the country.
75
 It even 
recommended some guidelines to the Union Secretary of Health on better regulation 
                                                                                                                                                                    
present are: a) the employer-employee relationship must be determined, b) the act of the state servant 
must have been done while carrying out her duties in official capacity, and c) there must be harm 
caused to the life or property of the claiming individual. See generally J. W. Neyers, A Theory of 
Vicarious Liability, ALBERTA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 43, Issue No. 2, (2005).  
72
 Sections 3 and 21, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.  
73
 Section 13, Id.  
74
 Section 2(d) of the Human Rights Act, 1993, says ““human  rights”  means  the  rights  relating  to  
life,  liberty, equality  and  dignity  of  the  individual  guaranteed  by  the Constitution  or  embodied  
in  the  International  Covenants and  enforceable  by  courts  in  India.” 
75
 NHRC Case No. 787/6/0/2011, see also NHRC issues notices to the Union Health Secretary, ICMR 
and DCGI calling for reports on allegations of fatal drug trials in the country, (August 12, 2011),  
available at 
http://www.nhrc.nic.in/dispArchive.asp?fno=2364 (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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of clinical trials in India.
76
 However, when a petition on the same cause of action was 
filed in the Supreme Court, the NHRC had to relinquish its authority on the matter, 
as the Commission cannot inquire into sub judice cases.
77
 The role of the NHRC in 
India is more-or-less a ‘paper tiger’. Its decisions are not legally binding
78
 and it 
cannot take cognizance of human rights violations if they are reported one year after 
their occurrence.
79
 It can, however, call for compliance reports and ask the 
authorities to follow up on them.
80
 Hence, it is quite effective in drawing the 
government’s attention to rights violations.  
Now that we have taken note of the avenues available to individuals under 
public law, let us consider the remedies available to individuals under private law in 
India. 
4.2.6.  Remedy under private law/tort law 
Private law is the body of law that deals with horizontal interactions between 
individuals in their capacities as private actors.
81
 It is unclear whether individuals 
have a private right to action to receive damages for lack of informed consent in 
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 NHRC sends draft guidelines on clinical drug trials to the Union Health Secretary: Also decides to 
file an affidavit in the Supreme Court on the issue, (August 20, 2013), available at 
http://nhrc.nic.in/dispArchive.asp?fno=12968 (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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 Section 36, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 
78
 Under Section 18(b) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the NHRC has the right to 
“approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such directions, orders or writs as that 
Court may deem necessary.” Hence, this is one method of making sure that the state authorities 
comply with the orders of the Commission. High Courts in states like Uttar Pradesh have ruled that 
the orders of the NHRC are not merely recommendatory in nature and States are duty bound to 
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State of U.P. v. NHRC, W.P. (Civil), 15570 of 2016.  
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 Supra note 77.  
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 See Section 18, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.  
81
 M. Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty First 
Century: An Introduction, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. 11, (2013), p. 
126.  
82
 This is the conclusion based on my research conducted on online legal databases and legal resources 
in the libraries.  
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Commentators have suggested that there is not much tort litigation in India 
due to the high costs of litigation.
83
 It could perhaps be one of the reasons why 
rights-based avenues (human rights or fundamental rights based) are currently more 
popular where issues related to clinical trials are concerned in India.
84
 Tort law 
development has been somewhat patchy in India.
85
 Even though there is a 
respectable body of case law on medical negligence,
86
 most of it derives from foreign 
precedents and there is, to my knowledge, no precedent on lack of informed consent 
in clinical research as the sole cause of action. Therefore, if someone wanted to 
employ a private law remedy under tort law in India for lack of informed consent in 
clinical research, the courts would perhaps like to note how the private right to action 
is invoked in other common law jurisdictions. Let us first find out if such a private 
right to action for lack of informed consent is recognised in other common law 
jurisdictions. 
4.2.7. Informed Consent in the research context: lessons from other 
jurisdictions 
There has been a steady increase in lawsuits in the USA based on investigators’ 
failure to take informed consent in the United States of America.
87
 Despite such an 
                                                          
83
 See K. B. AGRAWAL & V. SINGH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INDIA, (Kluwer Law 
International, 2010), p. 135.   
84
 The third chapter traced the Kalpana Mehta and SAM case which are the two major cases on 
clinical trials filed as PIL in the Indian Supreme Court, thereby showing the extent of rights based 
claims in this field. 
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 P. Reddy, A Small But Significant Victory For Tort Law And Civil Liberties, LIVE LAW, (October 6, 
2017), available at http://www.livelaw.in/small-significant-victory-tort-law-civil-liberties/ (last 
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 See generally T. K. KOLEY, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE LAW IN INDIA: DUTIES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
87
 M. M. Mello, et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE, Vol. 139, (2003), p. 40; A. Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical Research-Patient 
Safeguards, Oversight Key Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, (August 12, 2002), available at 
https://www.sskrplaw.com/lawsuits-target-medical-research-patient-safeguards-oversight-ke.html (last 
accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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increase in lawsuits, scholars claim that the courts have rarely succeeded in 
extending a right of private action to lack of informed consent in clinical research.
88
 
An analysis of case law from the US confirms this claim. For instance, in Wright v. 
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center,
89
 (hereafter Wright case) the Cancer 
Research Center and its investigators were sued by family members of cancer 
patients who had participated in a series of clinical trials conducted by the Center. 
The clinical trials used T-cell depletion in an effort to prevent graft-versus-host-
disease (GVHD), which is a major cause of death in bone marrow transplant 
recipients. Several patients, who were enrolled in the trial, died. The patients’ 
families brought the following claims against the Center: 
1) The federal regulations that defined research requirements for informed 
consent in clinical trials, known as the Common Rule
90
 had been violated and 
the families of patients could sue under the Civil Rights Act of 1983.
91
 
2) Since the families of the patients had due process rights as guaranteed under 
the US Constitution under the 14th Amendment, these rights were violated 
when the Center interfered
92
 with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
procedures. There were no adequate research procedures in place and the 
patients had suffered harm because of the Center’s negligence in not 
informing the patients that the GVHD treatment was known to cause bone 
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 V. G. Koch, (2015), supra note 7.  
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 Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002). 
90
 45 C.F.R. §46 et seq. (2002). The Federal Policy on the Protection of Human Subjects in the US, 
also called the ‘Common Rule’, was adopted by federal government agencies to promote uniformity 
in the conduct of human subjects research. Clinical research in the US is overseen by the Office of 
Human Research Protections (OHRP), which is an office within US Department of Health. The 
OHRP ensures regulatory compliance and provides guidance for the conduct of such research. 
91
 42 U.S.C.A. 1983.  
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 The families alleged that the Center did not disclose relevant information to the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) and intimidated the IRB in direct violation of the federal regulations. They also alleged 
that the investigators had a ‘financial interest’ for conducting the trial because they owned stock in the 
company that was responsible for supplying materials for the trial. These claims were based on a 
report carried by the Seattle times, see D. Wilson & D. Heath, Patients Never Knew They the Full 
Danger of Trials They Staked Their Lives on, SEATTLE TIMES, (2001), available at 




marrow rejection. (It is important to note that the plaintiffs did not bring a 
specific claim against the Center under the tort of negligence.) 
3) They claimed that since the US had accepted the Nuremberg Code, 
Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report,
93
 it signified that the US 
accepted the right to be treated with dignity and the right to informed consent 
as the standard in its due process jurisprudence. 
The US District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed all of the 
claims made by the patients' family. It granted the Center's motion for judgment in its 
favour. The jury found that the trial participants had given their consent.
94
 It also 
found that a reasonably prudent fully informed person in their position would have 
made the choice to participate in the clinical trial. The court held that breach of 
informed consent in clinical trials is not deemed a violation of a federal right as 
defined by law. The court said that: 
1) There was no statutory basis for the private rights of action that the 
petitioners sought to assert. It noted that there was no legal support for a 
private right to action or a civil rights claim because neither statute nor 
legislation had defined a right of action for a regulatory violation under the 
Common Rule.  
2) The 14th Amendment entitles citizens to have adequate due process, which 
means that the state must have constitutionally adequate procedures to protect 
                                                          
93
 The Belmont Report is a concise summary statement of the ethical principles and guidelines for 
research involving human subjects. The core principles identified in the report were: respect for 
persons (autonomy), beneficence, and justice, see The National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, The Belmont Report, (1979), available at 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html (last accessed on June 2, 
2018) 
94
 After due consideration of facts the jury found that the plaintiffs did not prove any missing 
information that would have changed the patients’ decisions. The court held that “[t]he entire 
complaint is couched in terms of the decedents' "participation in [the study]," with no indication that 
such participation was unknowing or that the protocol was anything other than an experiment 
designed to test new treatments for the type of cancer from which plaintiffs' decedents suffered. 
Finally, the Complaint acknowledges that plaintiffs' decedents signed "Consent to Participate" forms 
which, while not as forthcoming as plaintiffs obviously believe they should have been, informed the 
participants of both the experimental nature of the protocol and the hoped-for therapeutic results. For 




the individuals. But it does not require flawless implementation of these 
procedures. However, if an imperfect procedure leads to harm, the state must 
provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy. The court held that the families 
had access to adequate procedures, like a standard IRB procedure and post-
deprivation tort remedies, therefore, the court held that: “defendants' alleged 
actions in failing to obtain informed consent were random and unauthorized 
and because there are adequate post-deprivation remedies for their alleged 




3) The plaintiffs had eventually given up any private right of action under the 
Nuremberg Code and/or the Declaration of Helsinki. Their claim of a right of 
action under these documents was later amended to assert that the “precepts 
set forth in those documents are simply evidence of this country's recognition 




If the Wright case were to be applied to India, the court could find a similarity in the 
statutory absence of a right to private action. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 
does not prescribe any remedial clause for the failure to observe informed consent 
procedures for clinical trials. Moreover, a potential claim for lack of informed 
consent leading to violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of 
India would not stand if an Indian court were to consider what the US court in 
Wright noted: 
...defendants' failure to make disclosures necessary to the informed 
consent process in a therapeutic, experimental setting, does not 
implicate rights that are so rooted in the tradition and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental. A doctor's tortious failure 
to obtain informed consent is not a threat to our citizens' enjoyment of 
ordered liberty, even when the doctor is employed by the state. 
Although the failure to obtain informed consent necessarily throws 
some doubt on the voluntariness of the patient's participation in a 
research study, such a failure does not raise the specter of the type of 
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 Supra note 89. Moreover, the court noted that the “[p]laintiff has not identified, and the Court has 
not found any case which has equated lack of informed consent in the medical context with a 
constitutional violation.” 
96
 Id.  
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involuntary, non-therapeutic experimentation which shocked the 
nation after World War II and gave rise to the Nuremberg Code.
97
 
However, there have been cases where courts in the US have held that research 
participants can bring a claim for lack of informed consent in the research context. 
But these cases have either involved particular vulnerable population groups (Grimes 
case) or where the investigator has failed to disclose information about the 
foreseeable risk in research (Whitlock case). 
The Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute
98
 (Grimes case) involved non-
therapeutic health research on children.
99
 The brief facts of this case are that some 
researchers from Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI), an affiliate of the John Hopkins 
University, conducted a two-year study to measure the usefulness of varying levels 
of lead abatement procedures in housing. The US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and a few local Maryland organizations funded the study. Researchers from 
KKI were to measure and compare lead dust levels collected in the housing with lead 
levels in blood samples drawn from children living in those homes over the period of 
two years.
100
 It was necessary to obtain informed consent and parents were notified 
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 Supra note 89.   
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 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc, 366 Md 29, 782 A2d 807 (2001). 
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 Paragraphs 12 & 20 of the Declaration of Helsinki, deal with ethical principles related to research 
on vulnerable individuals and groups who have increased likelihood of being wronged. See World 
Medical Association (WMA), Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, 1964 (last amended in 2013), available at https://www.wma.net/policies-
post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/  
(last accessed on June 2, 2018). Part D of the Common Rule has additional protections for trials 
involving children, supra note 90, The Common Rule (2002). India released the ethical guidelines for 
the biomedical research involving children in 2015. It said that since children usually lack the capacity 
to consent, the authority to allow the child’s participation in a study “rests with parents or guardians, 
who must provide their permission. However, with respect for children’s emerging maturity and 
independence and investigators must seek to involve children in discussions about research and obtain 
their assent to participation." It also says that for children, between the ages of 7 and 12 years, oral 
consent must be obtained from the child in the presence of a parent or legal guardian; for children 
between the ages of 13 and 18, written consent must be obtained, See Indian Council for Medical 
Research (ICMR), National Ethics Guidelines for Bio-Medical Research involving Children, available 
at 
https://www.nihcollaboratory.org/sites/CbyC/Document%20Library/Draft%20National%20Ethics%2
0Guidelines%20for%20Biomedical%20Research%20involving%20Children.pdf (last accessed on 
June 2, 2018) 
100
 The study protocol “required certain classes of homes to have only partial lead paint abatement 
modifications performed ...[and]...required, the landlords to rent the premises to families with young 
children.”, Grimes case, supra note 98, pp. 811-812.  
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of their children's blood levels and the results of the lead dust collection in their 
homes. The report on blood levels was evidence of the effectiveness of a particular 
level of abatement. Two families that received less than full lead abatement brought 
the KKI to court on the grounds that KKI deliberately delayed the reporting of results 
that would have allowed them to prevent their children from being exposed to high 
levels of lead, and that KKI inadequately informed them about the hazards and risks 
involved in the study. 
In this case, the trial court ruled in favour for the investigators, but the 
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals held that the 
informed consent requirement under the Common Rule created a duty of care that 
arose out of a “special relationship” between the investigator and research participant 
and such a breach of such duty was actionable under state law. The court said: 
Such research  programs normally  create  special  relationships  
and/or  can  be  of  a  contractual  nature,  that  create  duties. The 
breaches of such duties may ultimately result in viable negligence 
actions. Because, at the very least, there are viable and genuine 
disputes of material fact concerning whether a special relationship, or 
other relationships arising out of agreements, giving rise to duties 
existed between KKI and both sets of appellants.
101
 
The court held that the study conducted by KKI lacked full informed consent of 
participants and the research did not comply with federal regulations.
102
 The court 
reiterated the Canterbury principle that the standard for disclosure is whether a 
reasonably prudent fully informed person would have decided to participate in the 
research. It then held that the KKI breached the duty of care by not disclosing 
information that the participant or the participant’s surrogate would have liked to 
know in terms of the ‘foreseeable risks’ of the study. The decision rested on the fact 
that the KKI waited nine months to disclose “hot spots” of high lead exposure to 
parents, even after the child's blood was found to contain elevated levels of lead.  
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It is important that we analyse this case thoroughly to determine whether this 
case extends a private right to action in all research-based cases. The court 
determined that a “special relationship” existed in this case because it involved 
healthy children who required surrogate consent to participate in the study. 
Moreover, the research was non-therapeutic (gave no direct benefit to the research 
participant) and there was more than ‘minor’ risk involved. These factors made the 
case ‘special’. Furthermore, the court said, “whether a duty of care existed between 
the parties is a question to be determined by the trier of fact on a case-by-case 
basis.”
103
 Koch suggests, and I concur, that since no other court in the US has found 
such a “special relationship” between investigators and research participants, “it 
would be presumptuous to assume, based on this single court's narrow holding, a 
general private right of action for participants for failure to disclose the risks and 
benefits of a research protocol.”
104
 I would argue that if such a case were to come 
before a court in India, it ought to follow a similar ‘case-by-case’ strategy to 
determine the nature of relationship between the research participant and the 
researcher.  
The other case mentioned above was Whitlock v. Duke University,
105
 (the 
Whitlock case). In this case, Leonard Whitlock participated in a simulated deep dive 
experiment to study high-pressure nervous syndrome. During the study, he suffered 
permanent organic brain damage. Whitlock alleged that Duke University had failed 
to warn him of the risk of organic brain damage and was, therefore, negligent in its 
duty to fully inform the participant about the ‘foreseeable risks’. The court held that 
the degree of required disclosure of risks is higher in the non-therapeutic research 
context than in the treatment context. The Court did not reach the issue of whether a 
private cause of action in favour of an experimental subject arises from the Common 
Rule. It granted a summary judgment
106
 to Duke University on the negligence issue 
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as it concluded that no genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the risk of organic 
brain damage was a ‘foreseeable risk’.  
This case is indicative of the legal recognition of a higher degree of 
disclosure being required for research cases than in treatment. If a case based on a 
similar cause of action were to arrive before a court in India, the court would have to 
reconsider its standard opted for disclosure of information.
107
 As noted earlier, the 
Bolam test does not do justice to the relationship between a research subject and an 
investigator. The nature of scientific research into new entities is such that no other 
investigator would be able to comment on the nature of any other investigator’s 
research. Bolam, in relation to information disclosure, has largely been abandoned in 
other common law jurisdictions. If a court in India were to use a pre-existing 
standard for information disclosure from the treatment context for dealing with a 
case under the research context, it might as well be the Canterbury principle. Then, 
at least, the standard of disclosure would be determined by the yardstick of what a 




Along the same thread of requiring a nominally higher degree of disclosure 
needed for research rather than the treatment context, the Canadian Court of Appeal 
in Saskatchewan in the case Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan et al. (1965),
109
 
(hereafter Halushka case) was of the opinion that: 
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[T]he duty imposed upon those engaged in medical research...to those 
who offer themselves as subjects for experimentation, as the 
respondent did here, is at least as great as, if not greater than, the duty 
owed by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his patient. There can be 
no exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure in the case of 
research as there may well be in ordinary medical practice. The 
researcher does not have to balance the probable effect of lack of 
treatment against the risk involved in the treatment itself. The 
example of risks being properly hidden from a patient when it is 
important that he should not worry can have no application in the field 
of research. The subject of medical experimentation is entitled to a 
full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities and opinions 




This case involved a student who was paid $50 to participate as a research subject in 
a test of a new anaesthetic. He was informed that the test involving a “new drug” was 
“safe” and he had nothing to worry about. He was also not informed that a catheter or 
a tube would be inserted into his heart; he was allegedly led to believe that the tube 
would be inserted in his arm. The plaintiff had signed a consent form. During the 
test, the plaintiff suffered from a cardiac arrest, but he was resuscitated. The plaintiff 
sued the defendants for trespass to person and negligence. The plaintiff’s claim for 
both trespass and negligence succeeded at the original trial. He was allowed to 
recover $22,500 as damages from the defendants, and the Court of Appeal upheld the 
verdict for damages but only under trespass, not negligence. While reaching its 
decision the court noted that in medical cases, an actionable trespass to person is said 
to have occurred if consent is not informed and freely given. The court also went into 
the risk versus benefit analysis of the research. It held that since the plaintiff was 
simply a research subject who received no therapeutic benefit from the research, he 
was entitled to a complete and frank disclosure of all facts, probabilities, and 




 The Indian court in Kohli was not quite clear in making a distinction between 
the tort of battery and negligence. It appears that the court was open to the idea of 
determining a liability under either negligence or battery, whichever suited the facts 
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of the case more.
112
 But in Halushka, the Canadian court made a distinction between 
the two torts. It said that the jury could have found that a negligent act on the part of 
the researchers might have led to trespass to the person, but that did not mean that the 
action related to the tort of negligence.
113
 More significantly, the Halushka case 
considered the differences between the research and treatment context and suggested 
that the standard of information disclosure under informed consent was a little higher 
than that required for in treatment. This was because there could be no case for 
exception to omit information for the welfare of the research participant, like a 
doctor could for the benefit of the patient. Morreim, while writing about the legal 
treatment of informed consent in research has written about the need for courts to 
understand the difference between the two contexts, he writes: 
Across this spectrum, the message is not that research injuries are 
somehow worse (or better) than medical malpractice, or that we need 
to augment (or diminish) the available causes of action against 
research errors. The message is simply that research is different, that 
courts need to be more knowledgeable and to think more clearly if 
they are to build an adequate foundation by which to guide conduct in 
this increasingly important realm.
114
 
To sum up the position on lack of informed consent in research, the US courts have 
recognised a “special relationship” between investigators and research subjects in a 
case involving children. They have recognised that a higher degree of disclosure is 
needed in research cases. They have also held that lack of informed consent does not 
provide a private right of action under federal regulations (Common Rule) and if an 
alternative remedy exists (as it does in tort); lack of informed consent is not a 
violation of due process (violation of life and person liberty). The Canadian position 
is that a higher degree of disclosure is needed for research, especially for non-
therapeutic research in which the risk is higher and which is of little benefit to the 
research subject. It is pertinent to note that each of these cases had different facts and 
completely different claims, which shows that the right to recover for lack of 
informed consent in research is not as established as it is under treatment. Moving 
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further, the cases that I have mentioned so far dealt with inadequate consent in the 
research context. I will now look at a case where the court had to deal with complete 
lack of consent, i.e., non-consensual cases of clinical research.  
4.2.8. Non-consensual research 
In the case of Mink et al. v. University of Chicago,
115
 the plaintiff along with a 
thousand other women was given diethylstilbestrol (DES) as part of a double blind 
study to study the affect of DES on preventing miscarriages. The plaintiffs were 
neither told that they were to be a part of an experiment nor were they told that they 
were being given DES, as such they alleged that their newly born daughters 
developed cervical abnormalities and that led to an increased risk of cancer in them 
and their daughters. The court held that the cause of action that could succeed was of 
battery since there was a complete lack of informed consent as the case involved 
“unauthorised touching” without the consent of the person. This equated to the tort of 
battery. Here again, as in Halushka, the court differentiated between the torts of 
battery and negligence. The court said that: 
While early cases treated lack of informed consent as vitiating the 
consent to treatment so there was liability for battery, the modern 
view [quoting from Prosser’s text on torts] “is that the action...is in 
reality one for negligence in failing to conform to the proper standard, 
to be determined on the basis of expert testimony as to what 
disclosure should be made.” Nonetheless, a battery action may still be 
appropriate in certain circumstances. Where the patient has not 
consented to the treatment, it is meaningless to ask whether the doctor 
should have revealed certain risks necessary to make the consent an 
"informed" one.
116
 [My emphasis] 
Summarising the previous two sub-sections, a court in India would have the option to 
entertain a claim arising out of lack of informed consent in research under the torts of 
battery or negligence (depending on the facts of the case). As for a private right to 
action for lack of informed consent in research, whether arising from a statute or 
other regulatory provision in India, the court would have a difficult time finding one. 
If a claim under lack of informed consent is filed in the higher courts as a violation of 
a fundamental right, it will remain at the discretion of the court to determine whether 
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the lack of informed consent amounted to a violation of the right to life and/or 
personal liberty (a position rejected by the US court in Wright).  
 Having outlined the position of the Indian courts on informed consent and 
suggesting the lessons that they could learn from other jurisdictions, simply focusing 
on law in this area is unlikely solve the problems with the process of informed 
consent. Of course, development of a clear and concise legal remedy is required to 
tackle grievances arising out of a lack of informed consent in research, but there are 
some limitations that need to be accounted for in any discussion on legal remedies. 
The next part will draw out some of these limitations. 
Part 3. The limits of law 
The law of informed consent in research, as described in Parts 1 and 2 above, sets 
legal standards for information disclosure but does not provide clarity on the redress 
mechanisms available if the standards are not met. But this is not the only limit of the 
law of informed consent. In what follows, I will outline a few other limitations of the 
law.  
4.3. Legalism and its pitfalls 
As noted in the previous chapter, the law of informed consent has been criticised for 
having a vision that is subpar to the ethical vision of informed consent.
117
 A number 
of commentators have challenged the legal implementation of the principle. One of 
the strongest criticisms came from Jay Katz, who called the law’s vision of informed 




Academics and medical lawyers have commented on how the importance 
placed on law
119
 sometimes makes the complexities of moral dilemmas disappear.
120
 
This is particularly evident when there are lawyers on ethics committees reviewing 
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medical cases or study designs. For instance, Cohen and colleagues while sharing 
their experiences on ethics committees, noted: 
[i]n all cases where there has been a lawyer on the ethics committee; 
that is, what tends to happen a lot is that everybody looks to one end 
of the table where the lawyer sits and asks, “What is the answer?” or 
“Is that legal?” and the lawyer says, “Yes, it's legal, it's fine,” or “No, 
it isn't.” That, in some cases, will end the discussion.
121
  
Such a situation depicts the drawbacks of ‘legalism’, which Callahan describes as 
“the translation of moral problems into legal problems.”
122
 Legalism is characterised 
by the elevation of the moral judgments of the courts as the moral standards of the 
land.
123
 The problem with legalism is that it reduces ethics committees to little more 
than legal watchdogs who care only about adherence to law, thereby reducing moral 
reasoning to mere ‘rule-following’.
124
 Such rule-following behaviour also adds to the 
discrepancy in the theory and practice of informed consent. As noted earlier, law 
only provides for the bare minimum of acceptable behaviour. However, for meeting 
the goals of informed consent, practitioners ought to strive for higher standards than 
the bare minimum. This is essential to ensuring that informed consent is not reduced 
to a mere tick-box exercise.   
It is pertinent to note that the only normative standard that case law has been 
interested in setting has been the standard for information disclosure. The ideal 
ethical standard is the subjective standard,
125
 which no leading common law 
jurisdiction (discounting a state in the USA)
126
 has applied. As for the requirement 
for ensuring capacity to consent, as noted earlier, India does not have a law 
                                                          
121
 M. Cohen, et al., Everything You Always Wanted To Ask A Lawyer About Ethics Committees, 
CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS, Vol. 1, (1992), pp. 33-39. 
122





 R. F. Weir, Paediatric Ethics Committees: Ethical Advisers Or Legal Watchdogs? LAW, MEDICINE 
& HEALTH CARE, Vol.15, (1987), pp. 99–110. 
125
 V. Dranseika, et al., Relevant Information and Informed Consent in Research: In Defense of the 
Subjective Standard of Disclosure, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS, Vol. 23, Issue No. 1, (2017).  
126
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the subjective standard to information disclosure for 
informed consent in the case Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla.1979). See also, K. Ivy, Medical 
Malpractice: A Subjective Approach to Informed Consent in Oklahoma, TULSA LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 
15, (2013).  
129 
 
equivalent to MCA in the UK. The legal standard for what informed consent should 
look like in clinical research is not established yet and it echoes the doctrine 
developed in the treatment context, which I have established, is a different context 
and creates different relationships. The law heavily borrows from the ethical 
guidelines but falls short on setting standards to guide the process of informed 
consent. This is because most questions involved in the process of informed consent 
are essentially moral questions. They require ethical decisions, like does poverty 
affect a participant’s voluntariness to consent, or how much money, or what 
incentives, must be offered to participants without leading to undue inducement? Is it 
autonomy enhancing to have to gain the permission of a woman's husband when she 
says that she would not consent without her husband's permission, and so on. 
Practitioners face such questions in their day-to-day research work during the process 
of informed consent. Law does not provide answers to these, but ethical discussions 
and guidelines do. Therefore, while law helps in post-process situations in 
determining when consent has been breached, it provides little guidance to the 
researchers on how to deal with ethical dilemmas during the consent procedure.  
For these reasons, in every ethico-legal analysis of informed consent, law 
seems to fall behind on the ethical requirements for informed consent.
127
 
Nevertheless, law, owing to its remedial nature, is more solution-oriented than the 
slightly more abstract ethics. Faden and Beauchamp, however, note that though 
ethics might not supply mechanical solutions or definitive procedures for decision-
making, they provide a reasoned and systematic approach to moral problems. They 
write that: 
Moral dilemmas require a balancing of competing claims in untidy 
circumstances, and moral philosophy can make a significant if not 
decisive contribution. In these respects philosophy is neither 
surpassed by, nor superior to legal reasoning and legal solutions.
128
 
Ethical analysis employs a nuanced and sensitive approach to certain situations that 
law can sometimes be too blunt to appreciate. De Ville explains this further by 
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noting, “in the interest of objectivity and consistency, the legal process, training, 
doctrine, and tradition have tended to downplay humanity and individuality.”
129
 A 
case in point is of conjoined twins, the surgical separation of which involved the 
survival of one at the cost of the other’s life.
130
 While adjudicating in favour of 
separation, Justice Alan Ward of the English Court of Appeal famously remarked, 
“this is a court of law, not of morals.”  
  The purpose of introducing the reader to the drawback of legalism is not to 
downgrade the importance of law or the legal doctrine. It is to show the distinctness 
in the legal and ethical underpinnings of informed consent and to advise readers 
against conflating the two. The other limitation of law is more context specific as 
will be discussed below. 
4.3.1. Limits of law of informed consent in India 
We have already seen that claiming a lack of informed consent as a violation of a 
fundamental right is not as easy as it sounds in principle.
131
 We have also seen that 
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there is no option to claim lack of informed consent as a statutory right. Therefore, 
the focus here will be on tort law. But before I address the limitations of tort law that 
are specific to India, I want to first address the general limitation of tort law in 
dealing with the lack of informed consent in research.  
It is generally accepted that the legally recognised right to informed consent 
is aimed at protecting the autonomy of the research participant. But commentators 
question the sufficiency of the present legal doctrine with regards to protection of 
autonomy. Morreim, for example, is of the opinion that the standard legal doctrine of 
informed consent does not sufficiently protect autonomy where there is no 
demonstrable physical harm to the individual. He writes: 
[B]ecause standard informed consent doctrine usually limits recovery 
to cases featuring a physical or other separate injury, it can fail to 
honor human autonomy in cases where someone's right to choose has 
been abused without demonstrable physical damage. If this is a 




I do not think that this criticism is sound to the extent that there are claims that can 
succeed under the tort of battery without a demonstrable physical damage.
133
 
Moreover, even though it is rare and often difficult to claim, people with no physical 
injury after having proven ‘infliction of emotional distress’ have also been able to 
recover damages under tort law.
134
 Serious dignitary harms
135
 can also be rectified 
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under constitutional rights. Yet some commentators have demanded a new dignitary 
tort for lack of informed consent in research.
136
 While the right to recover damages 
under lack of informed consent in research is not as established as the right to 
recover under treatment; and there is a need for clarity in law pertaining to the 
treatment of lack of informed consent in research, there is arguably enough flexibility 
under tort law to address the different nature of the investigator-subject 
relationships.
137
 An example of this sort of flexibility is the Grimes case, in which 
the court acknowledged the wide knowledge gap between investigators and research 
subjects and found a “misalignment of interests”.
138
 
Yet there are some limitations of tort law that are specific to India. On 
problems facing the law of torts in India, Thanvi writes: 
The received English law, and more especially law of torts, has not 
fared well with the Indian conditions of life, and as such it has not 




There is not much reliable data to suggest how much litigation has occurred under 
tort law as cases in trial courts generally go unreported. Even in the higher courts, 
only those cases that are marked “fit for reporting” by the judges in the High Courts 
and the Supreme Court are reported.
140
 But from a cursory glance at reported cases, it 
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is evident that litigation under tort law is sparse when compared to other common 
law jurisdictions. Marc Galanter conducted a ten-year survey (1975-1984) on tort 
litigation in India and concluded that tort law in India was unsystematic, largely 
neglected, and infrequently resorted to by the people.
141
 Noting the poor 
development of tort law in India, Cassels also remarked that, “[a]t least until now the 
law of tort in India is little more than a myth about how people would be cared for in 
a better world.”
142
 While the works cited rely on data from decades ago, little seems 
to have changed to undermine their findings.
143
 These works were one of the few 
exhaustive academic commentaries on the status of tort law in India, suggesting in 
addition that not much academic attention has been paid to it.   
 Nevertheless, a significant portion of the criticism directed against tort law in 
India is procedural and logistical. There is a long-standing problem of paucity of 
judges in India,
144
 but more importantly, there is a lack of specialisation amongst 
lawyers. As Galanter, based on his years of research conducted on tort law in India, 
noted “[o]ne may visualize Indian lawyers as stuck in a hyper-individualized bazaar 
economy in which virtually all lawyers offer the same narrow range of services.”
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This remark was made three decades ago, but even today, with the advent of many 
professional and large scale law firms, tort law as a specialisation has not seen much 
development. Considering the fact that Indian lawyers work with little to no 
institutional support for specialised knowledge, with no specialist organisation or 
specialised technical publication in tort law, and coupled with the recent trend of 
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 Galanter’s reasonable critique from 1986, that tort 
law in India is unsystematic and largely neglected, still holds. There are also 
significant barriers to access like lack of legal aid, high court fee, and lack of 
insurance to cover legal fee. These barriers, along with the protracted delays and 
meagre recoveries, have made people wary of litigation in India. A combination of 
all these factors has contributed to the underdevelopment of tort law in India.  
Despite all these drawbacks, it is nonetheless possible that the courts in India 
adopt an innovative application of tort law
147
 if presented with the right opportunity 
and a rightly argued case. As Basu fittingly notes: 
It seems that the problems of tort law in India lie not so much in the 
laws themselves as in their use and application. As such they may 
have much to do with economic and political realities of a more 
general “underdevelopment” in a Third World nation. After all the 
number of judges and courts available is really a product of economic 
necessities and political choices.
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These logistical problems aside, there is reason to believe that the Indian courts will 
forego their current approach to informed consent under tort law and adopt a modern 
approach to cases dealing with lack of informed consent. The source of this optimism 
lies in a recent statement pronounced by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court 
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4.4. Conclusion: Need for Empirical Data 
The legal doctrine of informed consent focuses on the post-fact and post-injury 
aspect of informed consent. The focus on the process of consent is only as much as is 
needed to determine liability. This chapter has tried to demonstrate what happens (or 
could happen) when actions leading to informed consent come to rest within the 
ambit of law. There is an enormous difference between the material facts of a case 
that a court would consider worthy of consideration and the social facts that 
determine the actual process of consent. This difference also contributes to the 
theoretical-practical divide in the larger conversation on informed consent.  
This chapter makes it evident that individual cases claiming a lack of 
informed consent in research do not often reach a court of law, and in India’s case, 
they have not reached the court at all. But it would be naïve to deny the significant 
effect that law has on the whole process of informed consent. People take and give 
consent in the shadow of law. By better understanding how stakeholders understand 
the role of law in informed consent, it may be possible to find newer ways within the 
law, and outside of it, to improve the informed consent process. Mnookin and 
Kornhauser write:  
Theoretical and empirical research concerning how people bargain in 
the shadow of law should provide us with a richer understanding of 
how the legal system affects behaviour, and should allow a more 
realistic appraisal of the consequences of reform proposal.
150
   
Therefore, a few questions need further probing. These questions include: what do 
the authorities and stakeholders involved in the process of informed consent think 
about the role of law? Do the stakeholders involved in clinical trials perceive 
informed consent as an ethical obligation or a legal compulsion? Is legalism 
prevalent within the clinical research spectrum in India? These questions are 
empirical in nature and require a different approach than the one taken here thus far. 
Answers to these questions will provide a window into the actual practice and 
process of informed consent and will give a grounded perspective to the more 
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abstract discussions already elaborated. Most of the information collected in the 
chapters so far has been obtained through documentary review. But when 
considering empirical questions we must remember Atkinson and Coffey’s advice to 
researchers to carefully use document review as a method of data collection. They 
write: 
[w]e should not use documentary sources as surrogates for other kinds 
of data. We cannot, for instance, learn through records alone how an 
organization actually operates day-by-day. Equally, we cannot treat 
records - however ‘official’- as firm evidence of what they report... 
[this kind of] strong reservation does not mean that we should ignore 
or downgrade documentary data. On the contrary, our recognition of 
their existence as social facts alerts us to the necessity to treat them 
very seriously indeed. We have to approach them for what they are 
and what they are used to accomplish.
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Hence, to arrive at a more realistic depiction of the principle of informed consent as 
applicable to human subject research in India, I will be employing social science 
research methods for data collection. The next chapter will outline the qualitative 
methodology in trying to gauge various stakeholders’ view on informed consent in 
research. The stakeholders’ views shed a light on the reasons participants are 
encouraged to volunteer for clinical research. They also shed light on what 
practitioners think about informed consent, in other words, what motivates them to 
take informed consent from the participants. Once we understand their motivations, it 
will be easier to comprehend the reasons why informed consent procedures have 
taken their present form in India.  
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5.0.     Introduction  
The focus will now shift to the methodological approach adopted by this thesis in 
order to answer the empirical question: How is the principle of informed consent 
perceived by the different stakeholders involved in the process of informed consent in 
clinical research in India? We have already seen how the ethical and legal 
approaches to informed consent interact with each other in the previous chapters. To 
understand how these two approaches interact with the practice of informed consent, 
we will look at how the principle of informed consent is perceived by the different 
stakeholders involved in the process of informed consent in clinical research in India. 
By ‘different stakeholders’ I mean people who fall within the spectrum of clinical 
research in India and have a say in how informed consent plays out in practice. 
Therefore, along with the influence of the grounded theory methodology (described 
below), I employ a multi-stakeholder approach to data collection and a contrasting 
method to analyse the data in order to grasp the bigger picture of informed consent in 
action as opposed to in the books.  
5.1. Why the grounded theory methodology?  
For any socio-legal study, it is essential to map out the law as it stands, as it is 
doctrinally understood, and then delve into further exploration of how social actors 
engage with it.
1
 Therefore, along with a desk-based analytical research, that maps the 
world of law and the theory of informed consent, this research is guided by a 
qualitative approach that involves inductive reasoning to observe patterns in 
interview data and reach conclusions. This qualitative approach goes by the name 
grounded theory. 
Grounded theory developed in the field of health and nursing in the United 
States in the 1960’s. It was developed by two sociologists, Barney Glaser and 
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Anselm Strauss, as a constant comparative method of inquiry.
2
 It is the “actual 
production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings”.
3
 It places 
emphasis on two fundamental points: i) the participant’s own understanding of their 
social environment is the key for any qualitative inquiry, and ii) the importance for 
researchers to be creative and flexible to mould their approach to their respective 
research settings.
4
 This theory was developed as a release-valve from the trappings of 
a priori research, to move beyond doctrinal arguments, normative (value) judgments 
and ideological positions, which are not grounded in empirical data.
5
  
Since the theory aims at ‘grounding’ theory in data, it uses a judicious mix of 
inductive and deductive reasoning.
6
 Inductive reasoning, also called the ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to research, is where the researcher “uses observations to build an 
abstraction or to describe a picture of the phenomenon that is being studied”.
7
 It was 
imperative to take a bottom-up approach in trying to fully address the purpose of the 
research project, which was to understand the dynamics and the process through 
which the legal and ethical principle of informed consent is operationalised within 
the paradigm of biomedical research in India. My research adopted this approach by 
not just stating what individuals and institutional actors said about informed consent, 
but also by observing how and within what context they said it.  
Strauss and Corbin, the proponents of modern grounded theory approach as 
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means of qualitative study, noted that “[i]f someone wanted to know whether one 
drug [was] more effective than another, then a double blind clinical trial would be 
more appropriate than grounded theory study. However, if someone wanted to know 
what it was like to be a participant in a drug study…then he or she might sensibly 
engage in a grounded theory project or some other type of qualitative study.”
8
 The 
choice of grounded theory for collecting and coding the data was apt for this project 
because I was looking at questions like: what does informed consent mean to 
different stakeholders; how do they understand the intrinsic value of the principle; 
does law or do ethics prompt them to follow the principle; and what factors, 
including deficiencies or limitations, determine how they implement the principle? 
These questions were important to have an understanding of what the principle 
means to the beneficiaries and bearers, because unless we collect and build upon this 
knowledge the principle will continue to remain detached from reality. 
 Any area where health, healthcare, law, economy, politics, and ethics 
intersect is bound to be a disputed area. The principle of informed consent operates 
within complex layers of legal, regulatory, administrative, and personal structures. 
These structures need to be studied in isolation and as part of a bigger picture in 
order to uncover the many ‘myths’ about the principle of informed consent.
9
 There 
have been arguments for and against considering the principle of informed consent as 
‘fiction’ or a ‘myth’.
10
 This thesis intends to highlight that most of these arguments 
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are sometimes at odds with social and institutional reality.
11
 For understanding the 
institutional reality, it was important that my interviewees included people who were 
in authoritative positions and who have a say in validating informed consent 
procedures to clear the trials. This was in addition to having research participants and 
investigators as interviewees. 
In a strictly doctrinal research, I would not have had the opportunity to 
conduct an empirical investigation; the focus would have remained on the analysis 
and manipulation of theoretical concepts. This thesis aimed at exploring the world 
beyond those theoretical concepts. I tried to push the envelope a little further to 
understand how the theory of informed consent plays out in a real-life setting. In the 
grounded theory approach, theoretical development and pattern observation is a 
continuous iterative process;
12
 therefore, interviews conducted under this 
methodology were more open-ended and interactive in the form of a ‘dialogue’ or 
‘discussion’ rather than a ‘question-answer based pattern’. Such an approach enabled 
most interviewees to relax and give unmanufactured responses.  
Additionally, it is important to note that this thesis merely employs a skeletal 
framework of grounded theory and is restricted to the design of empirical research. I 
would refrain from calling this thesis a grounded theory project as only some aspects 
of data collection and coding were guided by the methodology. The data analysis is 
not guided by this methodology and employs a contrasting method instead which 
shall be discussed later in this chapter.  
The institutional process of informed consent within the context of clinical 
trials in India has not been documented through such multi-method research before. 
There is a gap in literature pertaining to the actual process of realising informed 
consent and the practitioners’ perceptions on the principle.
13
 The tools from the 
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grounded theory methodology used in designing this qualitative research gave me 
flexibility to collect the data without worrying about proving a pre-existing 
hypothesis. It helped me create a hypothesis from the themes that were teased out 
from the data that was collected during the fieldwork. Furthermore, the flexibilities 
built into the grounded theory methodology helped me accommodate a multi-
stakeholder approach to data collection; details of this approach to data collection 
that is discussed below.  
5.1.1. Multi-stakeholder approach  
I chose a multi-stakeholder approach to get a comprehensive picture of the 
operationalisation and perception of the principle of informed consent. This meant 
that no stakeholder was given primacy while collecting data, and views and opinions 
of all the stakeholders were significant. This was one way to understand the 
perceptions of all the sides involved. As stated above, the principle of informed 
consent operates within complex layers of legal, regulatory, administrative, and 
personal structures. I was trying to study the context in which informed consent 
operates. For a contextual understanding, the various stakeholders involved in the 
paradigm of clinical trials in India needed to be identified and approached for 
research. The stakeholders approached for interviews are outlined in the following 
table: 
Stakeholders involved in the clinical trial paradigm in India  
& 
 Stakeholders approached for interviews (Table 1.) 
 
Stakeholder Role/Function 
Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare 
(MoHFW) 
The Ministry in charge of health policy in 
India.  
Central Drugs Standard Principal regulatory body which oversees 
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the licensing, marketing and trials of drugs 
in India.  
Drugs Controller General 
of India (DCGI) 
Final authority in matters related to 
approval of new drugs under certain 
specified categories.  His office’s approval 
is necessary to commence a clinical trial.   
Indian Council of Medical 
Research (ICMR) 
The apex body for the formulation, 
coordination and promotion of biomedical 
research in India.  
Central Drugs Research 
Institute (CDRI) 
It is a multidisciplinary research laboratory 
operating under the aegis of the Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). 
Conducts clinical trials as well.  
Institutional Ethics 
Committees (IECs) 
Reviews the research protocol/proposal of 
the clinical trial studies keeping the welfare 
of trial participants as top priority.  
Trial Investigators In charge of conducting the trials and are 
accountable for conduct of the study. They 
bear the responsibility of ensuring that the 




Business that specialises in providing 
support services to the pharmaceutical, 




These representatives were involved in 
compliance oversight functions and were 
project leads for clinical trials sponsored by 
their corporations in India.  
Bioethicists Experts in the field on biomedical research 
ethics.  
Lawyers Those who have handled cases of medical 
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negligence, experts in medical and health 
law issues in India.  
Civil Society NGO’s and other organisations demanding 
safety of trial participants; watchdogs of 
clinical research in India.  
Trial Participants Participants involved in clinical trials. 
Bearers of the right to informed consent.  
After identifying the main stakeholders or actors involved in the process of informed 
consent in clinical research, I went about a systematic procedure to collect the 
interview data. The step-by-step process will be detailed in the sections that follow.  
5.1.2.  Site-Selection and Recruitment of Interview Participants 
India can be an overwhelming country in which to conduct research owing to the 
sheer magnitude and diversity of the population. However, since it is my native land, 
it made access to information slightly easier because of my familiarity with the 
surroundings. Furthermore, I belong to the same society that I set out to research and 
a deeper understanding of the Indian society was vital to do the kind of research this 
thesis warrants.  
I required no research permit to conduct research in India. Nonetheless, 
necessary permissions were sought (and granted) from the Edinburgh Law School 
Research Ethics Committee and the respective governmental authorities before some 
officials were interviewed in their official capacity. New Delhi, the capital of the 
country, was chosen as the base for the six-month period of data collection given that 
the bodies that regulate clinical research in the country are located there. Mumbai (in 
the State of Maharashtra) was chosen for accessibility to academics and bioethicists 
that have been working on clinical research related issues. The state of Madhya 
Pradesh was the site of the clinical trials that highlighted the debate about ethics of 
clinical research in India. I mentioned these trials in the introductory chapter. The 
cities of Indore and Bhopal (in Madhya Pradesh) were chosen to meet with civil 
society members who highlighted the unethically conducted trials in the region. The 
investigators approached for this study were spread across public and private 
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hospitals in New Delhi and Mumbai. For maintaining anonymity, the site location of 
the Contract Research Organisations (CROs) and the trial participants is not being 
disclosed.  
 Research participants were selected through a combination of purposive, 
snowball, and random sampling method. Purposive sampling was employed to 
ascertain the first few participants of research. This was based on the multi-
stakeholder approach to data collection, therefore, I started from the top of Table 1. 
This kind of sampling was chosen because it is a non-probability sampling where the 
researcher selects the participants based on her judgment and purpose of research.
14
 
From the primary research participants identified through purposive sampling, 
snowball-sampling was done to select the rest of the research participants. 
Snowballing, or snowball sampling, is a method whereby research participants are 
chosen from the acquaintances of the existing research subjects. Simply defined, 
snowballing is “technique for finding research subjects. One subject gives the 
researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and 
so on.”
15
 The simple random sampling was used for the list of sample units or 
participants (sample basis), where individuals were randomly selected from a 
database. Access to some participants, especially in the regulatory circle, was granted 
through gatekeepers or key insiders, who were people with formal or informal 
authority to control a site and flow of information.  
5.2. Process of Data Collection 
The dynamics were ever-changing in the field. I had planned for monthly visits to 
trial site locations across the country to interview trial participants, but I spent most 
of my time New Delhi. I made intermittent visits to Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
and to undisclosed locations of CROs. I ended up travelling as and when a potential 
interviewee was available for discussion. However, the data collection process 
followed a skeletal three-phase structure, which proceeded as follows: 
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5.2.1. Phase I of Data Collection 
Location: New Delhi  
This phase involved conducting interviews with officials from the administrative 
bodies involved in clinical trial regulation and biomedical research promotion in 
India. The targeted officials included members of the Indian Council of Medical 
Research (ICMR), Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), Central Drugs 
Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) and the sub-divisions within, and members 
of Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs) from hospitals and research centres. The 
aim of this phase of data collection was three-fold: i) to better grasp the clinical trial 
process and the nuances of the informed consent procedure as understood and 
managed by the regulatory officials, ii) to note deviations from prescribed procedure 
in law and the theoretical principle, if any, and use it as a standard for comparisons 
from data collected in the later stages, and iii) to understand the different 
perspectives from which these bodies approach the principle of informed consent 
given their different engagement with the process.   
5.2.2. Phase II of Data Collection 
Location: New Delhi, Mumbai (Maharashtra), Indore and Bhopal 
(Madhya Pradesh) 
This stage of interviewing focused on the organisations and people that were 
involved in highlighting the unseen side of the clinical trial industry in India. It also 
focused on getting various stakeholder views on the implementation of the new rule 
related to mandatory audio-video recording of the informed consent procedure, 
which was compulsory for all trial participants when this fieldwork was undertaken, 
however, it was later limited to vulnerable trial participants. Some bioethicists and 
doctors, who have been involved in debates around clinical trials in India, 
contributed their views on some aspects of clinical research and informed consent in 
the country. The aim of this phase of data collection was to reach out to people who 
have spoken or written about issues related to informed consent in clinical trials in 
the country.  
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5.2.3. Phase III of Data Collection 
Location: New Delhi, Mumbai (Maharashtra), and undisclosed locations 
In this stage, I tried to get access to trial participants, which turned out to be 
extremely difficult, especially for the current trials happening in the country. The 
reasons cited were many, including confidentiality, data protection, and yearlong 
wait periods to get the requisite permissions.  
 I visited public and private hospitals and research centres in Mumbai and 
Delhi to interview investigators running trials in the country. This phase also 
involved talking to CRO employees (at undisclosed locations), pharmaceutical 
representatives, lawyers, and activists. However, while I waited at the public 
hospitals, the dismal reality of poverty and the context within which medical 
decisions are made was quite evident. But in sharp contrast to it, the research arms of 
the same public hospitals were quite well-maintained. The professional research 
centres were even better maintained. The aim of data collection in this phase was to 
get a complete picture of the various debates plaguing the clinical research spectrum 
in the country and to see how informed consent fits in the bigger picture.  
During the data collection process, I interviewed close to 50 stakeholders. 
However, I have signed consent forms and email confirmation for use of data from 
35 of them. I have attached a copy of the consent form for this research in Appendix 
IV. However, I decided to exclude data obtained from only verbal consenters who 
could not be reached again for verification and reconfirmation, this was despite the 
fact that their consent was fully informed and their data was relevant to the thesis. 
The following table contains a breakdown of the numbers corresponding to their 
roles and affiliations. 
Number of stakeholders interviewed:* (Table 2.) 
Officials from Regulatory Bodies  6 
Trial Participants 2 
Investigators  8 
Institutional Ethics Committee Members 4 
147 
 
Contract Research Organisations 3 
Civil Society Members (NGO’s, bioethicists, public health 
activists) 
5 
Lawyers   2 
Representatives of Pharmaceutical Corporations  3 
* this only includes people whose data I use for analysis and who either signed the consent form or gave verbal 
consent and reconfirmed use of their verbatim quotes via email 
Having mentioned the process of data collection, I will now outline the design of my 
interview questions.  
5.3. Design of Interview Questions 
The interviews took the form of discussions, which were open-ended and semi-
structured, and addressed the following themes: 
- How does the perception of law and ethics affect the perception of the 
principle of informed consent? Simply put, is the principle observed by the 
authorities because it is ethical to do so or is it seen as a legal obligation by 
the people who engage with it? This question aimed to challenge a lot of 
assumptions that I had regarding the normative value of the principle of 
informed consent. This line of questioning helped understand whether the 
principle is followed because it addresses key ethical values or simply as a 
tick-box exercise for the purpose of the formal process of informed consent in 
India. 
- What role do law and ethics play in bringing about ethical conduct in clinical 
trials? 
- How do officials in the regulatory authorities (CDSCO, DCGI) and at the 
apex medical research organisation (ICMR) view informed consent in their 
respective roles?  
- How have the various stakeholders in clinical trials in India encountered the 
principle of informed consent? What challenges did they face during the 
process of realising (or giving) consent?  
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- How much has the case Swasthya Adhikar Manch v. Union of India (SAM 
case), the sub-judice case that started the legal debate about ethics in clinical 
trials in India, changed perceptions about the principle of informed consent 
on the ground, keeping in mind that it led to audio-video recording of 
informed consent procedure being made mandatory for vulnerable trial 
participants. 
- Is ‘informed consent’ the only way to protect ‘personal autonomy’ of 
research participants? What factors affect the choice of research participants 
to volunteer for clinical trials? What would the research participants regard as 
adequate information to make a decision about volunteering for a clinical 
trial?  
- Are the officials aware of, or responsive to, the vulnerability of the Indian 
trial participants? 
Up until now, the reader was led through a sanitised version of my data collection 
process. But like any other qualitative researcher, I too encountered some problems 
while conducting the actual fieldwork. The next few sections will document my 
research experience on the field and how the field reality was different to the one 
envisaged during the preparation for fieldwork. Here, I will also be transparent about 
how I got access to different stakeholders so that future researchers can identify the 
dos and don’ts for conducting similar research.   
5.4. Ground Reality: Access to Research Participants  
There were some limits to adopting a multi-stakeholder approach to data collection, 
as there was limited accessibility to certain stakeholder groups, like trial participants 
and government officials. Trial participants are bound by confidentiality agreements 
with the trial sponsors. Therefore, it is almost impossible to conduct an interview 
with them regarding their participation in the trial and the procedures involved. 
Moreover, access to trial participants is difficult, as no investigator would 
compromise a trial study by giving access to their trial participants. From another 
perspective, government officials in India are in an elite position, and it is often 
impossible, as an independent researcher, to establish a connection with these 
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officials. In a survey conducted by a Hong-Kong based think-tank, Political and 
Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), India was ranked as Asia’s most over-
regulated country, with a highly inefficient bureaucracy, with a score of 9.21 out of 
10.
16
 The same survey revealed that the Indian bureaucracy is a power centre in its 
own right and access to bureaucrats for common people is almost impossible. To put 
this into perspective, I was just another commoner who had difficulty getting access 
to the bureaucrats.  
I started out by approaching members of various regulatory bodies through 
email. After a long wait period, three participants responded to the emails. A copy of 
the email sent to research participants is attached in Appendix V. I tried to contact 
officials on the telephone numbers provided on the official government websites, but 
without much success. Lastly, I personally approached the officials within these 
regulatory bodies and other government organisations at the institutional premises. 
At first, I requested the officials to consider being “interviewed”, but barring one 
almost all of them turned down the request. Instinctively, I tried to persuade them to 
“talk and discuss” issues pertaining to clinical research in the country. This approach 
was much more successful. Most of the officials allowed the information to be used 
for research purposes on the condition of confidentiality, which has been respected 
throughout the thesis.  
As mentioned above, trial participants are bound by confidentiality 
agreements with the trial conductors. I interviewed eleven trial participants, but only 
two signed the consent form and I could not relocate the rest to reconfirm their verbal 
consent. Hence, I use data from only two trial participants. One of them was an ex-
trial participant and was not enrolled in any trial study. The other participant had not 
been administered the trial drug, but had been led through the consent procedure for 
the trial study. It was the investigator of the study who invited me to talk to the trial 
participant.  
The investigators of trial studies were selected at random through the Clinical 
                                                          
16
 As cited in P. L. Joshi & R. Kumar, A survey of positive and negative aspects of the Indian 
administrative bureaucratic system, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDIAN CULTURE AND BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT, Vol. 4, Issue 6 (2011), pp. 658-684. 
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Trial Registry of India (CTRI) web platform which is an online database of clinical 
trials being conducted in India.
17
 The email addresses and contact details of 
investigators and sponsor representatives are mentioned on the data sheets available 
online. I selected my sample size at random and met investigators who responded to 
my emails or telephone calls. Some investigators introduced me to the Institutional 
Ethics Committee (IEC) members and some had themselves served as members of 
ethics committees at their respective institutes. This is how I also got access to IEC 
members.  
The Contract Research Organisations (CROs) were selected at random from 
an exhaustive list of CROs operating in India. I was invited to visit the premises of 
one of the CROs. I personally met and spoke to the clinical research associates of the 
other two CROs.  
 I shortlisted five global pharmaceutical corporations conducting trials in India 
and sent emails to key contact persons in the clinical trial operations teams. Three 
people responded to the emails and I met two of them at their chosen time and place. 
One of the representatives spoke to me online through the WEBex communications 
platform, the conversation was recorded for the communication files of the 
corporation.  
 The members of the civil society were screened from the newspaper articles, 
periodicals, journals, and through snowballing methods. Communication was set up 
through gatekeepers and through email requests. The lawyers selected for the 
research were approached through my own professional legal network.  
5.4.1.  Problems with consent forms and audio recording 
When I approached the government officials for interviews, none were willing to 
sign a written consent form or agreed to audio recording of the interviews. They all 
gave verbal consent to allow the use of the data from discussions. They only agreed 
to speak to me on the condition of “full confidentiality”. I followed the guide for elite 
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 Clinical Trials Registry of India website, available at http://ctri.nic.in/Clinicaltrials/login.php (last 
accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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interviewing for these officials.
18
 When I asked the participants if they were 
comfortable with being audio-recorded, they appeared extremely uncomfortable at 
the prospect. During the entire fieldwork period, I took written notes, sometimes in 
alphabetic shorthand to minimise loss of data. After each session, I typed up all the 
data, in a neater language, into a word document to minimise any chances of 
mistakes that might arise from having to remember the conversation later and 
emailed this back to these participants.  
Some stakeholders like the representatives of pharmaceutical corporations, 
trial participants, CRO employees, and a few investigators did not sign a written 
consent form and requested confidentiality, but permitted me to use the information 
for the research. I communicated these issues from the field to my PhD supervisors 
and to the Ethics Committee members at Edinburgh. It was agreed that the 
information would only be used if discussion/interview notes were sent back to these 
participants for comments. All the discussion notes were typed with verbatim quotes 
and paraphrases and were sent back to the research participants for their comments. 
Most participants responded by permitting the use of their quotes as long as 
confidentiality was maintained. As best as I could, I have anonymised all the 
research participants in the thesis.  
From my own perspective, as someone researching the principle of informed 
consent, it was insightful to perceive how participants responded to the consent 
forms handed to them for this research. I gave complete information about myself 
and my research project to the participants, explained to each participant their rights 
as mentioned in the consent form, read out the contents of the consent form, but most 
stakeholders refused to sign the paper. Some joked about my background as a 
lawyer, saying they would not sign a paper given to them by a lawyer. It was 
important for the research participants to create a trust-based relationship with me, 
but without the need for formal papers.  
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 D. Richards, Elite Interviewing: Approached and Pitfalls, POLITICS, Vol. 16, Issue no. 3, 
(September 1996), pp. 199-204. 
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5.4.2.  Acknowledging limits of this qualitative research 
I realise that I have barely scratched the surface of the problem in terms of my 
qualitative inquiry. A major limitation of this empirical research is that people who 
responded to the emails that I sent out were the ones who either believed in the ethics 
of clinical research, or, at least, had proper knowledge of them. These people did not 
mind expressing opinions, were educated, spoke fluent English and mostly came 
from a privileged stratum of the society. A significant proportion of stakeholders 
interviewed for this research were government officials, trial investigators, CROs, 
and employees of pharmaceutical corporations. The number of trial participants was 
too small to make general claims. Hence, for the purpose of data analysis I have used 
previously conducted empirical research by other scholars to bolster my research 
findings. Moreover, some claims of the research participants for this research could 
be true in their individual experiences with the system, but my sample size is too 
limited to make generalisations regarding any such claims.  
Another limitation of the thesis is that the empirical claim of the thesis, which 
will be outlined in Chapter 8, might lead some readers to think that this thesis is 
about bureaucratisation or about the nature of bureaucracy. Although I use terms like 
“procedural necessity” and “tick-box exercise” they are used for the process of 
informed consent effectuated by researchers/investigators and not the regulatory 
officials. It needs to be made clear that the interviews with the stakeholders, 
including regulators, included their perceptions on the nature of informed consent, 
i.e., what they think about informed consent or its various features. The research 
findings are not about how all stakeholders view consent in their given roles. The 
only stakeholders who spoke to me about consent from their respective roles within 
the (biomedical research) paradigm were the researchers as they are the ones upon 
whom the duty to take consent rests. The other stakeholders only come into the 
picture when there is problem with the process as performed by the researchers. The 
regulators I interviewed did not say anything that could be bracketed as their official 
position on the process of consent, except when asked about the need for stricter laws 
to make researchers more ethically complaint. Their views on informed consent echo 
the views of the researchers. That is hardly surprising because the officials I 
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interviewed had themselves been researchers at some point of their careers. 
Another factor to take into consideration is that I spoke to 6 officials from the 
regulatory and research coordinating bodies, 4 of whom had been researchers 
themselves and were affiliated to ICMR, which is often (mistakenly) considered a 
regulatory body, but is not a regulatory body by its mandate. I spoke to 8 
investigators and 4 Ethics Committee members. The Ethics Committee members had 
previously been investigators of studies. This means that 16 (of 35) of those that I 
spoke with have primary experience of informed consent in research from their 
experiences as researchers/investigators, and in another capacity only secondarily. 
This makes it predominantly an investigator-perspective thesis. Therefore, the scope 
of the empirical claim is limited to researchers/investigators.  
5.5. Data Analysis 
The development and identification of variables did not take place prior to data 
collection but instead was carried out as part of the data collection process. 
Consequently, the variables or concepts were mostly initiated by the 
interviewees/participants and further developed and conceptualised by me. This is an 
important aspect of the iterative process. Data was collected until theoretical 
saturation was reached,
19
 which means that collection of data continued until no new 
or relevant data emerged regarding informed consent.  
According to Strauss and Corbin, in grounded theory methodology, interview 
questions should give as little guidance as possible to allow the interviewees to talk 
about what is of importance to them regarding a given context.
20
 Therefore, the data 
collected can be patchy and unstructured. After the collection process is over, the 
data is analysed through identification of themes and development of a coherent 
conceptual framework around those themes. As I employed tools from this 
methodology for data coding, I was required to extract phenomena or experiences 
significant to the interviewee by assigning a conceptual label, known as a ‘code’. 
Several codes were then grouped into more abstract ‘categories’ which eventually 
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 STRAUSS & CORBIN (1998), supra note 6.  
20
 Id.  
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formed the basis for developing themes. As will be evident in the next section, few of 
the categories and themes that emerged during analysis were irrelevant to the 
principal research question, but for the purpose of demonstrating the steps of my data 
analysis, I have shown all the themes and categories. 
5.6. Coding and Development of Themes 
I tried to use the software QDA Miner Lite v1.4.6, an open source software, to 
develop codes and categories from the interview transcripts. However, it was much 
easier to manually code and categorise the data, as the number of interview 
transcripts was quite small. I worked through each transcript using line-by-line 
coding to note down the themes and categories along the margins of the sheets. 
Keywords and main phrases were noted on differently coloured post-it notes and 
stuck on a board. This was useful in categorising the data under different post-it 
notes. These post-it notes, carrying categories, were later arranged in a logical order 
on a separate sheet of paper. During the progression of coding, interview data 
belonging to a particular code and category was placed under the corresponding post-
it note. The QDA software was used to retrieve all the text related to the phrase 
‘informed consent’ to double-check if I had lost any data during the process of 
manual coding. All interview data categorised under informed consent was 
extrapolated into different themes. These themes were initially categorised as 
follows: 
 Process of consent* 
 Law as a solution* 
 Role and limits of ethics and law* 
 Drop outs, retention rates – measure of success of informed consent? * 
 Bioethical Health Regulatory Authority of India Bill, BHRAI Bill [x] 
 Developments in other countries [x] 
 No objectivity in journalism, sensationalism of trials* 
 Acknowledgment of the role of the civil society in the government sector [x]  
 Manipulation of clinical trial data [x] 
 How do we make people more ethical? Kantian ethics-treat people as ends 
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and not just means to an end *  
 Do strict laws help? * 
 Practical India-specific solutions * 
 Taking and giving consent were circumstantial acts * 
 Informed consent cannot be directive * 
 How to ascertain that information related to trials is understood by the 
participants? * 
 Is knowledge of the law under which you’re doing something wrong 
necessary? [x] 
 We cannot apply western standards of quality control etc, [x] 
 Universalist western ethics? [x] 
 Risks v. Benefits of clinical trials in India [x] 
 Should trials only be for public health needs? [x] 
 No capacity or possibility of on-site inspections * 
 Oversight mechanisms * 
 Conflict of interests in IECs and compositional problems [x] 
 New regulations, problems, are they being diluted? [x] 
 Clinical trial industry: a structurally violent industry? [x] 
 How do we read deaths from clinical trial data, causation? [x] 
 Undue Inducement: not an unfair deal in countries like India * 
               [x] themes not included in final thesis/ * themes condensed into broader themes 
Many of these themes fell out of the scope of the thesis. They corresponded to the 
broader gamut of clinical trial regulation and included participant views on other 
ethical issues in clinical research in India. However, the research findings and themes 
that explained the phenomena and process of the principle of informed consent that 
were central to this thesis were:  
1. The three conditions of consent in trials through the lens of different 
stakeholders: Voluntariness, adequacy of information, 
capacity/competence to consent 




3. Different perceptions on agency of trial participants 
4. Law or Ethics? The ambivalence around legal solutions 
5. Who does the Informed Consent Form Protect? 
6. Lack of oversight mechanisms 
7. Current regulatory norms and problems therewith  
8. How to measure the success of informed consent procedure? 
9. Difference in informed consent to treatment and consent in trials 
10. Informed Consent cannot be separated from the overall context of 
clinical trials in the country- Controversy in perspective. 
 
For the purpose of final data analysis, a contrasting method was employed where 
these research findings were pitted against the ethical, legal, and empirical literature 
on the topic and were ultimately condensed into five major themes. These themes 
will be elaborated upon in the next two chapters. The first three themes correspond to 
the three broad ethical and legal requirements of informed consent, viz., 
voluntariness, adequate information, and competence/capacity. The other two 
correlative themes concern autonomy as the rationale of informed consent and the 
role of law and ethics in the realisation of informed consent. I have used the 
qualitative interpretative approach to the semi-structured interviews, which means 
that analysis is presented alongside theoretical discussions. 
5.7.  Triangulation  
Data triangulation implies the collection of data from different participants in a given 
setting, or from different stages in the activities of the setting and/or, if appropriate, 
from different sites of the setting. Triangulation is done through a mix of methods or 
data types to shed light upon various viewpoints or to validate the claims that might 
arise in the initial stages of the study.
21
 The multi-stakeholder approach, as explained 
above, proved to be quite effective for data triangulation because it allowed me to 
verify information given by one stakeholder with that of another stakeholder. During 
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 P. BANISTER, ET AL., QUALITY METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1994), p. 146; See also E. G. GUBA & Y. LINCOLN, FOURTH GENERATION EVALUATION, (Newbury 
Park: Sage Publishers, 1989),  
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the interviews, as a triangulating technique, it was useful to pit one stakeholder view 
against the other to verify opposing statements by different stakeholders on some 
issues. In the later stage, the findings from the interviews were contrasted and 
bolstered through comparison with existing empirical research studies. This method 
of triangulation called “methodological triangulation”
22
 was constantly used in the 
analysis and will be evident in the following chapters. 
5.8. Data Storage 
During the fieldwork planning stage it was decided that interviews would be audio-
recorded, however, things quickly changed in the field. People showed disinterest in 
interviews if the suggestion to be audio-recorded was put forward. Most participants 
only agreed to talk if they were not being audio-recorded. Therefore, quite early into 
the fieldwork I took the decision in consultation with my supervisors that none of the 
discussions/talks/interviews will be audio-recorded. I, therefore, took handwritten 
notes, sometimes using alphabetic shorthand, during interactions with the 
participants.  
The data is stored on my person laptop and is kept in one external hard-drive 
for back-up purposes. All the data is password protected for security. The files will 
only be shared with supervisors via dropbox or email, if necessary. The data will 
remain stored my personal computer for the time required to complete the thesis and 
disseminate the findings. The data will be stored for University purposes for 10 years 
as prescribed by the Research Ethics and Integrity Committee, School of Law at the 
University of Edinburgh, and in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act, 1998.  
5.9.  Conclusion 
It is important that the methodology utilised to answer the research questions stands 
up to scrutiny. Therefore, this chapter has explained how I utilised some tools from 
the grounded theory methodology to collect and code the interview data that I 
accumulated from different stakeholders. During the fieldwork, I had to adapt to 
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issues like participants’ refusal to sign consent forms, constant change in interview 
locations, frequent cancellations of previously agreed to interviews, and inaccessible 
bureaucrats. Despite all those issues, I did manage to collect data from all the 
stakeholders that I had identified as instrumental in the process of informed consent 
in India. A grounded thesis, which works from the bottom-up in terms of the 
principle and process being described through the words of the practitioners 
themselves, has been developed using a mixed methodology. This grounded thesis 
(which will be elaborated upon in the final chapter) has been developed to identify 
the reason for the discrepancy between the ethical principle, the legal doctrine, and 
the practice of informed consent. The next chapter will present the research findings 
and analyse them in comparison with the existing academic literature in the area. 
What this method of analysis highlights is the fact that the practitioners do not often 
view the principle and the process of informed consent as is envisaged in theory.  
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RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: THE ESSENTIALS 
6.0.   Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the question: How is the principle of informed consent 
perceived by the different stakeholders involved in the process of acquiring it in 
clinical research in India? This chapter will use examples of informed consent “in 
action” against the backdrop of informed consent in ethical and legal theory. 
Informed consent “in action” will consist of my research findings accumulated over 
the period of six months interviewing various stakeholders in clinical research in 
India.  
Earlier chapters in this thesis firmly established that informed consent is 
considered the ethical and legal cornerstone of medical research involving human 
subjects.
1
 In bioethics, for consent to be ‘informed’ in the context of a clinical trial, 
an individual must: a) have the capacity to consent, b) be fully informed about the 
trial, and c) have given the consent voluntarily.
2
 Under the Indian law governing 
clinical trials,
3
 informed consent must be: 
vi) Freely given and must be obtained in writing on an informed consent form. 
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 See J. W. BERG, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, 2nd edn); J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, 
(New York: Free Press, 1984); R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
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REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH, (2
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 edn., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 95-
153.  
2
Although Faden and Beauchamp write about five main elements of consent; viz, i) Disclosure ii) 
Comprehension of information iii) Voluntariness  iv) Competence of the individual giving consent v) 
Consent (decision of consent). Comprehension and consent are taken to be imbedded in the other three 
conditions mentioned above. See R. FADEN& T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT, (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 274. 
3
 Schedule Y, Drugs and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 (hereinafter ‘The Rules’), as appended to Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act, 1940.  
4
 The Rules say that the Investigator must have informed the study subject verbally and through the 
patient information sheet (PIS).  
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viii) The patient information sheet as well as the informed consent form should 
have been approved by the ethics committee and furnished to the 
Licensing Authority (DGCI). 




x) If the trial participant or his/her legally acceptable representative is unable to 
read/write - an impartial witness should be present during the entire 
informed consent process who must append his/her signatures to the 
consent form. 
At a cursory glance, the ethical and legal requirements of informed consent in 
clinical trials in India do not seem to be at odds with each other. They can broadly be 
classified under voluntariness, full disclosure of information, and competence to 
consent. Chapter 4 showed that when the principle of informed consent is put into 
practice, it appears that the law has made an uneasy compromise with the ethical 
theory of informed consent.
7
 Scholars like Schuck and O’Neill have identified the 
considerable gaps that exist between informed consent in theory and practice.
8
 
Schuck recognizes three different versions of informed consent, viz., informed 
consent “in books”, “in the mind”, and “in action”. According to Schuck informed 
consent “in books” has been developed primarily by courts, a physician’s version of 
informed consent is the version that exists “in the mind” of the physician, and 
informed consent “in action” is what is practiced in a real setting by the clinicians. 
He notes that considerable differences and varying opinions exist between the three, 
especially in the academic opinion regarding the scope and applicability of informed 
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consent. Borrowing from Schuck’s classification, I propose that, in the case of 
clinical trials, three versions of informed consent can be found, viz., informed 
consent “in ethics”, “in legal doctrine”, and “in action”. 
This chapter is divided into three sections corresponding to the three broad 
ethical and legal requirements or essentials of informed consent. I first give an 
account of each feature in theory and follow it up by talking about each essential 
feature in action. This format of data presentation has been chosen to show the how 
informed consent appears in academic literature versus how stakeholders view it in 
real clinical research practice.    
6.1. VOLUNTARINESS 
Populations of developing countries are said to be subject to a variety of 
undue/coercive influences that erode their voluntariness.
9
 Empirical studies across 
Asia and Africa have been undertaken by numerous scholars to assess the 
voluntariness of clinical trial participants or research subjects, but scholars have had 
difficulties interpreting these studies due to the wide variety of assessment 
approaches used.
10
 Up until now, there are no well-accepted adequate measures of 
voluntariness in research settings,
11
 although attempts have been made to develop 
more comprehensive approaches to assess voluntariness of consent to research.
12
 One 
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 P. S. Applebaum, et al., Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Preliminary Empirical 
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 Mamotte & Wassenaar (2015), supra note 9, in a Wellcome Trust funded study on the voluntariness 
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of the major reasons attributable to the uncertainty in measuring voluntariness is the 
lack of consensus in the definition of what it entails. 
The different definitions of voluntariness include Beauchamp and Childress’ 
definition where a person is said to act voluntarily “if he or she wills the action 
without being under the control of another’s influence”.
13
 Nelson et al., conceptualise 
voluntariness as intention to consent with the absence of exposure to controlling 
influences or conditions.
14
 In Beauchamp’s definition the ‘controlling influence’ 
entails personal influence whereas in the definition given by Nelson and colleagues it 
entails personal, economic, and other influences. Olsaretti has defined 
involuntariness as lack of acceptable alternatives to research participation.
15
 
Wertheimer and Appelbaum have proposed to morally assess the legitimacy of 
influences to understand when consent is non-voluntary.
16
 Some scholars opine that 
clinical research conducted by developed country researchers in developing countries 
leads to non-voluntary participation due to the nature of monetary or medical 
incentives offered that the trial participants might not be in a position to deny.
17
 This 
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lack of consensus over the concept of voluntariness has led researchers to raise 
various concerns about voluntariness, as understood by them, to consent in clinical 
trials. 
Appelbaum has suggested that to begin understanding the notion of 
voluntariness, one must understand how law has defined voluntariness, he writes: 
[f]rom the perspective of the practitioner or researcher trying to 
understand the implications of the requirement that consent must be 
voluntary to be valid, the key question is not how philosophical 
thought has characterized voluntary action over the millennia—it is 




In the same paper, Appelbaum suggests that theorists could adopt either of two 
approaches to develop a theory of voluntariness. The first approach would be to 
begin with a priori principles of the conditions of voluntary choice, an approach 
reflected in the definition of voluntariness given by Nelson et al (as mentioned 
above). Appelbaum contends that in Nelson et al’s attempt of developing a value-free 
theory of voluntariness, they did not rely on legal approaches to voluntariness. He 
explains that law accepts some external pressures as legitimate that might otherwise 
negate voluntariness (like a spouse saying, “Stop drinking! Or I am leaving you”), 
while it recognises others as illegitimate (like a doctor saying, “Sign up to this trial, 
or I will never treat you again”). This distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
external pressures is based on choices that are inherently value-laden. The second, 
and a more realistic, approach would require the theorist to acknowledge that the 
process of informed consent is governed by a set of legal rules, after which 
extrapolation of theory could come from the legal concept of voluntariness as applied 
in similar situations. Wertheimer approves the latter approach – an opinion that I 
support because it corresponds to the idea that informed consent is carried out in the 
shadow of the law. Wertheimer has suggested that any approach that aims to 
recognize the importance of context for explaining the concept of voluntariness 
would begin not with a priori principles, but with some indication of how the law has 
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 These philosophers accept that any a priori approach to 
conceptualizing voluntariness of consent is much less likely to be helpful in the very 
treatment or research settings in which it is meant to be applied.
20
 Hence, we must 
look at the legally accepted version of voluntariness as a starting point for further 
inquiry. 
Applebaum, Lidz, and Klitzman argue that for legal purposes an act “is 
presumed to be voluntary if no evidence exists that someone else has unduly 
influenced it or coerced the person deciding.”
21
 This definition holds up to the law in 
India as well. Schedule Y on informed consent requirements holds that consent must 
be ‘freely given’. The Indian Contract Act, 1872, says, “consent is said to be free 
when it is not caused by coercion or undue influence or fraud or misrepresentation or 
mistake.”
22
 Simply understood, consent is deemed to be free consent when there is 
absence of evidence of undue influence, coercion and misrepresentation. For the 
purposes of contract law, each of the conditions of coercion, undue influence, fraud, 
misrepresentation, and mistake have been given legal definitions under the Act 
(Sections 14-21 in particular). However, such definitional clarity is not present for 
the law of informed consent. The definitional clarity is lacking mostly because it is 
hard to ascertain the exact legal status of consent forms.
23
 They seem to be 
contractual in nature and give rise to contractual relationships but are not sensu 
stricto contracts.
24
 As there is no clear legal definition of voluntariness in the law of 
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informed consent in clinical trials, the next step is to look for voluntariness in the 
ethical guidelines as they are more situational and elaborate. 
The Ethical Guidelines for Medical and Health Research on Human 
Participants (hereinafter the guidelines) released by the ICMR do not define 
voluntariness per se. They do, however, talk about monetary and medical incentives 
that should not be large enough “as to make prospective participants consent readily 
to enrol in research against their better judgment, which would then be treated as 
undue inducement.”
25
 The guidelines leave it for the Ethics Committees (ECs) to 
decide what kind and amount of compensation would be tantamount to ‘undue 
inducement’.
26
 It is here that we notice the stark distinction between the law and 
ethical guidelines. Law is cautious about getting inside the workings of human 
decision-making to disentangle the web of causal influences, and even more cautious 
about deciding when one of those influences become determinative enough to void a 
person's choice. However, the drafters of guidelines chose one controlling influence, 
large monetary incentive, to be determinative enough to void a person’s choice. 
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Having taken note of how voluntariness is understood in ethical guidelines 
and in law; let us now see how some stakeholders involved with informed consent in 
action in India understand voluntariness.  
6.1.1.     VOLUNTARINESS IN ACTION 
Two trial participants agreed to be interviewed by me. Their experience illustrates 





 trial participant (hereinafter ‘A’) - BA/BE studies: The ex-trial participant had 
been part of many BA/BE (bioavailability/ bioequivalence) studies
28
 and used the 
income from trials to supplement his major source of family income, which was not 
sufficient for him, his wife, and his three children. He told me that he sometimes 
encouraged his wife to become a participant too. According to A, the recruiters had 
told him that the risk for participating in BA/BE studies was quite low, so he 
preferred going for multiple screenings. He told me that these screenings were 
usually held at various CRO
29
 facilities for determining whether the volunteers fit the 
inclusion criteria for the trial study. The CROs also paid people who turned up for 
the screenings irrespective of whether they passed the screening or not. When one 
passed the screenings one would be taken through the consent procedure and the 
participant would get the amount fixed by the CRO for becoming a trial participant. 
The ex-trial participant said that he was one of the several people who the bichauliya 
(intermediary) contacted to show up for screenings. When asked whether if the 
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studies turned out to be riskier than presumed he would still choose to participate in 
the trial, the participant said that he would make the same choice again. Regarding 
compensation for participation, the participant said that sometimes he could negotiate 
on the compensation rates but most of the times the rates were fixed.  
 The experience of A shows that he had agreed to consent even before he 
passed the screening. He perceived the BA/BE studies as low risk and viewed 
participation as an opportunity to supplement his family’s income. Yet had the risk 
been higher he would nonetheless still have volunteered. What they might or might 
not have told him at the consent sessions made little difference to him. He even 
spoke about the possibility of negotiating compensation rates. While A was clearly 
motivated by payment that would help to support him and his family, trial participant 
B below had a somewhat different perspective. 
2
nd
 trial participant (hereinafter ‘B’): This participant had only recently consented 
to becoming part of a trial for testing a bio-similar compound;
30
 hence, the trial drug 
had not been administered to him yet. On why he chose to be part of the trial, the 
participant said: 
I was told it will be randomised so they will not know which one will 
receive which injection…we will all get free drugs and I think that 
was my main reason to take part in this study. The regular dose I get 
is lakhs [a hundred thousand] of rupees a month, I cannot afford it. 
This at least gives me at least the normal one I use regularly or the 
new drug, which they tell me, are both completely similar, and it is 
free. I would have been stupid to miss this. 
On being asked whether he received full and complete information from the doctors 
who were also the investigators for the study, the trial participant said that he trusted 
them and that they had told him “all that I need to know”. He mentioned that he had 
faith in the people involved in the trial as it was going to be conducted at one of the 
best hospitals in the country.  
 The experience of B shows that his motivation to join the trial stemmed from 
the monetary and health benefit he was going to derive from the study. He was going 
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with the same chemical composition, thereby driving the cost down. That new biologic drug is a bio-
similar. Bio-similar compounds are not identical, but are almost identical to the original biologic.  
168 
 
to receive an expensive drug or its bio-similar, which would otherwise have cost him 
thousands of Indian Rupees.
31
 B placed his trust in the investigator and the hospital 
where the study was going to be conducted.  
 Both A and B had different factors motivating them to join the trials. Both 
derived monetary benefit out of the situation and both were led through an 
informative consent procedure. I concede that my sample size is limited and the 
situation of A and B might not be representative of the experiences of most of the 
trial participants in India, but given these participants’ perceptions, I will proceed to 
analyse the implications of these two cases. 
 In the cases of A and B, the decision to participate in the trial was affected by 
either monetary or health incentives, or both. Does this mean that their consent 
should be deemed non-voluntary, hence, invalid? Should monetary or medical 
incentives for participation in trials be considered as coercive offers that invalidate 
consent? If we go by the provision on free consent in the law of contracts in India,
32
 
an act is voluntary if there is no evidence of undue influence or coercion. If an act is 
driven or motivated by a person’s values and preferences or the person’s 
“circumstance, such as poverty, illness, or, in medical cases, the lack of “alternative 
treatment options”,
33
 the act is neither legally involuntary nor invalid. However, 
ethicists have argued this subject matter at great length. Some suggest that any 
amount of payment
34
 cannot be termed as a coercive offer
35
 and payment for 
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participation cannot invalidate consent.
36
 Some suggest that large enough 
inducements of payments, which lead people into taking risks that they would 
otherwise not have taken, is undue inducement/influence.
37
 Wertheimer claims that 
offers of payment that would compromise the validity of consent would be offers that 
distort a subject’s capacity to assess the benefits and risks of participation. He further 
defines undue influence as an influence that is likely to make trial participants 
overestimate the benefits of participation or underestimate the risks. Wertheimer 
states that there is no undue influence when research subjects are capable of making 
rational appraisals of benefits and risks to reach the conclusion that participation in a 
trial or study is their best option.
38
 Given these debates, some authors suggest that 
ethicists need to stop talking about undue inducement in reasonably risky
39
 trials that 
are approved by independent reviews and focus on what they view as being real 
ethical concerns.
40
 The following section will look at how the stakeholders 
understand this concern within their respective roles.  
6.1.2. Do the stakeholders involved in realising informed consent in India think 
of undue inducement as a real ethical concern? 
A clinician working for a pharmaceutical corporation told me that ethical guidelines 
indirectly depict economically poor trial participants as “lacking any form of agency 
which is quite paternalistic by itself”. The clinician said that in some trials, the 
majority of voluntary participation comes from economically and socially vulnerable 
groups because they get monetary or other incentives out of it. However, in his view, 
he said that in a country like India it was “not an unfair deal”.  
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I interviewed some NGO members working on clinical trial issues who 
alleged that trial sponsors, investigators and CROs frequently target poor population 
groups to conduct trials. Such accounts also appear in empirical studies conducted by 
other scholars in other countries.
41
 An NGO member I spoke to alleged that the 
CROs offered large sums of money to poor people to make them appear for trials. I 
asked a CRO member if the amount they gave to volunteers, especially economically 
vulnerable participants, to appear for screenings could be termed as ‘undue 
inducement’. The CRO employee said: 
It is hypocritical to call the compensation rate large and undue 
inducement; if the money was less the same people would call it 
exploitation. 
Let us consider this: if treated as a payment for labour or as a contractual job of a 
kind,
42
 there is nothing inherently unethical about paying research participants for 
participation in a trial. If it is about the degree of risk involved in the job, ethicists 
argue that it ought to be treated as no different to financial payment made to police, 
military, fire fighters or sanitation workers.
43
 Moreover, the view of the clinician 
about paternalism is in line with the views of some authors on the subject of 
pervading paternalism in research ethics.
44
 Although most of this paternalism is 
justifiable, some scholars argue that ethics committees can show unjustifiable 
paternalism by rejecting research that poses risk to people who are perfectly 
competent to decide for themselves.
45
  In both the cases of A and B, the individuals 
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seemed to have made a voluntary choice and appeared to be acting in their own best 
interest. It is then quite paternalistic to write about protecting them, “against their 
will, from the harmful consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and 
undertakings”.
46
 If any systematised form of ethics, like ethics of clinical trials, 
imposes its own values and judgments on people “for their own good”, it seems well 
labelled as “paternalism”. In most cases, this kind of paternalism can be justified, 
especially when there is an unhealthy risk-benefit assessment negatively affecting the 
trial participant. Nevertheless, in other cases, we must to be able to justify this kind 




We must also be cautious and consider the fact that there is a dearth of pan-
India empirical data related to the economic and social backgrounds of trial 
participants. It would be a mistake to generalise such claims that only the poor or 
people with weak bargaining power are targeted for trial recruitment in countries like 
India. It is a natural assumption that people in need of money or health care would be 
more willing to participate in paid or otherwise beneficial clinical research studies. It 
is a reasonable assumption considering the vast socio-economic disparities that exist 
in India. But unless there are reliable statistics on the backgrounds of all trial 
participants, we must be cautious and avoid making blanket claims that they are the 
only groups that are recruited for all kinds of clinical trials being done in India.  
I interviewed a doctor who had served on numerous Ethics Committees (ECs) 
that reviewed research protocols. He told me that the amount of payment or 
incentives given to trial participants needs to be disclosed in the study protocol for 
ethical review. He said that the point of ‘undue inducement’ was never raised as a 
problem in any of the trial studies that he had reviewed. He said that reviewers were 
mostly concerned with how risky the study/trial would be to the health of the trial 
participant and whether all measures would be taken to keep the trial participants 
safe. This corresponds with the most important aim of research ethics, which is 
participant safety. From a practical lens, EC members are not present during 
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participant recruitment; as such, they cannot be expected to ascertain what amount of 
monetary or medical incentive would amount to undue inducement as ascertaining 
this would require detailed information and analysis of the economic or social 
background of each trial participant. With the limited time that they have to produce 
valid results for the study, they claim to prioritise issues that might compromise the 
health and safety of trial participants. 
Some commentators consider inducement as ethically problematic only when it 
distorts the judgment of the agent, but if it does not distort the judgment and serves 
as a mere motivating factor then they claim it to be unproblematic for the validity of 
consent.
48
 If we ascribe to this view, as long as a trial participant shows willingness 
to participate in a trial, then irrespective of the motivation of joining the trial, the 
autonomous decision making capacity of the individual needs to be respected. 
However, sometimes the willingness to participate is questioned when the participant 
comes from a disadvantaged background as people assume that poverty compromises 
the agency to such an extent that it leaves a person with no agency. Here I will revisit 
the concept of coercion from Chapter 3 to discuss my findings within the theoretical 
framework outlined therein.  
6.1.3.  Coercion or harsh choice circumstances?  
The two major infractions on voluntariness are undue influence and coercion. We 
have dealt with undue influence in terms of inducement; let us now analyse situations 
that have been considered as coercive circumstances or circumstances that might act 
as undue influence on the decision-making capacity of the participants. George J. 
Annas, a prominent bioethicist, was once quoted as saying:  
I'd argue you can't do studies ethically in a country where there is no 
basic health care. You can tell a person there that this is research, but 
they hear they have a chance to get care or else refuse their only good 
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chance at care. How can you put them in that position and then say 
they are giving informed consent?
49
 
Annas’ use of “you put them in that position” reflects that he considers the situation 
of poverty or lack of basic health care as a coercive circumstance. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, some scholars have suggested that there needs to be a distinction between 
hard choice/harsh circumstances and coercion.
50
 It is sometimes assumed that when 
people have to make choices between a harsh set of circumstances, their choice is 
somehow coerced. This is assumed even when the agent makes the choice 
independently and in his/her own interest.  
Philosophers have given different theories of coercion. I ascribe to the theory 
where philosophers have required coercion to have two elements – i) a set of choices 
available to the agent and ii) actions of external parties that have affected that set of 
choices.
51
 The second element seems to be missing from the situation described by 
Annas. The situation in developing countries like India is already one in which harsh 
circumstances (e.g. poverty or lack of basic health care) exist abundantly. There is 
hardly any evidence showing that the actions of parties conducting trials in 
developing countries unfairly create or affect those set of choices. The trial sponsors 
do not create the situations of injustice that already exist. They make attractive offers 
that might seem opportunistic considering the harsh circumstances that exist in parts 
of these countries, but those offers are not coercive.
52
 Moreover, such attractive 
offers are made in developed countries as well; especially where a participant 
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suffering from a disease with no cure has a limited set of options from which to 
choose. Hence, hard choice circumstances need to be distinguished from coercion. 
One clinician based out of Mumbai, while talking to me about ‘guinea-pig’ coverage 
in the media and about poor people having no choice but to participate in trials, said: 
I think there is a big misconception that poor people have no other 
choice than to participate in trials in India. They have multiple options 
for getting healthcare. If money is an issue, they even have extremely 
subsidised government hospitals where they can get treatment for next 
to nothing. Yes! the lines are big, but people all over the country 
middle class, even the rich, and the poor, all suffer in long queues. 
Why would a person just volunteer for a trial because they have no 
other choice and no choice for what? This [while air quoting] “no 
other choice” business makes absolutely no sense to me. There is 
always a choice and we don’t force them to do anything…Even if 
money is the reason for them to participate then how is it any different 
from maut ka kuan [the well of death motordrome] at the circus? 
Don’t they risk their life for nothing but money there? So you see at 
least in clinical research, even if there is a risk, the benefit goes to 
thousands of other people.  
Scholars have argued extensively over whether harsh circumstances affect people’s 
autonomy,
53
 this, however, does not lead to the conclusion that harsh circumstances 
invalidate consent. I address this point further in Chapter 7. The real problem lies not 
in the debate on whether poverty invalidates consent, but in the existence of harsh 
circumstances in developing countries that might induce people to choose clinical 
trial participation for any form of benefit that they are otherwise denied. Stakeholders 
seemed to think that the focus should shift from mere theoretical debates in clinical 
research to finding real solutions to eliminate these harsh circumstances. As a 
member of one of the higher regulatory bodies, who requested strict confidentiality, 
opined that academics will be taken more seriously if they provided real solutions, he 
said: 
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…people sitting in plush offices [of Universities] tell us how we do 
everything wrong, they use big fancy words for simple common sense 
things.…If they [academics] have real data-based solutions, we 
respect them and we ask for help. These [policy] decisions take 
months and years of deliberations. They are made keeping in mind 
needs of the most number of people. If some benefit in money terms 
or medically from trials why should we not let them?  
This shows that harsh circumstances are neither a serious concern for 
practitioners/researchers nor for regulators, yet they are the focal point of discussions 
in academic literature about ethics of clinical research in developing countries.  
In the next section I look at another important facet of voluntariness that has 
not yet been mentioned, i.e., the right to withdraw from a trial at any time. This 
important right is arguably responsible for taking away the contractual element from 
a consent agreement, since it means that the research participant is immune from 
performing her contractual obligations. Here we shall see how different stakeholders 
perceive this right and what we can learn from this.  
6.1.4.  The right to withdraw: completing voluntariness 
Participants, even those that are given inducements for participation, are free to 
withdraw their participation at any point, even where it jeopardises the trial. The 
right to withdraw from trial participation at any time completes the voluntariness 
condition of a trial.
54
 Some trials conducted in India have poor retention rates and a 
high rate of dropouts. One scientist at CDRI said: 
...we [sic] need to realise that the clinical trial process is an extremely 
slow one and the first few interactions with the participants is [sic] 
quite cumbersome...here [at CDRI] the rate of drop outs from trials is 
about 10-15% which is higher than the fewer number of drop-outs 
elsewhere in the world. These are not unusual figures for us. 
This shows that perhaps the agency of trial participants in India is not as reduced as 
some claim it is. An investigator, based at a private hospital in New Delhi, claimed 
that poor participant retention was a good example of participants not being bound to 
the trials as they were free to leave the study according to their wishes. However, one 
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public health activist refuted the claim. According to the activist, participant 
retention was “not an indicator” of unproblematic informed consent procedures. 
Another public health activist agreed with his colleague and said: 
Most trial participants fear leaving trial studies as that affects their 
relationship with their care provider and no one wants to take a study 
drug and leave the study without the follow-up supervision.  
This concern is supported by a study conducted by Mandava and colleagues 
suggesting that participants from developing countries were less likely than those 
from developed countries to be willing to refuse to join or withdraw from a trial.
55
 
This was, the study found, because participants in developing countries were more 
likely to be concerned about the consequences of refusal or withdrawal, for instance, 
being refused health care. There appears to be a division between different 
stakeholders as to how to interpret the relatively high drop-out rate, and on whether 
there is a high drop-out rate at all. But some global pharmaceutical company 
representatives reiterated views similar to those of the CDRI scientist, that the refusal 
rates for trial participation in India were sometimes more than the acceptance rates. 
They showed me their data charts on participation and refusal rates and the rate of 
refusal and drop outs in India were considerably higher than their trial sites in other 
countries. However, in most academic articles, dealing with clinical research in 
developing countries, researchers fail to mention that sometimes recruiters struggle 
to achieve trial participation and retention in countries like India. When asked about 
informed consent procedures in general, a representative of a global pharmaceutical 
MNC, who was also a clinical trial site manager in India, said:  
The informed consent procedure is very robust. There is a healthy 
refusal rate of participants; the investigators are thoroughly trained. In 
fact, it is a struggle to recruit patients sometimes, because their 
opinions are respected. 
Existing empirical studies show that factors contributing to dropouts include fear of 
serious and adverse effects, change in trial participant’s residence, poor compliance 
with study protocol, participant’s fear of side effects, and a fear for study 
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 This is in contrast to the allegation by the activist above that 
participants fear dropping out of trials.  
The right to withdraw from a trial is an important precondition of 
voluntariness.
 57
 This right seems to have been respected in the studies that were 
conducted by my interviewees because they claimed that their dropout rates were 
high, and if their claims are true (which I cannot confirm as the data charts were 
shown but not shared with me) it shows that the agency of the research participants 
was respected.  
The next section will look at a meta-analytical study that analyses several 
other empirical studies to determine what motivates people in India to participate in 
or drop out of trials. This study will help us understand that the reasons people 
participate in trials in India are not simple.  
6.1.5. What motivates people in India to participate in (or drop out from) trials?  
There are multiple empirical studies on what prompts people to become, or drop out 
as, trial participants in India.
58
 Shah and colleagues conducted a meta-analytical 
study that evaluated all empirical studies (up until 2010) that determined the factors 
contributing to decisions made by trial participants in India. The variables of this 
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Benefits   
Altruism    Methods for 
motivating 
participation (See 
Appendix II)  




about trials  
  Trust in 
Physicians  
 
48% 43% 34% 31% 21% 8% 
 






   
Concerns 
about efficacy 













26%   21% 19% 17% 11% 6% 1% 
 
It is evident that although a substantial percentage of people considered participation 
in trials out of altruism (43% of sample size), the majority participated in them 
because of personal health benefits and as a source of additional income (48% and 
31% respectively). There are clear overlaps in what factors motivated them to 
participate in trials; some might have had altruistic options combined with the 
motivation of gaining benefits. As noted in Section 5.1.1., irrespective of whether 
some ethicists approve or not, payment in the form of financial or monetary benefits 
is important for the recruitment for trials in India. The factors affecting drop-out rates 
or factors that lead to people not volunteering for trials includes a high percentage of 
people (about 26%) who mistrust trial organisations. This is interesting because it 
shows that money itself is not sufficient to entice people to participate in trials. 
About 21% of people would not participate in or would withdraw from trials because 
of concerns regarding the safety and efficacy of trials. This shows that a substantial 
number of people regard the trial industry in India with suspicion. Hence, 
recruitment for trials is not as effortless as most people think, even in resource-poor 
settings and where financial inducements are paid. 
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 The most striking feature of this study is the percentage of people who cited 
‘language’ as a barrier to trial participation. A huge proportion of bioethical literature 
cites language as a major problem in realising informed consent in developing 
countries with multiple languages and high illiteracy rates like India.
62
 But only 1% 
of Indian people interviewed for these empirical studies regarded it as a barrier to 
trial participation. Moreover, the first table shows that the percentage of people who 
participated (or were willing to participate) because they received detailed 
information about the trial was about 21%. By inference, this means that for 79% of 
the people, detailed information about the trial was not a decisive factor in 
volunteering for a trial. This is important because information disclosure is the other 
major ethical requirement for proper informed consent procedure. The ethical and 
legal requirement also suggests communication of information to the trial participant 
in the language and manner most suitable to the understanding of the prospective 
trial participant. This takes us to the second ethical requirement of full information 
disclosure in clinical trials.  
6.2. INFORMATION 
Full information disclosure, along with assuring comprehension of that information 
is another major ethical and legal requirement for informed consent. It is a 
requirement by law and by the ethical guidelines in India that adequate information 
must be given to the trial participant in a “simple and easily understandable 
unambiguous language in a document known as the Informed Consent Form with 
Participant/Patient Information Sheet.”
63
 For the sake of analysis, I am going to 
presume the precondition that general information is given during the recruitment of 
participants for a trial. The problem that is identified by numerous scholarly studies 
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is whether the trial participants adequately understand the information. Scholars have 
extensively written about poor literacy conditions in the developing world that make 
this ethical requirement a difficult condition to achieve.
64
 Most other empirical 
studies in this field have been dedicated to suggesting methods through which 
participant comprehension of information in clinical trials can be improved. These 
include methods like making consent forms shorter and less technical, using teach-
back methods, using bulleted fact sheets, Q&A sessions, person-to-person interaction 
or interaction with a study educator, use of locally relevant analogies, and so on.
65
 
The next section considers how the stakeholders view participant comprehension in 
India.  
6.2.1.  INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND OBTAINING PARTICIPANT 
UNDERSTANDING IN ACTION 
The problems of illiteracy noted above have represented a major challenge for 
recruitment in India. One scientist/investigator at the Central Drugs Research 
Institute (CDRI), a government funded clinical research institute, spoke about 
illiteracy as a challenge for recruitment for trials, the scientist said: 
...illiteracy is a very big challenge while recruiting participants...extra 
care has to be taken...We try to mostly avoid recruiting completely 
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illiterate people for trials. In our experience most volunteers have 
been well-informed and educated...they even question the consent 
forms and ask lots of questions...the patient information sheet [PIS] is 
always printed out in local languages and explained in detail...we put 
major efforts while recruiting participants…having a non-informed 
trial participant is difficult even for a trial to be conducted properly. 
Two important points can be inferred from the experience of this scientist from 
CDRI. First, the motivation to take consent here is not to act ethically but efficiency 
i.e., getting the trial to work well. Second, it might be easier to refrain from 
recruiting illiterate participants for research altogether. However, the CDRI scientist 
noted that even educated trial participants could have difficulty understanding the 
exact nature of the trial because the terms can be too technical. He said that their 
approach in the consent counselling sessions is to make the information as simple as 
possible and to let participants ask as many questions as they want.  
 Perhaps in the effort to live up to the highest ethical standards it might seem 
practical to avoid recruiting trial participants who are illiterate or might have 
difficulty understanding the nature of a trial study. However, are we then not 
assuming the patronising stance that illiterate people cannot be made to understand 
complex information? A researcher from India addressed this point: 
...[n]ote that while potential research participants from the lower 
classes may be illiterate, they are not ‘uneducated’. Individuals often 
have life experiences which empower them. A researcher must be 
innovative in creating a consent process for communicating 
information which ensures that potential research participants 
understand the purpose of the research before consenting.
66
 
Debates related to trials in developing countries have not yet reached a point where 
parties demand that certain poor and illiterate populations be excluded from being 
recruited for trials altogether. However, allegations of “recruiting and exploiting poor 
and illiterate people” made against CROs in India
67
 led some CROs to adopt policies 
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of excluding illiterate people from trial recruitment completely.
68
 A CRO I spoke to 
based out of Andhra Pradesh confirmed that they had decided to not recruit illiterate 
participants and had been following the policy since the year 2014. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that such policies of non-recruitment of illiterate people will be expanded in 
the near future. Instead, what the field arguably needs is more context specific, 
innovative, and practical solutions to practical problems like assuring adequate 
understanding of information. As an investigator/scientist at a public hospital said: 
These things are obvious. When people don’t have the capacity to 
understand you make them understand using simple words...You 
don’t need a law to tell you that you have to do that. It is [a] basic way 
of communication. 
The experiences of these practitioners show that though obtaining reasonable 
comprehension of trial information from the participants can be difficult, it is not 
impossible. It requires the right approach towards the consent process. The approach 
seems to be simple: you use the language the participant is most comfortable in and 
you simplify the information to convey the risks and the purpose of the study most 
efficiently. The purpose behind adopting such an approach should be to ensure that 
the trial participants make an informed choice. Such an approach is beneficial to both 
the parties because having ill-informed trial participants could be harmful to the trial 
process and could compromise the results of the trial study. We must remember that 
communication between the investigator and the trial participant is not a one-off 
process and instead involves months or years of interaction. This is because a trial 
lasts for several months, and sometimes several years, and if the participant decides 
not to drop out of the trial in the middle of such trial period, the interactions are 
frequent. Therefore, it does neither party any good to be complacent about ‘adequacy 
and understanding’ of the information during the consent process.    
 In action, as we have seen from the study conducted by Shah and colleagues 
above, there are many more factors affecting a trial participant’s motivation to join a 
trial than mere adequacy of information. If we go back to the cases of trial 
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participants in Section 5.1.1., it is quite apparent that A did not care much about 
information related to the trial. He was of the opinion that BA/BE studies are low-
risk, but even if they were high risk, he would have joined the study anyway. His 
consent was pre-determined to such an extent that any other information given to him 
at the consent process would not matter much. In B’s case, extreme trust in the 
institution and the investigator, along with the health and monetary benefit, overrode 
any need for detailed information. Although from what B said, it seems that he 
understood the concept of randomisation in trial, even if he did not know the clinical 
jargon. The relevant point here is that even if there are other factors motivating trial 
participants to join trials than mere adequacy of information (as the study suggested 
in Section 5.1.5), it is the duty of the investigator to ensure that the information is 
comprehensible and that the participant has understood the information. Only when 
there is satisfactory comprehension of information can we call informed consent 
meaningful; otherwise, its significance is reduced to a mere procedural requirement. 
This raises the question - how does one assess satisfactory comprehension of 
information as an investigator of a trial?  
 Most investigators I interviewed felt that they had duly complied with all the 
necessary requirements of informed consent once they had informed the participant 
and taken written consent. But when asked if they had ascertained that the participant 
had understood the information, some investigators were not exactly sure about how 
such an assessment could be made. As one investigator said: 
We ask again and again if they have understood what a technical term 
means or what is required of them. They ask us questions and we 
answer, isn’t that enough? Should we take written tests? Itna time 
nahi hota [we do not have so much time]. Some people opt to bring 
their more educated children or relatives to explain them some things. 
We allow even that...I think it is not possible to guarantee or exactly 
tell about things like comprehension. [sic] 
Taking note of the difficulties in assessing comprehension of trial participants, some 
empirical studies in the US have found that repeated participant consent counselling 
sessions help improve comprehension of information.
69
 Some researchers have 
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suggested repeated use of questionnaires within an interval of a few days to assess 
comprehension
70
 and others have devised their own comprehension tests suitable to 
their field of study to assess participant comprehension, such as the Deaconess 
Informed Consent Comprehension Test (DICCT).
71
 Participant comprehension can 
thus be assessed in a number of ways.
72
 It can safely be concluded that eventually it 
is up to the will and effort of the individual investigator and the intent of the trial 
sponsor to ensure that there is sufficient comprehension of information by trial 
participants of their study. Of course, the other option could be to legally necessitate 
‘comprehension assessment’ as part of the consent process, but for that, we would 
first need some agreement on the best possible method to assess comprehension. The 
next section will look at the legal understanding of this essential requirement of 
informed consent.  
6.2.2.  Law and its understanding of the condition of full disclosure of 
information 
We have seen that the focus of most ethical and empirical studies in this area has 
been on the understanding of information by the trial participant. Let us now see how 
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the law deals with this requirement. Schedule Y of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act, 1940, mentions that the information should be presented in a non-technical and 
understandable manner, but the provision is laid down as a guideline without a 
remedial clause. But as we saw in chapter 4, in case law related to informed consent 
in treatment there is a preoccupation with outlining what adequate information 
disclosure might mean and according to whom. Previous chapters have highlighted 
the fact that courts in different jurisdictions determine the disclosure of adequate 
information according to three standards: 1) the professional practice standard; 2) the 
reasonable person standard; and sometimes 3) the subjective patient standard. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 4, the Indian courts follow the professional practice 
standard.
73
 In that chapter, I also suggested that the reasonable person or the 
subjective standard would be the best approach to protecting the autonomy of the 
trial participant in cases arising out of lack of informed consent in research. 
However, such a standard would also require the courts to assess the materiality of 
the information to be disclosed.  
 The medical professionals must divulge all ‘material risks’ to the patient for 
the duty of information disclosure to be fulfilled.
74
 Prior to the evolution of the 
reasonable person standard, the disclosure of material risk was looked at from the 
viewpoint of the established medical professional standard. Now most courts (in 
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common law jurisdictions) look at materiality from the point of view of whether a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to 
the risk.
75
 However, we must question what materiality means in the modern world, 
where access to information is easier, and where decision-making is not the same as 
it used to be. Some, like Sawicki, say that weighing up the risks and benefits of the 
various treatment alternatives does not accurately reflect modern understandings of 
how patients make medical decisions.
76
 She holds the view that existing common law 
disclosure duties fail to capture multiple non-medical factors that are relevant to 
patients. Such non-medical factors include the cost of treatment, the physician’s 
personal characteristics, the social implications of health care interventions, and the 
legal consequences associated with diagnosis and treatment.
77
 Hence, she seeks to 
expand the doctrine of informed consent to include information that may be relevant 
to patients/participants but falls outside the traditional scope of materiality as 
understood in medicine and law. I agree with this to the extent that there are multiple 
factors that affect how modern patients and trial participants make decisions 
pertaining to their bodies these days. However, the common law has usually limited 
the scope of disclosure to medically material facts and any argument favouring an 
extended scope would have to be thoroughly examined,
78
 a task that is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 Nevertheless, in addition to disagreements over what constitutes materiality 
in disclosure there is the added problem of risks in the case of clinical trials. This is 
because some of the risks are discovered while the drug is in the process of being 
tested upon the trial participant. Therefore, the uncertainty of risks, including every 
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other material information that has the potential to affect a participant’s decision to 
join the trial, must be fully disclosed by the investigator. Most investigators I 
interviewed claimed to be doing just that. Some investigators even showed me 
consent forms where the study protocol had been explained in different languages 
and the risks were outlined in a bullet point format. I could not get a copy of those 
forms as they were forms of ongoing trials, but I have attached a similar copy of a 
trial consent form from a sample trial (in English and Hindi) in Appendix III. The 
language of the consent form is simple and there are about seven double-sided pages 
of information. In my estimation, a person has to be educated to at least high school 
level to be able to understand the form’s content. Although a seven-page consent 
form is a reasonable sized form, one investigator showed me a 50-page consent form. 
When I asked the investigator how he translated such long and dense forms to people 
with low literacy levels, the investigator told me that he sat down with each 
participant and explained each bullet point of potential risk in detail. He said that his 
strategy worked well especially for people who could not read the consent form, 
although he claimed that he followed this procedure with every participant 
irrespective of his/her educational background. He said:  
We try to make sure that the uncertainty about risks is conveyed as 
clearly as possible because we don’t want legal suits and other 
problems because of that.  
It might be obvious, but it does no harm to emphasise that while the potential threat 
of a lawsuit might change the attitude of some people regarding certain ethical 
requirements, it is not sufficient to make research ethical. There is much more to the 
process of a clinical trial than the prerequisite of ethical informed consent. While 
informed consent is necessary in all cases, in no case is it sufficient for ethical 
clinical research. There are other ethical benchmarks, like fair subject selection, 
value to society, risk benefit ratio, scientific validity of the research, collaborative 
partnerships between stakeholders, independent review of the study, and respect for 





 But these benchmarks are outside the scope of informed 
consent, and hence excluded from discussion in this chapter.  
 However, regardless of the shifting academic debates, as for example in the 
case of materiality, the difference between the legal and ethical requirements for 
information disclosure remains the same. The ethical standard preoccupies itself not 
just with the adequacy of information, but also with the understanding of it. It not 
only takes into account the potential vulnerabilities (cognitive, emotional, etc.), but 
also the cultural, educational and language barriers that might make comprehension 
of information difficult. It focuses on effective communication and dialogue with the 
trial participant. In contrast, the legal standard has a limited remit because it focuses 
on the standards of disclosure and what leads to causation of injury rather than the 
format or the content of communication.
80
 The legal standard that comes closest to 
corresponding with the ethical requirements is the subjective patient standard. 
However, it is not the dominant legal standard in the law of informed consent. The 
law has not yet evolved to fully embrace the ethical standards required to ensure 
comprehension of information to the patient/participant. This is a classic case where, 
despite progressive developments in case law, the law makes an uneasy compromise 
with ethical theory.  
 This discussion prompts another question – even if we assume that the 
information was adequate, non-technical, and communicated in an understandable 
manner, how do we assess that the trial participant has the capacity or competence to 
understand that information? The next section will assess considerations affecting the 
trial participant’s capacity to give informed consent. It will highlight the practice of 
equating legal age of majority with capacity (even for trials not involving children).  
6.3. COMPETENCE / CAPACITY  
As noted above, it is not just the disclosure of information that is relevant; the 
research subject must also have the capacity to consent. Capacity to consent refers to 
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the decision-making competence of an individual. As noted in Chapter 4, informed 
consent is not just about the capacity to be able to enter into a contract; it is about the 
capacity to be able to make a decision after rationally understanding the information 
and the consequences of that decision. However, when I asked the investigators how 
they ascertained capacity of the trial participants, almost all of them told me that their 
trial participants were above 18 years of age. It is important to note that none of the 
investigators I interviewed were involved with trials on children, minors or people 
with mental illness. However, levelling capacity with age is a simplistic and 
legalistic way to approach the informed consent process. 
 When the principle of informed consent to treatment was being laid out in the 
US courts, it included “every human being of adult years and sound mind”.
81
 Adult 
years meant the age at which individuals were considered capable of making their 
own decisions. In India, the legal age of majority is 18 years of age, which means 
that it is the age at which an individual is considered to be of ‘adult years’.
82
 
Schedule Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, says that legally incapacitated 
persons, like minors or people with mental illness, would need the signature of a 
legal representative to become trial participants.
83
 But the manner in which this legal 
requirement plays out, or has played out, in practice undermines the rationale behind 
this requirement. The next section will revisit the HPV vaccine case, which was a 
study conducted on minor girls. Although ethical issues involving children are 
outside the scope of this thesis, I am mentioning this case in the next section to show 
how the simplistic legal understanding of capacity is counterproductive and not 
sufficient to protect trial participants. 
6.3.1.  CAPACITY IN ACTION 
One cannot argue against the importance of vaccine trials on children in India,
84
 but 
the conduct of these trials has raised some grave ethical concerns. As was discussed 
                                                          
81
 Schloendorff  v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). 
82
 Section 3, Indian Majority Act, 1875.  
83
 Supra note 3.  
84
 In a UNICEF report from 2015, around 1.2 million children in India were reported to have died of 
preventable causes, more than half of them were vaccine preventable cases. Which translates to about 
17% of the world’s total under the age of 5 year deaths. As such, it becomes a public health need to 
190 
 
in the introductory chapter, in the HPV vaccine case, the Indian government 
documented ethical misconduct due to the death of seven minor girls enrolled in a 
clinical trial for the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine in the states of Andhra 
Pradesh and Gujarat. Although, after an enquiry, the deaths were found to be 
unrelated to the trial vaccine, the media coverage of the event led to a debate on the 
informed consent requirements for minors and their capacity to consent.
85
 The 
Parliamentary Committee Report on the alleged irregularities in the HPV trial 
conducted by the NGO PATH revealed serious discrepancies in the informed consent 
process. The report found: 
The Informed Consent document approved by various Ethics 
Committees on PATH project included the sentence: “I have read the 
information in this consent form (or it has been read to me). I consent 
to allow my daughter to receive three doses of HPV vaccines.” In the 
case of Andhra Pradesh 9,543 forms were signed, 1,948 had thumb 
impressions while hostel warden had signed 2,763 forms. In the case 
of Gujarat 6,217 forms were signed, 3,944 had thumb impressions and 
545 were either signed or carried thumb impression of guardians. The 
data shows that a very large number of parents/guardians were 




The report found that the Andhra Pradesh State Government’s circular directing all 
Headmasters/Wardens in all private/government/ashram schools to sign the consent 
forms on behalf of parents/guardians was legally questionable. According to the rules 
under Schedule Y, in case the trial participant or his/her legal guardian (for minor or 
incapacitated person) is an illiterate person, an independent person has to sign the 
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consent form (along with the thumb impressions of the participant or participant’s 
guardian) as a witness to the consent process.
87
 The report also mentions that the 
witnesses in such cases have to be full-time government employees and have to be 
responsible for explaining the information to the person. However, the report found 
that the signatures of such witnesses were missing.
88
 If the Parliamentary 
Committee’s report is read in toto, it reveals that not only was the competence of 
parties not properly ascertained, but there was also a lack of understanding of the 
information involved.  
 This case shows that in cases where participants lack capacity, there are 
problems with how their capacity or that of their legally authorised representatives is 
ascertained in practice. First, hostel wardens of schools do not qualify as legally 
authorised guardians for minors under the Indian Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. 
The same would apply to clinic wardens for hospitalised mentally incapacitated 
individuals. Second, the requirement of finding a full time government employee to 
witness a consent process and to explain the information to the illiterate or 
incapacitated person (or to the guardian of such persons) could be extremely 
cumbersome in practice. Although such a requirement was possibly introduced to 
ensure transparency and should be commended, it serves little purpose as far as 
ascertaining participant’s capacity to understand is concerned. By such capacity I 
mean the ethical test for capacity, i.e., a person showing the ability to assess the risks 
and benefits of a study and showing an understanding of the consequences of one’s 
decisions. Third, the HPV case raises a fundamental problem, that of having no 
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safeguards in place during the consent process. There is no independent (one who is 
not a government employee for a government-supported initiative) reviewer to 
oversee that the consent forms are being signed in due compliance with the three 
major ethical requirements. Fourth, an inquiry made after-the-fact that looks at 
consent forms to ascertain if the participants had capacity does not accurately reflect 
that the participant or the guardian, at the time of consenting, showed that she could 
reasonably assess the consequences of her decisions pertaining her herself or her 
guardian. This is because merely the signature on a consent form does not reflect 
either the mental capacity (pertaining to a clinical judgment on the soundness of 
mind) or the ethically understood requirement of capacity. Therefore, capacity 
assessment methods have been designed for such situations.  
Numerous assessment methods have been developed to assess the 
competence of adults.
89
 As Grisso and Appelbaum have noted, what counts as 
impaired decision-making capacity is partly determined by the standard of 
competence that is chosen to assess competency in adults.90 It is largely agreed that a 
prospective research participant’s capacity to decide whether to participate in a 
particular research project cannot be determined through a general mental status 
assessment.
91
 Therefore, the investigators ought to develop and present the specific 
information relevant to their study and evaluate the prospective participant’s 
understanding and appreciation of that information. Such evaluation must also 
ascertain a participant’s continuing ability to be able to understand the information 
throughout the course of the trial. The role of the researcher/investigator is key in 
                                                          
89
 T. Grisso & P. S. Appelbaum, Comparison of Standards for Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Make 
Treatment Decisions, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY, VOL. 152, (1995), pp. 1033–37. An 
overview of the different assessment tools developed for assessing competency in treatment and 
research contexts, including, but not limited to, the Hopkins Competency Assessment Test (HCAT), 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study (MTCS), MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—
Treatment (MacCAT-T), The Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE), etc., can be found in the 
following article. See E.D. Sturman, The capacity to consent to treatment and research: A review of 




 D. M. High, et al., Guidelines for Addressing Ethical and Legal Issues in Alzheimer Disease 
Research: A Position Paper, ALZHEIMER DISEASE AND ASSOCIATED DISORDERS, Vol. 8, Supp. 4, 
(1994), pp. 66–74; R. J. Bonnie, Research with cognitively impaired subjects: Unfinished business in 
the regulation of human research, ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY, Vol. 54, Issue No. 2, 
(February, 1997), pp. 105-11. 
193 
 
ascertaining the competence of the individual and ensuring the success of an 
informed consent procedure. However, from my interviews with investigators in 
India, the general attitude towards competence was the levelling of capacity with the 
legalistic requirement of age and soundness of mind. Although soundness of mind is 
almost always presumed in all cases, even if there was indication of unsoundness, 
there are no capacity assessment tests mentioned anywhere, neither in a statute (akin 
to MCA in the UK) nor in the ethical guidelines. Such attitude of levelling the 
capacity requirement with age does not prove competence as ethically understood.   
The next section will bring to fore another aspect of capacity in action that 
has been given little attention in India.  
6.3.2.  What about therapeutic misconception? 
My empirical research brought to the fore another factor that seems to affect the 
capacity of an individual to participate in clinical research, although there are hardly 
any studies from India evaluating the effects of it. Bearing in mind the differences 
outlined in Chapter 3 between medical treatment and clinical research, it becomes 
important to discuss the role of ‘therapeutic misconception’ while discussing 
capacity. Therapeutic misconception occurs when a research subject fails to grasp the 
distinction between the imperatives of clinical research and of ordinary treatment.
92
 
Such a misconception of a clinical trial makes a participant inaccurately attribute 
notions of therapeutic intent and individualized care to trials, notions that are usually 
synonymous with treatment.
93
 Studies have shown that despite adults possessing the 
necessary competence to make decisions about participating in research, therapeutic 
misconception about the trial impairs their ability to reason efficiently thereby 
inflicting doubts on competence.
94
 Many studies have found that subjects frequently 
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overestimate the likely benefits of entry into research studies.
95
 Such a 
misconception leads them to underestimate risks,
96
 confuses them about the nature of 
randomized assignment,
97
 and generally leads participants to mix up research with 
ordinary treatment.
98
 An investigator I interviewed told me about such problems 
while recruiting for trials but without quite using the expression ‘therapeutic 
misconception’. He said: 
There are times people expect trials to give them a cure for 
everything, they expect too much. When they realise they are not 
benefitting medically, they either drop out or become difficult.  
This perception of the investigator might raise the question - was the trial participant 
not adequately informed that trials have different objectives than medical treatment? 
Some empirical studies show that despite there being adequate disclosure some trial 
participants still hold on to such misconceptions.
99
 This suggests that having the 
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cognitive ability to make rational decisions and receiving adequate information does 
not necessarily lead to an adequate understanding of the issues at hand. Therefore, 
such issues can only be addressed through transparent communication between the 
researcher and the subjects and the clear mention of the likelihood of benefits being 
low or none at all.
100
  
 If we are to assess competence using the four-element model given by Grisso 
and Appelbaum,
101
 the competence of individuals to make decisions regarding trial 
participation cannot be reduced to simply age or soundness of mind. Bureaucratic 
methods of assuring that consent forms are duly signed by guardians of incapacitated 
persons is also not sufficient evidence of capacity to consent. The onus of ethicality 
in making sure that consent is ‘understood’ and ‘informed’ by a ‘competent’ person 
lies upon the investigator of the trial (or recruiters for trials).  
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter is the first part of the two-chapter discussion on the research findings 
accumulated through semi-structured interviews of various stakeholders involved in 
clinical research in India. But even if we assume that the criteria mentioned in 
Sections 5.1-5.3 have been met with, debates about informed consent do not rest 
there. The concept of autonomy has been used as the predominant justification for 
informed consent since the 1970s.
102
  But is it the only justification for informed 
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consent? What do various stakeholders think about autonomy? The next chapter will 
consider the existing debates surrounding the justification for informed consent while 
keeping in mind the practitioner perspectives. It will also evaluate the perspectives of 
various stakeholders on the role of law and ethics in ensuring good ethical conduct in 
clinical research. 
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FINDINGS & ANALYSIS: JUSTIFICATIONS & ROLES 
7.0.  Introduction 
This chapter continues to answer the empirical question: How is the principle of 
informed consent perceived by the different stakeholders involved in the process of 
informed consent in clinical research in India? The previous chapter focused on 
stakeholders’ perspectives of what the essential features of informed consent entail 
and contrasted it with the theoretical understanding of the principle. This chapter will 
address two other themes that emerged from the semi-structured interviews. These 
are interviewees’ views on autonomy and the role of law and ethics in ensuring 
ethical conduct in clinical research in India. These themes follow the same format as 
the previous chapter in presenting the views of stakeholders alongside the theoretical 
discussions pertaining to this area.   
7.1. AUTONOMY AND OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS 
Protecting participant autonomy is the predominant justification given for informed 
consent. According to bioethicists Beauchamp and Childress: 
The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-
chosen plan, analogous to the way an independent government 
manages its territories and establishes its policies.1 
However, the bioethicists stress that autonomy so understood differs from autonomy 
as acting on one’s own will, a perspective that is often supported by other 
philosophers.2 There is also the qualification that autonomy here differs from many 
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other uses of autonomy in bioethics and biolaw.3 Beauchamp and Childress also 
admit that actions can be autonomous by degrees. This means that an act can be less 
autonomous than another (perhaps due to varying degree of influences over decision-
making ability), but such varying degree does not imply that the act was not 
autonomous. Considering the varying notions of individual autonomy, some scholars 
have challenged the autonomy-based justifications for informed consent.4 Scholars 
have also criticised the individualistic nature of autonomy for being identity-based 
with too much focus on the nature and character of the self. Olweny writes:  
The concept of autonomy is a manifestation of Western culture, which 
emphasises individualism, personal happiness and self‐actualisation. 
In this context, “personhood” is viewed from the perspective of 
autonomy and individual rights.5 
If this is true, can a person with non-western religious ideals, traditional or 
community norms, where “self-chosen plans” are dependent on others, still be 
autonomous? This was rather the trail of thought of one of the officials from ICMR, 
who I interviewed regarding the mention of informed consent in the ICMR Ethical 
Guidelines related to Human-Subject Research in India.6 The official said:  
India is complicated and huge...its cultures and values vary from 
place to place. You [pointing at the researcher] look at your own 
background and answer if most people in India have the kind of 
autonomy that people in the Western countries have. If we conduct 
research with a female participant in a rural or semi-urban area...the 
participant's mother-in-law, the panchayat head [head of the 
village], along with many others would also have to give 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Autonomy in Human Subjects Research, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. 38, Issue 
No. 2, (2011).  
3
 G. DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), p. 101. 
4
 N. C. MANSON & O O'NEILL, RETHINKING INFORMED CONSENT IN BIOETHICS, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 212; See also O. O'NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS (Gifford 
Lectures at the University of Edinburgh), (Cambridge University Press, 2002), in which O’Neill 
argues against using protection of individual autonomy as a justification for informed consent. She 
states that since the feasibility and the value of all conceptions of individual autonomy are hotly 
contested, the justification for informed consent cannot be merely based on securing individual 
autonomy.  
5 
C. Olweny, The ethics and conduct of cross‐cultural research in developing countries, PSYCHO-
ONCOLOGY, Vol. 3, Issue No. 1, (1994), pp. 11-20. 
6
 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), Ethical Guidelines on Biomedical Research on Human 
Participants, October 2006, p. 1, available at http://www.icmr.nic.in/ethical_guidelines.pdf  
199 
 
permission to the female to participate in a scientific research of 
that manner. So local values always differ...that is why ICMR 
mentioned in the Guidelines that one has to consider autonomy 
versus harmony of the environment of the trial participants.  
Such concerns led the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) to amend the international guidelines to include the guideline that trial 
investigators and sponsors should carry out informed consent procedures in 
“culturally appropriate” ways.7 Beauchamp and Childress have admitted that a 
person can autonomously choose to be guided by religious, traditional, or community 
norms and values. Although they concede that it can sometimes be difficult to take 
into account diverse values and beliefs while sharing the information necessary for 
decision-making, it is still no excuse for not allowing autonomous decision-making. 
They write, “autonomous choice is a right, not a duty of patients”.8  
 When Beauchamp and Childress gave their conceptualisation of autonomy as 
applicable to bioethics, they aimed to construct:  
 [A] conception of respect for autonomy that is not excessively 
individualistic (neglecting the social nature of individuals and the 
impact of individual choices and actions on others), not excessively 
focused on reason (neglecting the emotions), and not unduly legalistic 
(highlighting legal rights and downplaying social practices).9 
However, critics of rationalistic and individualist ideals of autonomy hold that 
despite such efforts on Beauchamp and Childress’ part, their traditional notion of 
autonomy has not paid attention to the individual relationships and social dimensions 
of autonomy. This has given impetus to the development of the concept of relational 
autonomy. The relational autonomists argue that their version of autonomy gives the 
most helpful account of decision-making in medicine. Relational autonomy holds 
that: 
                                                          
7 
Guideline 9, on Consent, International Ethical Guidelines for Health Related Research Involving 
Humans, Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS, p. 35, available at 
http://cioms.ch/ethical-guidelines-2016/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf  
8
 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS (2009), p.  105-106, supra note 1. 
9
 T. L. BEAUCHAMP & J. F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLE OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, (Oxford University Press, 
5th edn., 2001), p. 57. 
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[T]here is a social component built into the very meaning of 
autonomy, [autonomy] involves a dynamic balance among 
interdependent people tied to overlapping projects...[The autonomous 
self is one] continually remaking itself in response to relationships 
that are seldom static,[and which] exists fundamentally in relation to 
others.
 10  
Autonomy as a concept, as evident, is hugely contested in ethics. But in practice, 
how much are the recruiters for trials looking to protect the autonomy, as understood 
by them, of the trial participant? This question can partly be answered through the 
kind of informed consent procedures followed by the recruiters and their own 
categorisation of such procedures. A representative of a pharmaceutical company 
told me that for her it was “interesting to see how socio-economic conditions 
influenced people’s decisions” but she said that for practical matters “informed 
consent procedures are quite standard”. The company representative said that they 
had manuals for investigators to teach them how consent had to be taken from 
“different groups of people”, and they “never had any problems with consent”. 
However, extreme standardisation of procedures can lead to procedures becoming 
barely more than tick-box exercises. By ‘tick-box exercise’, I mean the consent 
procedure does not prove that the consent was informed; rather it only proves that 
there was signed consent.11 But when I asked the researcher about what he 
understood by autonomy of a participant, he said: 
…that the decision is their own. I know it is this, but this rarely 
happens because decisions are always influenced and family 
permissions have to be taken, and all those things…Our priority is to 
keep our participants safe, that is what matters in the end.  
Aiming for participant safety is fine, but to do so it is ethically required of a 
researcher to ensure that a participant’s act of consenting to a study is an autonomous 
act, i.e., an act in accordance with her “self-chosen plan”. Considering the socio-
                                                          
10
 A. Donchin, Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic Decision Making, In: C. 
MACKENZIE & N. STOLJAR (EDS.), RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, 
AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 236-258, at p. 239.  
11
 This can also be bracketed as the procedure which only shows that participants had the capacity to 
act autonomously, but whether or not the act was autonomous would be a different question 
altogether. Faden and Beauchamp give numerous illustrations of cases where they differentiate 
between autonomous acts and autonomous individuals in: Chapter 7, Concept of Autonomy, in: R. R. 
FADEN & T. L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT, (NEW 
YORK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: 1986).  
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economic conditions in India, this brings me to discuss another general, and perhaps 
reasonable, assumption that poverty limits choices. But this assumption often leads to 
the conclusion that a poor person being offered money or incentives to participate in 
research did not make an autonomous choice for lack of availability of meaningful 
choices. One is intuitively aware that a poor person with no access to health care has 
a limited set of choices. Here is another set of plausible assumptions: 
 (1) that a person's ability to exercise her autonomy in the pursuit of 
her values would be enhanced by the introduction into her choice‐set 
of additional options that she would value, and (2) that if new options 
are introduced into a person's choice set that she does not value this 
would not adversely affect her ability to exercise her autonomy.12  
Given these reasonable assumptions, it can be argued that any person who values 
“the ability of persons to exercise their autonomy in the pursuit of their values”13  or 
according to their “self-chosen plan” should approve the introduction of a new option 
into their choice‐sets. Here it would mean that the new option would be participation 
in trial for some form of incentive which was not an option before. Now a person still 
has the freedom to choose between status quo and the new option. Many scholars 
argue that, in situations where there are limited choice-sets available, autonomy is 
enhanced through the introduction of new options.14 This was perhaps what one 
investigator meant when he said:  
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 C. Freiman, Vote Markets, AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 92, Issue No. 4 (2014), 
759-774. Freiman’s assumptions, although given for allowing vote selling, would find support from 
Gerald Dworkin, Taylor, and Savulescu, who have supported a market in organ trade for the similar 
reason that introducing new options enhances autonomy of a person, See G. Dworkin, Market and 
Morals: The Case for Organ Sales, in: G. DWORKIN, MARKET AND MORALS, (Westview, 1994); J. S. 
Taylor, Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales, JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 
19, No. 3 (2002), pp. 273-285; Savulescu writes, “Poverty which is acceptable to a society should not 
be a circumstance which prevents a person taking on a risk or harm to escape that poverty. It is double 
injustice to say to a poor person: “You can’t have what most other people have and we are not going 
to let you do what you want to have those things”. When people go to war voluntarily, risking their 
lives for their country, they are heralded as heroes. If we allow people to die for their country, it seems 
to me we should allow them to risk death or injury for the chance to improve the quality of their lives 
or their children’s lives or for anything else they value. Money for these people is just a means to 
realise what they value in life.”See J. Savulescu, Is the sale of body parts wrong?, JOURNAL OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS, Vol. 28, Issue No. 3, (2003). 
13
 Id. Freiman (2014) 
14
 Supra note 12.  
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Our job should not be to judge why or how people are making 
decisions…we advertise. Interested people come to us. We explain the 
best way we can, the risks and benefits and everything and then we 
leave it to them to make the decision. Should we sit and counsel 
people on what we think is the best option for them? I am sure no 
ethics says [sic] that. If someone participates for the money, or for the 
drug, or for the [medical] check-up, it is his choice. It is bonus if he 
gets something he needed…we should be clear that they are never 
forced to make a choice.   
Many might still see some moral wrong in the scenario. Perhaps concerns of 
exploitation arise (which fall outside the scope of the thesis), but some would call 
such cases mutually advantageous cases of exploitation, hence, permissible.
15
 
Whether there is a moral wrong in conducting for-profit trials in developing 
countries with large disadvantaged populations is far from a settled ethical debate. 
But both the concepts of autonomy and exploitation are heavily debated theoretical 
concepts that have not yet found a clear expression in law.
16
  The legal silence on 
                                                          
15
 The fact that India has not been able to provide adequate health care to a large percentage of its 
population still begs the empirical question: how many of the people deprived of quality health care 
do actually participate in a trial, when fully informed of the risks and benefits, only to get access to 
health care? Furthermore, even if some do participate in a trial for the sole motive of getting access to 
health care, having been informed of the implications of such participation, should their voluntary 
consent be considered invalid? Some authors have addressed such questions in detail. For instance, 
according to Emanuel, if “(1) the consent condition is satisfied (B is not coerced by A); (2) there is 
mutual benefit (B is not harmed by A); (3) B receives a fair share of benefits, where fairness is 
determined according to whether B’s own preferences regarding the content and scope of her share are 
satisfied”, then clinical trials in developing countries would qualify as “mutually advantageous 
exploitative transactions”. However, he opines that such transactions would not be normatively 
problematic (i.e., would not warrant prevention) as long as the above stated conditions are satisfied. 
See E. J. Emanuel, Addressing exploitation: Reasonable availability versus fair benefits, see also 
Wertheimer’s Principle of Permissible Exploitation (PPE), A. Wertheimer, Exploitation in Clinical 
Research,  both as chapters in: J. S. HAWKINS & E. J. EMANUEL (EDS) EXPLOITATION AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (Princeton University Press, 2008), at 
pp. 298-303 & at pp. 73-74 respectively. 
16 
By this, I mean that the concepts per se have not been defined under (institutionalised) substantive 
law, although many legal rights derive from the concepts. A violation of autonomy per se is not a 
legal wrong. In fact, the legal paradox is that if autonomy is understood as freedom to choose then it 
can be argued that all proactive law enforcement tends to violate the autonomy of those subject to it. 
As for exploitation, jurisdictions usually pass laws against instances of specific exploitative practices; 
in such cases, the content of what would be termed exploitation is specifically outlined as opposed to 
simply saying, “This is unfair, hence, illegal”. (For instance, in the US, the State of North Carolina 
makes exploitation of an elder adult or disabled adult a specific offence, but such exploitation is only 
when someone cheats the adults out of their property, see § 14-112.2 of North Carolina General 
Statutes). For instances of exploitative transactions, which could be consensual and beneficial to both 
parties involved (and that are relevant to this discussion), the authority to make such transactions 
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these concepts as well as the views of researchers on these issues indicates these 
issues are not real concerns for legislature and researchers alike.  
Departing from autonomy-based justification of informed consent, some 
philosophers claim “informed consent… is generally important [to some extent] 
because it can make a distinctive contribution to the restoration of trust.”17 Some see 
informed consent as a fundamentally valuable way to honour the trust that the patient 
places in the physician, and as part of the fiduciary role that the physician has 
undertaken.18 By corollary, this would mean that it serves as a way to honour the 
trust the participants place on the trial investigators. In practice, the concept of shared 
decision-making due to trust often comes up when decisions depend on the 
participant’s trust in her doctor, as one investigator, who is also a doctor at a public 
hospital, told me: 
Sometimes there are patients who like to be told what is good for 
them...these are trickier cases for informed consent because there is 
the attitude that the doctor knows better and in most cases it is 
actually true...sometimes there are molecules in compounds of some 
medicines that are being tested so we cannot tell them if that one is 
going to suit a particular person or not...we mainly recruit participants 
with a particular health condition and prerequisites...there are always 
some risks we do not know about. Some patients ask “what do you 
think, should I do it?”...what does one say there? If you're sure there is 
not much of a risk then we advise them...why not....most times when 
they ask us and we think there might be a risk we tell them to make 
the decision themselves.  
Such situations, including situations where a person wholly delegates the task of 
decision-making to her physician, can also be covered under Gerald Dworkin’s idea 
of critical reflection on autonomy.19 Under this version of autonomy, there is room 
for a person’s conscious submission to some form of external authority (for example, 
a physician, a religion, a leader, and so on). Situations such as those described by the 
investigator above can be covered under this theory because it has room for a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
illegal depends upon the will of legislatures. For this thesis, I do not commit myself to any particular 
theory of exploitation or autonomy. 
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 O. O’NEILL, (2002), p. 145, supra note 4.  
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 S. Joffe & R. D. Truog, Consent to medical care: the importance of fiduciary context, In: F. G. 
MILLER & A. WERTHEIMER (EDS.), THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 352.  
19
 G. DWORKIN, (1988), supra note 3. 
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physician to play a paternalistic role. The central idea behind this account of 
autonomy is critical reflection on decisions, which means that after critical reflection 
on their preferences, patients may choose to let the physician decide which treatment 
is best. This also applies to cases where participants ask their physicians if they 
should or should not volunteer for a trial. This shows that there are accounts of 
autonomy that could partly include other justifications for informed consent, like 
honouring the trust placed in the physician/investigator. This could also be 
interpreted as a situation wherein a trial participant waives the right to informed 
consent, as many participants would rather have physicians make certain decisions 
for them. Beauchamp and Childress have noted that informed consent is a patient's 
right, not her duty. This if taken further implies that as informed consent serves 
autonomy, it ought to be autonomously waivable.20   
 With every different conceptualisation of autonomy, there will be someone 
who will argue against it. Such is the nature of the ethics. Therefore, one might 
prefer another, and perhaps simpler, justification for informed consent, which is the 
protection of the trial participant from abusive conduct.21 An unequal power 
relationship (asymmetrical relationship) exists between an investigator and a trial 
participant. Investigators are better informed than participants about both the 
procedures involved and potential results that may follow from the trial. The 
procedures and results of the trial are often unknown or of no medical benefit to 
participants, which may create a disincentive to participate. To recruit volunteers for 
trials, investigators might be tempted to resort to options that involve assault, deceit, 
coercion, and exploitation.22 Informed consent reduces the scope of employing these 
options for clinicians and investigators. For instance, by placing the duty upon the 
investigators to disclose information about the trial, informed consent minimises the 
information gap between clinicians and participants, thereby making the latter group 
less vulnerable to certain abuses of conduct. Of course, informed consent by itself 
does not protect participants from all abuses of conduct. That, however, hardly 
                                                          
20
 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, (2001), p. 106, supra note 9.  
21
 N. Eyal, Informed Consent, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Fall 2012 Edition), 
available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/informed-consent/  (last accessed on 
June 2, 2018) 
22
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undermines the fact that informed consent protects participants from significant 
forms of abusive conduct. An advantage of this justification is that it makes it easier 
to argue for stronger laws regulating informed consent procedures. A proposition 
demanding stronger laws would require evidence that the abuses of conduct by the 
investigators deserve measures to be minimised and that only by strengthening 
informed consent measures would such abuses of conduct be minimised. This raises 
the question - do we need stronger laws for implementing informed consent or do 
ethical guidelines suffice in minimising abusive conduct of investigators and trial 
recruiters? The next section will consider this important question from the 
perspective of various stakeholders.  
7.2. ROLE OF LAW AND ETHICS 
An important theme that stood out in my interviewee data was their views on stricter 
laws and the ethics of clinical research. Chapter 4 of this thesis elaborated upon the 
legal position of informed consent in India. It was noted that for dealing with lack or 
inadequacy of informed consent in clinical research some legal redress is available. 
For instance, under tort law, under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (criminal law) for 
more serious cases of physical injury without consent, and under the Indian 
Constitution for violation of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. However, 
there are no penal provisions under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, for failure to 
take informed consent as laid out under Schedule Y. Moreover, under the Code of 
Ethics Regulation, 2002, if an investigator is a registered doctor, the punishment 
comes in the form of removal of their name from the register of practitioners either 
for a limited period or permanently. The chapter also discussed that the right of 
private action for research subjects/trial participants is not as well-defined as it is in 
the context of negligent medical treatment under common law. This legal situation 
has led to a demand by the civil society for stricter laws for protecting trial 
participants in India, which, inferentially, is a demand for sanctions aimed at the 
investigators/recruiters of trials for the breach of informed consent requirements. 
But how much would stricter laws lead to ethical conduct in clinical 
research? Most of the stakeholders I interviewed expressed some sort of ambivalence 
about legal solutions to ethical conundrums in clinical research. For most of them, 
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strict penalties were necessary for gross violation of rules related to informed 
consent but laws were not sufficient for bringing about ethical conduct. I interviewed 
an investigator based at a public hospital in Mumbai, who said:  
If you are asking that if more laws are needed to make research more 
ethical then I would say maybe not, because we all know what our 
duties are and there are enough guidelines telling us what to do. 
Sometimes there are laws but people still do what is wrong especially 
when they know there are little chances of them getting caught and if 
they see it is easy to get away…of course there needs to be something 
to punish total criminals…Maybe what we need is better regulation so 
there is pressure of being constantly monitored. That would help. 
Penalties, jail time...do these things really help...will that make trials 
more ethical? I don’t know.  
It is noteworthy that this investigator thought that better regulation to monitor trials 
would be more suitable for ensuring ethical conduct than stricter laws. This 
investigator’s ambivalence about the force of law in assuring stricter compliance 
with the standards of informed consent was shared by an ICMR official. On being 
asked about the problem of poor and inadequate informed consent procedures in 
research in India, the official identified “lack of penal provisions in the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act, 1940, not only for the lack of informed consent, but also for flaws or 
shortcomings in the overall research design”. But when asked if the official saw 
stricter penalties as a solution to problematic ethical issues in human subject 
research, the official answered that in official capacity the answer would be a “yes, 
definitely”, but “in personal capacity, it would be a no”. Such duality in position 
makes sense because I was informed that the ICMR is pushing for a law that appoints 
a central bioethical authority in India for dealing with ethical violations in clinical 
research; such an authority would also be equipped with the necessary penalising 
powers. But for this official, the real problem was not lack of stricter penalties; it was 
the lack of research ethics training across the majority of medical and pharmaceutical 
colleges in the country. “If they are not aware of it, how will they implement it?” 
said the official, stressing the need to have more training programmes in bioethics 
and making research ethics a compulsory part of curricula across the nation. Another 
investigator from New Delhi reiterated similar worries as that of the ICMR official 
and said:  
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There is little thought given to ethics in research. It was not a 
compulsory course in my time [at medical college]. Now these things 
are being taken more seriously. ICMR officials and other people are 
teaching ethics at medical and pharmaceutical colleges. These will be 
the researchers of tomorrow and they need to know that it is unethical 
not to ask for consent before using someone else’s body tissues, 
etc….My worry is that when the money starts coming in, a lot of 
people lose their sense of ethics. 
The concern of this investigator about researchers having to worry about numerous 
other things than just ethics was evident in the manner in which all the investigators 
spoke about how difficult it was to conduct research in India. Almost all the 
investigators I interviewed spoke about the immense pressure that they had to work 
under. They spoke about tight deadlines, balancing jobs at hospitals/clinics and 
research, the pressure to create an international profile with good research 
publications, the administrative work related to funding of the study, the 
management of research staff, the re-training of clinicians according to sponsor 
standards, the sluggish bureaucracy, and so on. One investigator even suggested that 
I write about the struggles of being a research investigator in India rather than on 
informed consent. This is perhaps one of the reasons why stricter laws would not 
necessarily lead to ethical conduct. Remedial law has an obsession with fixing 
professional liability; this would not help address the heart of the problem which 
perhaps lies in the motivations and ability of investigators to follow ethical norms.  
While writing about the limits of law in realising effective informed consent, 
Beauchamp opined that formulating legal standards, like those for information 
disclosure (as discussed in the previous chapter) would not help with ensuring good 
informed consent procedures in medicine or research. He writes:  
Because courts are captivated by the context of after-the-fact 
resolution of narrow and concrete questions of duty, responsibility, 
blame, injury, and damages in specific cases, the law has no 
systematic way of affecting contemporary [bio]medical practice other 
than by a somewhat muted threat of prosecution for legal 
wrongdoing.23 
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 T. L. BEAUCHAMP, STANDING ON PRINCIPLES (Collected Essays), (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
p. 68.  
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For Beauchamp, the heart of informed consent is moral and not legal. He writes that 
informed consent has more to do with understanding autonomous choice of research 
subjects than with the liability of professionals.24 I mentioned in the earlier chapters 
that law had made an uneasy compromise with the ethical theory of informed 
consent, sometimes even making similar remarks as that of Beauchamp regarding the 
limits of law. The perceptions of the stakeholders seem to correlate to Beauchamp’s 
view. 
I asked a public health activist about what a stricter law would bring to the 
table that the current framework did not already have, after a long pause, he said:  
Law complicates more than solves. People like going to courts 
because if they win, it is for everyone to see, it serves as a token 
victory. Law can change, but attitudes take longer to change.  
If our goal is a change of attitude towards ethical procedures, then perhaps more laws 
are not the answer. This is also because India has a history of creating laws with poor 
implementation.25 A bioethicist based out of New Delhi raised the problem of poor 
enforcement of laws in India, saying: 
We will have more laws with poor enforcement. That is the situation 
in India. The new regulations will only be enforced till the dust over 
the controversies settle, and then it will be the same thing again.   
These excerpts from the interviews regarding the role of law in ensuring ethical 
conduct share commonalities. The common theme among them all was that stronger 
laws will not necessarily lead to ethical conduct, and even if there are stronger laws, 
the enforcement of those will be poor. But here I would like to bring the attention of 
the reader to the previous chapters where we discussed trust as a justification of 
informed consent. If the rationale of informed consent is taken to be trust, then one 
could argue that stricter sanctions are likely to create an untrustworthy litigious 




 See generally S. K. DAS, INDIA'S RIGHTS REVOLUTION: HAS IT WORKED FOR THE POOR?, (Oxford 
University Press Canada, 2013). In this book the author looks at four Acts in particular, Right to 
Information Act, 2005; National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005; Forest Rights Act, 2006; 
and The Right to Education Act, 2009. His in-depth analysis finds that “the laws, participatory 
framework, institutionalization, economic environment, and remedies mechanism have not been 
adequate to fulfil these rights for the poor.”, at p. 304.  
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atmosphere between the trial participant and the investigator. If the trust based 
rationale is accepted, it is unclear if stricter sanctions would then help or defeat the 
purpose of informed consent.  
As was noted at the beginning of this section, there are remedies available for 
breach of informed consent procedures leading to harm or serious injury. But there 
seems to be no blueprint on what stricter laws pertaining to informed consent are 
going to look like. If it means expansion of law to cover new ground, then that needs 
to be considered very carefully. There seems to be no legitimate purpose for having 
stricter laws that heavily penalise the mere breach of the one or the other condition 
of informed consent (without any resulting harm). Although there is still a need for 
clearer and firmer laws regarding lack of informed consent in research that cause 
injury or harm to the research participant.  
Another important aspect that came to light regarding the attitude towards 
ethical norms was the form that such norms have taken. This was evident in the 
views of some of the stakeholders who seemed to think that the consent form and its 
content was decisive to prove compliance with the informed consent requirement. 
The next section looks at this in more detail.  
7.2.1.  Bureaucratised ‘form’ of Ethics 
My interviews with different stakeholders revealed that the ethical guidelines have 
been formalised to resemble a tick-box exercise. The (over)emphasis on the 
requirement of the patient information sheet and written informed consent form, both 
under Schedule Y and under the ICMR ethical guidelines, have led to the 
equiparation of informed consent with the informed consent form. This critique of 
the formalisation of ethics, along with the Supreme Court orders in the SAM case, led 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) in India to release a 
regulation requiring mandatory audio-video recording of the informed consent 
process for all trial participants. This regulation was later amended and audio-video 
recording of informed consent process was limited to cases where the participants 
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were vulnerable subjects.26 There is, however, no clear definition of who falls under 
the category of a ‘vulnerable subject’, as has been discussed in Chapter 1. The 
following sections will explore different stakeholder views regarding the informed 
consent form and the lack of oversight mechanisms that threaten the goodwill behind 
the new regulations pertaining to informed consent.  
A)  The Consent Form  
An empirical study conducted in India showed that trial participants perceived that 
signing the consent form meant waiving their right to claim damages and that 
consent gave more protection to the doctor/investigator and to the hospital than to the 
participant.27 When I asked trial participants (A & B, from the previous chapter) if 
they had received copies of the consent form, they both said that they had not. One 
trial participant said that it was not much of a problem as signing the form was 
merely a “formality”. When the trial participants themselves view the process of 
informed consent, which is reduced to signing forms, as a mere formality, the 
principle of informed consent appears to have lost some of its value in action.   
The status of the informed consent form has also been the subject of 
academic scrutiny. Scholars, in other jurisdictions, have written about the ambiguous 
nature of the legal status of informed consent forms.28 Other scholars perceive the 
requirements for written signatures on consent forms as “legalistic rendering of the 
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consent as a signed contract rather than a social process.”29 An ICMR official also 
seemed confused about the exact purpose of the consent form, and said:  
I have always wondered who does the informed consent form 
protect (pause) legally. Does it protect the investigator...the 
sponsor...or the patient? 
While discussing the ethical requirement of capacity in the previous chapter, we saw 
how consent forms are evaluated after-the-fact when enquiries are made, which leads 
me to believe that the form’s status in India is limited to being an evidential proof of 
signed (or thumb impressed) consent to the requirements mentioned on the 
document. The problem that was raised in that section was that there are no 
independent overseers to observe whether the consent form is being signed in the 
context of the ethical requirements. Even if the by-laws require a full-time 
government officer or another independent person to attest as witness in cases of 
illiterate participants and minors, the important questions regarding all three 
requirements still remain open.  
The formalisation of ethical requirements appears to lead to bureaucratisation 
(where paperwork is more important that the actual process) which in turn makes the 
consent process highly impersonal. Existing research has shown that many informed 
consent procedures become formalised decisions that leave little room for questions 
and dialogue.30 Going back to the notion of relational autonomy as mentioned in 
section 6.1. above, the formalisation of informed consent procedures do not facilitate 
the building of relationships that create the room for reflection that is crucial for 
obtaining informed consent. An example of this is given by Spruit, et al, who write:  
In a relationship in which there is strong dependency because of 
informational asymmetry, risk-bearers have less capacity to genuinely 
reflect on their options. Strong personal bonds, on the other hand, may 
enhance reflection as is revealed in the deliberative model of the 
doctor–patient relationship.31 
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resource-poor settings, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH, Special Issue No. 5, 
(WHO, 2007), p. 32.  
30
 S. Clarke S, Informed consent without bureaucracy, JOURNAL OF CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE, Vol. 
10, (2003), pp. 35–36. 
31
 S. L. Spruit, et al., Informed Consent in Asymmetrical Relationships: an Investigation into 
Relational Factors that Influence Room for Reflection, NANOETHICS, Vol. 10, (2016), pp. 123-138.  
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The research into analysing how relationships interact and leave open room for 
reflection is still in its nascent stage.32 But if this research is developed further, and 
considering that it seems to complement the concept of relational autonomy, it could 
help in ascertaining how genuine informed consent could be obtained from trial 
participants.  
Regarding the new regulation of audio-video (AV) recording of consent 
procedure for vulnerable participants, it could, in principle, be helpful. However, the 
main issue with such recordings is: who will vet such recordings? Will it also be 
brought up as after-the-fact evidence to prove that the formality of recorded consent 
was complied with? Or will it actually make investigators more diligent in 
complying with the ethical standards? The latter is a question for further empirical 
research.33 Audio-video recording of the consent process opens up questions about 
issues of confidentiality and privacy, which have, to a large extent, been addressed 
by the CDSCO under the draft guidelines released for conducting such recordings.34 
But doubts have been raised over its effectiveness in getting rid of the formalisation 
that plagued the informed consent form requirement. While commenting on the new 
                                                          
32
 Id.  
33
 During the write up phase for this PhD project a number of Indian scholars published papers in 
2018 related to the working of the AV recording requirement for recording consent in India. In one 
paper the authors, who are also clinical research investigators, shared their experiences as well as 
those of other investigators and members of IEC monitoring committees, regarding the new AVR 
requirement for informed consent procedures. They outlined multiple challenges that they were facing 
pertaining to the new requirement. These were operational (poor sound and visual quality, improper 
visibility of investigator and participant); lack of proper infrastructure (some facilities do not have 
separate rooms for conducting recordings of consent procedure); the duration of consent procedures 
(the standard is 45 minutes; but recording duration should not be equalised with sufficiency of 
consent); testing of participants understanding (stressful for the investigator taking consent often at the 
cost of assessment of understanding of information by the participant);  training of personnel involved 
in the study (frequently the investigators themselves do not take consent; instead the task is delegated 
to other team members who are often not adequately trained); the storage of data (the storage, archival 
and retrieval of recorded data must be proper to ensure confidentiality, therefore, researchers need to 
be trained). See P. A. Shetty, et al., Audiovisual recording of the consenting process in clinical 
research: Experiences from a tertiary referral center, PERSPECTIVES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 9, 
Issue No. 1, (2018), pp. 44-47.  
34
 Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO), Draft Guidelines on Audio-Visual 
Recording of Informed Consent Process In Clinical Trial, (January 16, 2014), ¶ 3, available at 
http://www.cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/Guidance_for_AV%20Recording_09.January.14.pdf (last 
accessed on June 2, 2018). 
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regulations regarding clinical trials in India, a representative of a multinational 
pharmaceutical company said: 
Nowhere else in the world is it compulsory to record consent in an 
audio-visual manner. Nowhere else in the world is there a formulae 
for compensating victims. These rules are unprecedented. But 
recording does not necessarily guarantee informed consent on the 
part of the participant; it may only reflect compliance with a formal 
process. 
Similar ambiguity regarding the new regulations was expressed by an investigator in 
Mumbai who said: 
Recording of informed consent procedures only adds to procedural 
burden in getting regulatory and ethics approval and it solves nothing.  
While some find the new regulations cumbersome, a recent study on perceptions of 
investigators and trial participants on AV recording of consent revealed that some 
investigators found the new requirement helpful for documentation purposes.35 
However, the same study also revealed that some participants were uncomfortable 
with the recording of consent, and it was adversely affecting trial recruitment. 
Moreover, most investigators found the requirement “time-consuming” as they were 
required to take two consents (one for the trial, another for AV recording) and it took 
time away from patient care. Some investigators challenged the need for such a 
requirement with little to no guidelines given to them, while others endorsed it and 
thought they had to comply with it because it had legal implications.36 Perhaps these 
studies are too early into the process and more guidelines might soon be released to 
tackle the current challenges in AV recording of consent. As one member of the 
CDSCO said: 
We are looking into all the areas. New guidelines will soon be 
released for public comments and people can write to us about 
whatever issues they have with this requirement. 
                                                          
35
 This study was conducted in outpatient  department-based anti-cancer  drug  trials and used a 
qualitative interpretative approach to semi-structured interviews, see B. Ganguly, Newer Practice of 
Informed Consent Process of Clinical Trials in India, ASIAN BIOETHICS REVIEW, Vol. 8, Issue No. 4, 
(2016), pp. 327-336. 
36
 Id.  
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 However, it is beyond doubt that the new requirement for recorded consent has 
increased the cost and procedural burden for the researchers. But if the protection of 
vulnerable participants is the goal, and if this is the way to do it, regulatory oversight 
will need to be much more efficient than it has been so far.  
 If we are to use protection and promotion of autonomy as the rationale for 
informed consent, a seemingly bureaucratic ritual like signing a consent form or 
recording a consent process does little to protect a person’s expression of autonomy. 
Such rituals might be able to prove that the participant was autonomous in capacity 
(has reached the age of majority and is not of unsound mind, therefore, can make 
decisions), but the question remains open whether the act of consent was 
autonomous (consent to the trial in accordance with one’s own will and “self-chosen 
plan”).   
 Let us assume that, in the near future, signed paper consent forms will not be 
necessary at all, perhaps because the procedure has been replaced with audio-video 
recorded consent for all trial participants, or some other mechanism is put into place 
to register consent. Whatever the process, we would still need robust oversight 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the recorded consent tapes, disks, etc., are not 
tampered with, or that the participants are not giving consent to be recorded under 
undue influence, or that whatever loophole that exists in the process is being 
addressed by independent overseers. The following section will reveal the current 
state of affairs regarding lack of oversight mechanisms for informed consent 
procedures in India.  
B)  Lack of oversight mechanisms 
Ethics committees are entrusted with the enormous task of protecting the trial 
participants and keeping research ethical. Some investigators/doctors interviewed for 
this research had also been members of Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs) for 
trials conducted at their hospitals. They were quite forthright in stating that their job 
as members of IECs was not to vet consent forms or recordings of consent 
procedures. The ethics committees’ approval process appears before a proposed 
study goes into trial; hence, they are a pre informed consent formality. The role of the 
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ethics committee is to ascertain that the participants will be protected and that the 
study design has provisions to that effect. The role of IEC, among others, includes 
ascertainment of adequate informed consent procedures, like translation of consent 
forms in vernaculars, proper information leaflets about the study being handed out to 
the participants, etc. Although IECs have to review continuing reports from trial 
studies to check if there are any protocol deviations and monitor serious and adverse 
events (SAEs) arising during the course of the trial,37 they do not conduct on-site 
monitoring. This is arguably an obstacle to ascertaining the thoroughness of the 
informed consent procedures. As one IEC member mentioned:  
Ethics committees need to be given more teeth. There is a sab chalta 
hai [we are okay with everything] attitude as you might know…It 
works for most things here but should not work for ethical evaluation 
of studies. People who are knowledgeable and who know how to do 
ethical evaluations must man these committees…there is no point 
otherwise.     
A health activist, an academic and a doctor by training, told me that he had been 
“randomly” asked numerous times to turn up for ethical evaluations “at the last 
minute” to simply even up the quota required for ethical approval. He said:  
Such practices make you wonder how has clinical research happened 
in this country before 2014 or [20]15!...maybe there will be a change, 
or maybe not, but one thing [is] for sure, without accountability there 
will be little improvement.  
An investigator who had been a member of a few IECs shared a similar opinion, he 
said:  
The name Ethics Committee sounds like people on it know what they 
are doing. To tell you the truth, most people on the committee 
wouldn’t know what informed consent is, but then how many people 
really know what it means to consent to something. But it is not only 
about consent, it is about whether the study is relevant and to who is it 
relevant, is it just for big-pharma?…I think those kind of issues are 
also relevant.    
                                                          
37
 See Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR), Guidelines for preparing Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) for Institutional Ethics Committees for Human Research, available at 
 http://www.icmr.nic.in/ethics_SOP.pdf (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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These perspectives show that ethics committees in India have not lived up to their 
functional requirements for quite some time now. These perspectives also help us 
understand why some scholars have suggested that the role of the IECs must include 
continuous monitoring of trials.38 As one of my interviewees, quoted above, says 
“accountability” is important to ensure compliance with informed consent 
procedures. 
7.3. CONCLUSION 
Emily Sherwin has argued: “[i]t is in the nature of law that law can and must 
determine whether consent has occurred, even if no one is sure just what consent 
is.”39 Informed consent is a heavily debated concept in ethics. Law has taken bits and 
pieces from these debates and defined legal standards to fix liabilities, which, as this 
chapter highlights, does not necessarily ensure ethical conduct. Moreover, most 
stakeholders have expressed their ambivalence regarding the force of law in 
addressing ethical issues in clinical research. This is where training in ethics is 
important. The ECs, the investigators, the clinicians, and everyone involved with 
clinical research, need to be adequately trained in research ethics. Ethically trained 
and aware researchers might go the extra mile in making sure that they receive 
understood and meaningful consent from participants. It is also important to stress 
that effective communication between the researchers and the participants is key to 
building relationships within which the goals of truly informed consent can be met. 
This chapter has also highlighted the problem of formalised ethics. This manner of 
operationalising ethics does not serve in protecting the autonomy of the research 
participant. This can partly be avoided if Ethics Committees step out of being a mere 
pre-clinical trial formality and ensure the protection of trial participant’s lives, their 
interests, and their autonomy. However, continuous monitoring by Ethics 
Committees is also not a complete solution because such monitoring requires 
manpower, training, time, and most importantly, a willingness on the part of EC 
                                                          
38
 U. M. Thatte & P. A Marathe, Ethics Committees in India: Past, present and future, PERSPECTIVES 
IN CLINICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 8, Issue No. 1, (January-March, 2017), pp. 22–30.  
39
 Although this quote is taken from the work of the author theorising consent in sexual relationships, 
it fits well in the context of informed consent. See E. Sherwin, Infelicitious Sex, LEGAL THEORY, Vol. 
2. (1996), p 229.   
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members to perform such monitoring. Therefore, in the next chapter after 
formulating a grounded proposition based on the analysis of findings from this 
chapter and the previous one, I propose some innovative ways to regulate the 
conduct of researchers, based on my experiences in the field.  
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REFLECTIVE ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS 
8.0.  Introduction 
In this chapter I reflect on the data collection process and include my insights from 
that process to create a grounded proposition that will focus on practitioners’ 
motivations to take informed consent. These insights, into what the process of 
informed consent on the grounds involves, are based on the data collected from my 
‘multi-stakeholder’ sample size for qualitative inquiry and they stand in marked 
contrast to those outlined in the academic literature. While the latter largely focuses 
on how consent should be taken according to the essential features of consent as 
elaborated in Chapter 3, the former treats consent as just another step in the process 
of conducting scientific research. What emerges from my data is a picture that 
presents a situation where the process of informed consent is oftentimes followed 
neither as an ethical compulsion nor strictly as a legal obligation. It is not uncommon 
that researchers consider the process of consent as a mere procedural necessity, 
thereby performing the action without affording much consideration to either law or 
ethics. This often leads to apathy towards the ‘larger cause’ (or end goal) of informed 
consent which, I suggest, is a major reason for the misalignment between ethics, law 
and the practice of informed consent. To mitigate such misalignment I suggest the 
use of incentives and ‘nudging’ in addition to the more traditional forms of 
regulating conduct.  
8.1. The Four General Perspectives on Informed Consent 
Much has been written about the motivations of trial participants to volunteer for 
trials, but the motivations of stakeholders in taking informed consent has largely 
been ignored. If we are to desire the end goal of informed consent, which could be 
the protection of autonomy, the promotion of trust, the protection of research 
participants, or the prevention of abusive conduct, we must also be able to gauge 
what informs investigators’ actions in taking consent. This is where the research 
findings of this thesis make a particular contribution towards scholarship in the field. 
This thesis adopted a phenomenological approach to uncover the ground realities of 
informed consent in practice. This involved uncovering different stakeholders’ 
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perceptions and experiences of dealing with informed consent in biomedical research 
in India. This approach to data collection uncovered some rather obvious iterations 
like “Yes! We follow all the informed consent rules as mentioned in the GCP and the 
ICMR Guidelines”, but also some tacit views on informed consent that point towards 
the possible motivations of the practitioners to take informed consent in research. 
These implied views on informed consent in practice can be categorised as follows. 
My research findings derived from stakeholders’ views (predominantly the 
practitioners), reveal four general perspectives on informed consent. These are: 
i) that while some regard it as an ethical obligation that ought to be observed; 
ii) others consider it to be a legal compulsion (practiced with the intention to avoid 
lawsuits); 
iii) and some even consider it to be both - an ethical and a legal necessity; 
iv) nonetheless, the general view of the majority is one that perceives of informed 
consent as merely one of the many procedural requirements in the larger process of 
clinical trials (without giving any serious thought to either ethics or to the law).  
Using excerpts from my interviews with researchers and by separating phrases that 
outlined their possible motivations to take informed consent, I condensed them into 
the four general perspectives, discussed above. These perspectives, if represented 




There are some overlaps in the perspectives. Of the 16 current and ex-
researchers/investigators interviewed, 2/16 researchers said that they followed 
informed consent (IC) because it was the law, 1/16 followed IC because it was 
ethical and the right thing to do, 4/16 said that IC has to be followed because it is a 
legal and ethical requirement, and 14/16 researchers used the words “required to”, 
“we have to”, “we must”, “it is one of the requirements”, “it is necessary for ethics 
approval”, and “it is thrust upon us”. It is important to note that not a single 
researcher said that they follow informed consent because it protects the autonomy of 
the participant, or that it somehow protects the research participants, or that it fosters 
trust, or any other justification for informed consent that figures in the academic 
literature. Thus, my data shows a contrast in the practical and academic 
understanding of informed consent 
The aim of this thesis was to understand how the stakeholders viewed 
informed consent as opposed to how it is understood in the academic literature. The 
previous two chapters analysed this question by contrasting these views with the 
theory of informed consent. This revealed ambivalence by the different stakeholders 
about the role of law and ethics and how they perceive the force of both as affecting 
their actions. It might be that the ambivalence stems from weak regulatory oversight 
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and poor enforcement of law and the ethical guidelines. But my findings, particularly 
perspective iv) on informed consent, suggest that sometimes stakeholders do not 
apply the norms of informed consent in order to obey a law or by virtue of it being an 
ethical guideline; they do so because it is a formal requirement to proceed to the next 
step in clinical research. Most, if not all, are seldom concerned with the purpose or 
the goal of informed consent. I base this conclusion on two essential details:  
1) Despite my interview requests put forward as “interview on informed consent in 
clinical research”, about 80-90% of my qualitative data includes stakeholders’ 
views on aspects of clinical research other than informed consent. The majority 
of my interview data touched upon issues such as the impact of patent laws on 
clinical research, pharmaceutical funding for trials, post-trial access to trial drugs, 
new regulations for clinical research in India, the need to restrict trials to public 
health needs, technical information on different phases of trials, the need for 
more home-grown trials appropriate for the genetic composition of the 
population, and so on. It took repeated and persistent questioning on informed 
consent for stakeholders to express their opinions on the topic. Either my 
interviewees thought that informed consent did not require as much attention as 
other pertinent issues in clinical research, or they genuinely had little to say about 
it, which leads me to the second important detail.  
2) For most of the stakeholders that I interviewed, I had the impression that up until 
I asked questions on informed consent, they had barely given a thought to what 
informed consent purports to protect or achieve. But all the stakeholders were 
(rather too) quick to state that they duly took the informed consent of the 
participants and all the procedures were followed. Nearly all the stakeholders I 
interviewed possessed excellent knowledge about the procedural and ethical 
requirements for informed consent. Therefore, it becomes important to draw a 
distinction between someone possessing the knowledge about what informed 
consent entails and someone taking consent with the intention of fulfilling the 
purpose of informed consent. My research and fieldwork experience has led me 
to conclude that despite the enormous empirical literature in this field, academics 
have barely noticed that the apathy towards the larger cause of informed 
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consent is, perhaps, one of the causes for the lags between the theory and 
practice of informed consent. The reasons for this apathy could range from a 
personal lack of empathy to the effects of formalisation of ethics. 
Therefore, while it is important to debate the ethical and legal theory of informed 
consent, it is also important to understand that informed consent is a continuous and 
dynamic process involving individuals who might not always have moral or legal 
reasons to perform actions. This important aspect has been ignored in much of the 
literature on informed consent; therefore, it gives rise to the central claim of the 
thesis which I elaborate in the next section. 
8.2. Central Claim of the Thesis 
The central argument of the thesis is that scholars and regulators need to 
acknowledge and understand the perceptions of stakeholders involved in the process 
of acquiring consent. My empirical research suggests that the practitioners show a 
degree of apathy to the goals of informed consent. This proposition does not only 
derive from their views on why they follow informed consent, as shown in the pie 
chart above, but also their views on a number of ethically debated positions 
pertaining to the essentials of informed consent, as outlined in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 Let us consider practitioners’ views on voluntariness. The ethical 
understanding of voluntariness entails that a researcher has to ensure that a person 
consents to research participation without showing signs of coercion, undue 
influence, or any other controlling or restraining influences on her will. This leads to 
ethical debates on whether poverty compromises the autonomy of an individual, or 
whether incentives given to poor participants which they might not be in a position to 
deny, can be treated as coercive offers that render consent non-voluntary, hence 
invalid. These debates also include questions on whether a woman’s decision-making 
ability or autonomy is compromised if she is dependent on her husband’s consent to 
trial participation, and other such concerns. Despite the various ethical positions 
adopted by scholars on these debates (as outlined in Chapters 3, 6 and 7) the 
practitioners’ views suggest that for them these are not real concerns. The researchers 
seem to consider factors like poverty, communitarian consent, dependence of women 
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on men or other elders in the family, and lack of adequate health care as facts of life 
in India and that these, by themselves, do not preclude a person from giving valid 
consent. This corresponds to the legalistic understanding of informed consent where 
consent is presumed to be voluntary unless otherwise so established and such factors 
are not legally recognised as factors that invalidate consent. Yet a majority of 
academic literature pertaining to informed consent in developing countries considers 
monetary payments to be undue inducement, poverty as coercive, communitarian 
consent as opposed to individual autonomy, and suggests ways to improve 
voluntariness in clinical research studies. If practitioners themselves do not think that 
something needs improvement or if some factors are not real concerns then the 
impact value of prescriptive academic work (i.e., work which prescribes the right 
methods to take informed consent from research subjects in different settings)  in this 
direction is diminished. This also implies that any type of reforms in law and ethics 
that the academic literature presents will be meaningless if they are ignored or 
considered irrelevant from the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 As for information disclosure, the ethical understanding entails that all 
necessary information regarding a study would not only have to be disclosed by the 
researcher, but also understood by the participant. The practitioners, however, seem 
to think that conveying information in simple language and answering questions 
about the procedures are good indicators of information being understood. The 
practitioners that I interviewed did not use comprehension tests and thought that 
comprehension cannot be assessed even though they asserted that they made sure 
participants understood the information. The consent forms that I was shown during 
my fieldwork were elaborate and contained the necessary information regarding a 
study. Barring one researcher who used pictographic representation of the trial study 
(akin to a comic strip) no one else either had or showed me something that suited 
someone with a low (or no) educational background or thought that such an approach 
might be necessary. But most consent forms followed the ethical guidelines on the 
information a consent document ought to have. This too corresponds with the legal 
understanding of information disclosure which is silent on assessing comprehension 
but focuses on what needs to be disclosed. Yet a sizeable portion of academic 
literature focuses on “understood consent” and ways to achieve it. Here again, if 
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most practitioners are unconcerned about comprehension abilities or methods to 
attain such comprehension, it brings to question the ground impact of such 
prescriptive work.  
 As for ascertaining capacity to consent, the ethical approach is not limited to 
soundness of mind or age as the legal approach seems to be preoccupied with. The 
ethical understanding of capacity entails the ability to rationally assess the risks and 
benefits of a study and the consequences of one’s decisions. However, the 
practitioners that I interviewed seemed to think that a person who appears to be of 
sound mind and is of major years has the capacity to consent. This too corresponds to 
a simplistic legal understanding of capacity. In fact, mental capacity tests are not 
legally mandated by any law in India (even for incapacitated individuals) and the 
researchers that I interviewed seemed to be content with equating capacity with age. 
Yet there is a good portion of the academic literature focusing on capacity 
assessment tests for both normal and incapacitated individuals. Such prescriptive 
work will also only be useful once the practitioners themselves value their 
usefulness.  
 In essence, the practitioners’ views from my research suggests that they 
prefer the bare minimum approach to informed consent, i.e., just enough to box-tick 
the essentials of informed consent to avoid any legal trouble. Thereby indicating that 
they are only concerned with meeting legal formalities and not the spirit of the law. 
This seems to suggest that legalism is prevalent within clinical research in India. The 
more intensive approach, i.e., the ethical approach that keeps in mind the purpose 
and goals of informed consent does not appeal to most researchers. Perhaps this is 
because conducting clinical research in India is, in their own words, “a regulatory 
nightmare”, “financially restricted”, “extremely stressful”, “time-bound”, and 
“mostly not worth the time and effort put into it”. This justifies the focus of academic 
literature on the ethics of clinical research in developing countries. However, the 
apathy towards the purpose and goals of informed consent leaves the gates open for 
unethical conduct. Often what is unethical is not illegal; therefore, if an act is 
performed for the sole purpose of it reaching the legality threshold, there is not much 
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room for new methods suggesting improvements on the act for the sole purpose of 
greater ethical compliance.  
 While my findings suggest problems, there is already awareness within the 
regulatory system of the need to improve on how informed consent is operationalised 
in practice. And the apathy towards the goal of informed consent can be overcome in 
a number of ways. Recall that one of my elite interviewees, an ICMR official, 
pointed at the dismal state of ethics training in India. Currently, this is an ongoing 
process in the country. The officials went on record to tell me that the training has 
improved drastically in the past decade, whilst conceding that there is much scope 
for improvement. Caught in a commercial model of scientific research where time is 
money and results have to be positive, practitioners/researchers barely think about 
questions of poverty, autonomy, voluntariness, capacity, etc., in their day-to-day 
trial-related work, let alone be indifferent towards them. If this is to be overcome, 
ethics training will need not only to inform researchers about what is ethical/legal 
conduct but they need more directly to be part of shaping the ethical debates that 
concern their domain. A good sign is that most people invested in biomedical ethics 
training in India are practitioners themselves, but there is still a long way to go 
before ethics training and ethical debates form an intrinsic part of the clinical 
research education.  
 Additionally, we have seen that in clinical research practice the legality of an 
act seems to be of greater consequence to researchers and research sponsors than 
ethicality. Therefore, courts, legislators, and regulators need to set clearer rules of 
procedure and redress mechanisms. It could be that the ambiguity in law also adds to 
the apathy towards informed consent. Often when we think that our actions will not 
be judged, we are bolder. Yet, the Indian context demonstrates that the fact of 
making certain unethical conduct illegal does not appear to prevent them. This truism 
does not negate the need for clarity in the law. Participants that have genuine 
grievances should be able to recover damages for harm caused to them by a lack of 
consent (beyond contractual compensation); therefore, there needs to be greater 
clarity on legal remedies available for such claims. I have given a few suggestions in 
Chapter 4 regarding this, but they are not exhaustive. The lack of informed consent 
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in research can be legally addressed in other ways and I welcome future legal 
research on this issue from a different lens than mine.  
 Yet another question comes to mind regarding this. What if after imparting 
ethics training and achieving clarity in law the apathy continues? This could be 
because actions borne out of reasons beyond the moral and the legal cannot be 
regulated solely by ethical and legal tools. In what follows I will analyse the actions 
of practitioners in the informed consent process and suggest some ways in which this 
query can be addressed.  
8.3. Practitioner’s action in the informed consent process 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a ‘process’ as “a series of actions or steps 
taken in order to achieve a particular end”.
1
 There are two primary actions involved 
in the interpersonal process of informed consent 1) the practitioner’s action of taking 
informed consent from the research participant, and 2) the research subject’s action 
of giving the consent to participate in a trial. Since the majority of the academic 
literature on informed consent deals with issues from the vantage point of research 
subjects, I have discounted action 2 and have addressed the issue from the viewpoint 
of the practitioner/investigator. 
The motivation to perform an action is central to understanding why that act 
is not performed according to the ethical or legal standards. Although my research 
findings do not explicitly outline the motivations of practitioners to take informed 
consent, a few noticeable details are implicit in their ideas about informed consent 
and how some perceive the responsibility of taking consent as “thrust” upon them. 
As one investigator from a public hospital in Delhi said: 
There are so many responsibilities and duties thrust upon 
us...administrative...procedural...often there are lapses and no one 
understands why there were lapses. We are always in the wrong.  
                                                          
1
 Oxford English Dictionary, (2
nd
 edn., 1989). In a newer edition of the dictionary, process is defined 
as a “continuous and regular action or succession of actions occurring or performed in a definite 
manner, and having a particular result or outcome; a sustained operation or series of operations” (as 
the most common used no. 8), see  "process, n.", OED Online, Oxford University Press, (January 
2018). (Web last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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We must bear in mind that an investigator in a trial is not only responsible for the 
consent requirement for the trial; she is also responsible for the entire procedure of 
the trial. This includes, but is not limited to, the medical care of trial subjects, 
compliance with the trial protocol, the responsibility of the investigational 
product(s), accountability for the trial site(s), and responsibility for all the records 
and reports related to the trial.
2
 This entails that it would be unwise to assume that 
taking informed consent would be more important than all the other responsibilities 
placed upon the investigator. This could be a partial explanation for why my 
interviewees thought that informed consent was too “narrow” a topic for my 
research, as they saw informed consent as only a small part of what their jobs 
entailed and not even the most important part. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I maintained that law cannot guarantee ethical conduct 
because law, in general, prescribes the minimum acceptable standard of behaviour 
which is sub-par to the ethical vision of informed consent. I also maintained that the 
success of informed consent in research is largely based on the moral conduct of an 
investigator. Let me make it clear that when I use the term ‘law’, I mean law as it 
exists in typical legal systems and includes normative rules and guidelines that are 
generally made and enforced by institutions and authorities who are authorised to do 
so through the use of legal sanctions.
3
 By ‘morality’ I mean the rules that determine 
what is right or wrong and where moral incentives appear in the sentiments of virtue 
or guilt, and external moral sanctions are those of criticism and praise by others.
4
 
Ethical guidelines, as are generally understood, lay out the ethical procedure for 
conduct, failure to adhere to which leads to professional or ethical misconduct. It is 
important to ascertain which of these prompt the investigators to follow informed 
consent because this knowledge could be used to ensure a better process of consent. I 
                                                          
2
 International Conference on Harmonisation of technical requirements for registration of 
pharmaceuticals for human use, Good Clinical Practice (ICH GCP), Investigator, ¶ 4.1 – 4.13, 
available at http://ichgcp.net/4-investigator (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
3
 To clarify this further, I am not using the social science perspective of the legal system or a 
pluralistic understanding of the law. I am using the above definition to include situations where the 
fear of legal sanctions induce compliance. That said, I am well aware of the empirical evidence that 
suggests that people do not obey the law just for the fear of sanctions.  
4
 See further S. Shavell, Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, AMERICAN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS REVIEW, Vol. 4, Issue No. 2, (2002), pp. 227–257. 
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concede that there are overlaps between law, ethics, and morality, but here I will use 
them separately for the purpose of categorisation of motivational factors. Law has the 
ability to regulate conduct by motivating a person to do an action to avoid legal 
sanctions.
5
 Hence, there is a need for ‘unambiguous’ legal remedies for a lack of 
informed consent (as was argued in Chapter 4). Ethical guidelines can also regulate 
conduct by motivating a person to avoid the charge of professional or ethical 
misconduct. Individual morality governs the individual’s behaviour regarding what is 
right or wrong, but how do we understand actions borne out of the force of neither of 
these?  
Let us consider the situation where a practitioner regards informed consent as 
just another procedural formality, the situation indicated in perspective iv) above. In 
such a situation, if there is absence of any other reason to perform an action, it can be 
argued that her actions towards the process of consent are not strictly borne out of 
moral or legal concerns. Law, ethics, and morality can give reasons for the actions of 
the individuals. But some individuals might not be guided by those reasons. Here, I 
must add the qualification that I am not judging the reasons why practitioners 
perform or omit to perform some actions. But I am aware that some academics might 
consider the acts of these few individuals as falling outside the Kantian theory of 
“doing the right thing for the right reason”.
6
 Therefore, regarding the actions of these 
individuals as lacking moral worth.
7
 While this by itself is a strong reason to focus 
                                                          
5
 I'm aware of empirical evidence that shows that fear of sanctions is not the primary reason why 
people obey the law, but I am correlating it with the definition of law I propose above to reflect my 
research findings in an apt manner. See generally T. R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, (Yale 
University Press, 1990).  
6
 This phrase derives from Kant’s theory that “it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law 
— It must also be done for the sake of the moral law”, meaning that an act must be borne out of duty, 
not some ulterior motive, to be moral. See M. J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 
(Penguin, 2010), p. 111-116, while citing  I. KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(1785), translated by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). 
7
 Id. SANDEL (2010). Here Sandel, while explaining Kant’s theory, says, “the motive that confers 
moral worth on an action is the motive of duty”. Further explaining Kant’s motive of duty, Sandel 
says that motive of duty means “doing something because it’s right, not because it’s useful or 
convenient”. Illustrating the point further, Sandel gives the example of people who are altruists and 
help other people out of compassion. Sandel explains that for Kant these actions are not wrong, but 
they lack moral worth because acting out of compassion is not the same as acting out of duty. If the 
altruist, owing to some misfortune, loses compassion for all humanity but continues helping others for 
the sense of duty, then his actions have moral worth. Therefore, while compassion is an ‘inclination’ 
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on the motives of the practitioners, it does not help provide pragmatic solutions to 
situations where motives fall outside of pure reason (reason that is separate from 
empirical experience).
8
 Therefore, I have excluded Kant’s theory on motives while 
presenting my analysis.   
The important question that my data poses is - if the intent to perform the 
action of taking consent is neither born out of morality of the action and nor strictly 
from a legal obligation, how do we fix the action to achieve the desired end? Let us 
suppose that this end is protection of research participants through rigorous informed 
consent procedures. I propose that giving people the right incentives would help with 
informed consent where neither moral incentives nor legal sanctions seem to work. I 
also propose that the employment of the ‘nudge theory’, which so far has only been 
dealt with in terms of nudging patient choices, might be helpful in making 
researchers/investigators/practitioners more efficient in the performance of their 
actions towards securing informed consent of the participants. I suggest the use of 
these non-traditional forms of behaviour regulation as supplements to the more 
traditional forms, such as clear and unambiguous laws, strict regulatory oversight, 
better law enforcement, training and education, fostering desired attitudes within 
professional cultures, and so on. These non-traditional forms will be discussed in the 
following sections:  
a) The Right Incentives 
In most situations, law and morality are sufficient to regulate human conduct. But the 
formalisation of ethics, as evidenced in consent being reduced to a mechanical tick-
box process, betrays the ideals of informed consent by making practitioners 
indifferent to the ideal. The action to take consent is performed, but without 
                                                                                                                                                                    
to act morally, it is not a ‘motive’ acceptable to Kant. In this thesis, I am not judging the moral worth 
of the actions of the researchers, though I think that, Kant’s theory in itself is a good reason to 
encourage dutiful behaviour amongst researchers. However, my interest in the reasons and 
motivations for the actions of researchers is relevant insofar as making recommendations to guide 
actions to ensure greatest protection of the research subjects.  
8
 For Kant, morality cannot be based on empirical considerations like desires, interests, or preferences 
of people at a given time as these factors are contingent and variable. For him these factors are 
inappropriate to serve as a basis for universal moral principles. Kant argues that morality based on 
interests and preferences cannot helps us distinguish right from wrong, but can only help us become 
“better at calculation”, See Sandel (2010) citing Kant, supra note 6, p. 106. 
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reflection on what it means and only because it is a formal necessity. The end goal 
for most practitioners is to have participants signify their consent (either in written or 
audio-video format). This is quite evident in the views of my interviewees. Even 
though some interviewees were aware that a proper informed consent process 
involves building a relationship with the research subjects, they were more 
concerned about meeting time constraints and other procedural formalities that 
inadvertently cut into the relationship building process. It must be kept in mind that 
clinical research is extremely time-consuming and expensive and researchers have 
responsibilities not only to keep the participants well informed but also to produce 
scientifically valid data (at the same time shouldering multiple administrative and 
miscellaneous duties).
9
 Within a strict time limit, some responsibilities end up taking 
more time and effort than the others, because of which some other responsibilities 
suffer. As one investigator at a research centre based out of Mumbai succinctly stated 
“we do as much is necessary and focus on other things that are more necessary for 
the trial”. 
Going by the discussion on the content of informed consent in Chapter 3, if a 
researcher set down to achieve perfectly valid consent from a research participant, it 
would include:  
- Ensuring voluntariness: this would entail that practitioners would need to 
conduct a thorough analysis of what motivates the individual sitting in front 
of them to volunteer for the trials. They would have to proceed only with 
those who possess ‘free will’ (which means that they are likely literate, not 
poor, and not influenced by doctor-patient, familial, or other relationships) 
and have the right motivations (the ethically agreed upon criteria of whatever 
falls under the ‘right’ motivations).  
- Ensuring ‘proper’ and ‘adequate’ information disclosure and comprehension 
of information. This would mean, among other things, testing participant 
comprehension of technical and non-technical information or hiring experts 
who know how to assess comprehension - and redoing the entire process with 
                                                          
9
 K. R. Chi, Clinical research: Conducting a trial, NATURE, Vol. 493, (2013), pp. 565-567.  
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other participants if some fell short on the ‘right level of comprehension’ 
criteria.  
- Ensuring mental capacity based on agreed tests of reasoning capabilities, and 
ensuring that the participants have the ability to appreciate the situation and 
future consequences of their decisions, etc.   
If researchers spent all their time trying to recruit participants by adhering to all the 
idealised requirements forwarded by scholars on informed consent, it could be very 
challenging to finish a trial within a stipulated time.
10
 As noted in the earlier 
chapters, there is no agreed-upon concept of voluntariness, no generally agreed test 
for comprehension, and no agreed-upon concept of reasoning ability. Considering the 
scholarly disagreements on these concepts and practical limitations, a minimum of 
these requirements is usually accepted as legally valid informed consent. Therefore, 
if one is to argue that researchers must strive for more and something closer to the 
ideal, one would have to recognise the need for incentives to attain that goal. This 
might not necessarily make the researcher intrinsically ethical but it might help in 
aligning her conduct to ensure a rigorous informed consent procedure. 
 Grant writes that incentives have long been used to achieve public policy 
objectives in the field of public administration.
11
 She writes that the term ‘incentive’ 
is often and mistakenly used as a synonym for ‘reward’, ‘motivation’, or 
                                                          
10
 It is important to mention that the commercialisation of biomedical research has imposed certain 
limits on researchers and biomedical research is not just ‘public-interest’ science anymore. It has been 
alleged that the commercialisation of research (despite increasing research activities) has contributed 
to the erosion of research ethics. This, though outside the scope of this thesis, is intrinsically linked to 
the conditions under which researchers perform trials. A sizeable proportion of researchers are 
weighed down by commercial interests while performing their duties. None of my interviewees spoke 
about the commercialisation of biomedical research, but I am mentioning it here for the reader to 
appreciate that time constraints (along with primacy of other interests) in biomedical research are very 
real. See generally S. KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS 
CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH?, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004); T. Caulfield, The 
Commercialisation of Medical and Scientific Reporting, PLOS MEDICINE, (December 28, 2004); N. 
Freemantle & D. Stockton, The commercialization of clinical research: who pays the piper, calls the 
tune?, FAMILY PRACTICE, Vol. 21, Issue No. 4 (2004).  
11
 See generally R. W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES, 





  Grant and Sugarman define incentive as a particular kind of offer 
employed in a negotiation. According to them for an offer to qualify as an incentive, 
it must bear the following characteristics: 
1) “the offer must be made as an extrinsic benefit or a bonus. It should neither be a 
natural or automatic consequence of an action nor a deserved reward or 
compensation; 
2) the offer should be a discrete prompt expected to elicit a particular response;  
3) the offer is usually made in the context of an authority relationship - for example, 
adult/child, employer/employee, government/citizen  or  government/organization; 
and   
4)  the offer  is  intentionally designed to alter the status quo by motivating a person 
to choose differently than he or she would be likely to choose in its absence.”
13
 
Incentives are usually given by authorities to result in a desired action. If the desired 
action had resulted naturally or automatically, no incentive would be necessary. 
Incentives are considered as a form of power, but an alternative to other forms of 
power: persuasion and coercion.
14
 Coercion is, in most cases, objected to on ethical 
                                                          
12
 While distinguishing a reward from incentive, Grant notes that rewards are usually merited or 
deserved, and although an offer of a reward could be used as an incentive, rewards can also be given 
for past performances and do not necessarily function as incentives. Motivations could be internal or 
initiated by the individual, whereas incentives are regarded as “external prompts” to which an 
individual responds. Compensation is intended as redress for losses sustained in a situation, whereas 
incentives are designed to incite people to act in a particular way. See R. W. Grant & J. Sugarman, 
Ethics in Human Subjects Research: Do Incentives Matter?, JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY, 
Vol. 29, Issue No. 6, (2004), pp. 717–738. (Although this article views incentives from the viewpoint 
of research subjects, the first part of it deals with the meaning and ethics of incentives.) 
13
 Id.  
14
 GRANT (2011), supra note 11. Faden and Beauchamp define persuasion as “the intentional and 
successful attempt to induce a person, through appeals to reason, to freely accept—as his or her 
own—the beliefs, attitudes, values, intentions, or actions advocated by the persuader. Persuasion is 
always a non-clandestine form of interpersonal influence; the persuader openly puts forward reasons 
for accepting or adopting what is advocated.” Under persuasive techniques employed by an authority, 
all choices and actions performed by the persons are “non-controlled”. See R. R. FADEN & T. L. 






 whereas persuasion is a weak instrument for situations where norm 
flouting is commonplace. The theoretical-practical misalignment in informed 
consent, as was elaborated upon in Chapters 3, 6 & 7, are proof that the desired 
action is difficult to achieve in practice. Therefore, as a proposition, the regulators 
and the government could consider giving researchers and research sponsors some 
extrinsic incentives (i.e., not part of emoluments owed to them as researchers but as 
those that are beyond their reach) to ensure that informed consent is not merely 
treated as a tick-box exercise. My suggestion is also based on years of management 
research that has proven that incentives work well in achieving desired changes in 
behaviour.
16
 More importantly, these are to be given as a supplement and not as a 
substitute to the traditional tools of behaviour regulation like that of stronger 
regulatory oversight and better implementation of existing laws and guidelines.  
Giving the researchers the right incentives would perhaps bring about a change in the 
practice of informed consent. But what would the right incentive be in such a 
situation? Ethicists would consider right incentives as ones that are used in an 
ethically appropriate manner. It would be beyond my expertise and knowledge to 
suggest forms of incentives that would be able to affect a behavioural change. 
Moreover, the effect of incentives can be appraised only after they have been put into 
place. As such, there needs to be further research into what kinds of incentives would 
work. Subsequently there would be a need to empirically assess whether the chosen 
incentives bring about a change in the practice of informed consent. I am leaving this 
open to further scholarly enquiry. 
 Another reason that leads me to believe that incentives would work for 
affecting change in the process and practice of informed consent is that many 
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 Coercion has been dealt from the perspective of the research subject in Chapters 3 and 6. Here I use 
coercion as a form of power when it is exercised by an authority. It is a controlling influence which 
means that the action occurring through coercion is completely controlled and non-autonomous. 
State/government authorities often employ coercion (legitimately) to make people comply with certain 
norms (e.g., income tax laws). Faden and Beauchamp opine that coercion “occurs if one party 
intentionally and successfully influences another by presenting a credible threat of unwanted and 
avoidable harm so severe that the person is unable to resist acting to avoid it.”, Id. p. 261. 
16
 D. D. Fehrenbacher, An Integrative Framework of Influences on Behaviour Contributions to 
Management Science, (Springer Berlin Heidelberg), pp. 13–29, in: D. D. FEHRENBACHER, DESIGN OF 




stakeholders who I interviewed were quite ambivalent about law’s role in assuring 
ethical conduct. The reasons they held this view included patchy law enforcement 
issues, the fear of arbitrary prosecution if criminal penalties were to be introduced 
and enforced,
17
 a lack of faith in the effectiveness of the legal system, and so on.
18
 
The doubts expressed about the law’s ability to bring about greater ethical 
compliance implies that legal coercion would not necessarily ensure proper process 
of informed consent. Moreover, assuming that all researchers genuinely take an 
interest in the promotion of rights, safety, and well-being of their research-subjects 
would be a bit of a stretch. The history and the present of biomedical research have 
multiple examples to the contrary. It seems that ethical guidelines and laws are not 
enough; therefore, I see value in offering some form of extrinsic benefit to spur the 
practitioner into ensuring proper informed consent from all the participants.  
b) The Nudge 
The nudge-theory rose to prominence in 2008 with the public release of Thaler and 
Sunstein's book, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness.
19
 Thaler and Sunstein defined their concept as: 
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy 
and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye 
level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.
20
  
Choice architecture is the environment which influences people to make decisions.
21
 
The choice architect can amend this environment without limiting the choices or 
forcing outcomes upon the individuals. Sometimes incentives are employed to nudge 
people into altering their behaviour but a nudge is much more than incentives.  
                                                          
17
 M. Barnes, et al., Clinical trial research is no crime, THE HINDU BUSINESSLINE, (December 1, 
2014), available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/clinical-trial-research-is-no-
crime/article6652150.ece (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
18
 The reasons are supplemented with verbatim quotes of practitioners in Chapter 6. 
19
 C. R. SUNSTEIN & R. H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS, (Yale University Press, 2008) 
20
 Id. p. 6.  
21
 SUNSTEIN & THALER (2008), supra note 19. 
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 To further clarify the difference between a nudge and an economic incentive. 
An economic incentive might look like an 8-10% raise in the remuneration of an 
investigator in a sponsor-initiated trial
22
 for adhering to a more transparent and 
ethically sound informed consent procedure. In an investigator-initiated trial,
23
 the 
incentive could include faster regulatory clearances upon proof that the informed 
consent procedure was sound throughout the trial. But a nudge would be more subtle, 
it would perhaps be in the form of letters circulated by the regulatory authorities 
saying something like “82% of investigators who appended a comprehension 
assessment reports along with the informed consent forms had faster rate of approval 
of their study protocol”, or something along those lines.
24
 Nudges are intended to 
induce a cognitive effect that helps people make decisions that are ethically or 
socially desired. And something that appeals to the professionalism of researchers is 
intuitively likely to be more successful in such a high prestige industry.  
Sunstein and Thaler formulated the concept of nudge from research that 
shows that certain changes in the choice architecture can influence the human 
cognitive system. For instance, anti-smoking labels and nutritional labels have 
helped people make better decisions regarding smoking and healthy eating. 
Similarly, Sreedhari Desai, an expert in organizational behaviour, has suggested that 
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 A sponsor, which could be a pharmaceutical company or a biomedical research centre, initiates 
these trials. In such trials, investigators are hired as part of a larger team conducting the research. 
Sponsor-initiated trials (SITs) are large scale investments wherein economic incentives can work as a 
management strategy to increase efficiency, understood here as efficient taking of informed consent 
by investigators. Investigator-initiated trials (IITs) are studies initiated and independently managed by 
a non-pharmaceutical company researcher, like individual investigators or collaborative study groups 
or cooperative groups amongst different institutions. An external sponsor could fund the researcher, 
but in an IIT, the researcher is responsible for all the legal and regulatory responsibilities of the trial 
sponsor. 
23
 Id.  
24
 It could even be a letter by an authority stating “70% of clinical trials investigators think they 
should adopt norms x and y" or “80% of participants think investigators should give more information 
about the research trial”, etc, these of course have to be based on proper data. Such kinds of nudges 
work as peer or social pressure on people and they have proven to considerably affect people’s 
cognitive choices. See further R. B. Cialdini & N. J. Goldstein, Social influence: Compliance and 
conformity, ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 55, (2004), pp. 591-622. 
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ethical behaviour is encouraged by making people more accountable for their actions 
(like asking for an itemised receipt to avoid overbilling).
25
  
In public health situations, scholars have suggested the use of nudges to 
improve patient choices.
26
 In the clinical research context, scholars have suggested 
the use of nudges to improve enrolment numbers for trials.
27
 So far there has been no 
such study suggesting the use of nudges to make researchers more ethical while 
taking informed consent from participants.
28
 This is most likely because the earlier 
concept of nudging mostly
29
 applied to situations in which the harm intended to be 
reduced was harm done to self due to irrational decisions and not harm to others. 
However, new research on the applicability of nudges is not limited by scope. The 
research on the applicability of nudging in organisational behaviour, particularly for 
encouraging ethical behaviour, is still in its nascent stage.
30
 Nudging has even shown 
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 S. D. Desai & M. Kouchaki, Work-report formats and overbilling: How unit-reporting vs. cost 
reporting increases accountability and decreases overbilling, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND 
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, Vol. 130, (2015), pp. 79-88. 
26
 A. Aggarwal, et al., Nudge” in the clinical consultation – an acceptable form of medical 
paternalism?, BMC MEDICAL ETHICs, Vol. 15, Issue No. 31, (2014). 
27
 E. M. VanEpps, et al., A nudge toward participation: Improving clinical trial enrollment with 
behavioral economics, SCIENCE TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE, Vol. 8, Issue No. 348, (2016). For 
instance, the authors suggested that the use of social norms which were both descriptive (i.e., what 
others are doing) and injunctive (i.e., what others approve of), could encourage participation in trials 
through a “safety in numbers” mentality. This mentality, they explained, worked like a friend’s 
recommendation for a restaurant or a long waiting list outside a restaurant. These served as social 
proof as they provided some form of normative information, and therefore, social norms could 
perhaps resolve anxiety about randomised controlled trials. 
28
 Some researchers are already studying the effects of nudges on increasing scientific satisfaction so 
that the “transformative value of fundamental investigations can be increased without affecting the 
spirit of the basic research and scientists' work satisfaction”, A. Ballabeni, et al., Policies to increase 
the social value of science and the scientist satisfaction: An exploratory survey among Harvard 
bioscientists, F1000RESEARCH, Vol. 3, Issue No. 20, (2014).  
29
 I say mostly, not always, because one of the earliest examples of nudge was the etching of a 
housefly in men’s urinals at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam to help men with “improving their aim”. 
Here the harm reduction did not necessarily imply harm to self, but to avoid causing a nuisance to 
others. Other popular examples of nudging, such as placing sugar-filled products on the lowest aisles 
in supermarkets or the use of calorie charts and health advice on junk food are all nudges that aim at 
harm reduction to self.  
30
 There is a project being led by Professor Sreedhari and her colleagues on Ethical Nudges where 
they run field and Lab experiments to “investigate the role of ethical nudges, or non-coercive ways of 
leading people down moral pathways.” For instance, they found that displaying pictures of Mahatma 
Gandhi or other moral leaders triggered implicit psychological processes that made people feel averse 
to behaving unethically. Details of this project are available at, https://ethics.harvard.edu/ethical-
nudges (last accessed on June 2, 2018) 
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promising results in changing behaviour of the health professionals, for instance, a 
recent UK study found that nudging could help reduce antibiotic prescription rates in 
an effort to reduce antibiotic resistance.
31
 A controlled trial was conducted where 
personally addressed letters, signed by the Chief Medical officer (as a trusted 
authority figure), were sent to about 800 GPs who were high antibiotic prescribers. 
The letter contained a social norm message (something like “80% practices prescribe 
fewer antibiotics than yours”) and highlighted some actions from the good clinical 
practices guidelines. The study showed a significant reduction in prescription rates in 
the trial cohort of the GPs.
32
  
The uses of extremely simple nudges, like the changing shelf level of foods 
with high calorie content to avoid notice, are mostly uncontroversial.
33
 Such nudges 
are only persuasive and I am suggesting the employment of simple nudges to make 
researchers more compliant with proper informed consent procedures in biomedical 
research. This would arguably work to make the informed consent process feel less 
burdensome (psychologically) to the practitioners. If a nudge worked successfully, it 
could make researchers choose the option of building fruitful relationships with the 
research participants as default options.  
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 M. Hallsworth, et al., Provision of social norm feedback to high prescribers of antibiotics in general 
practice: a pragmatic national randomised controlled trial, THE LANCET, Vol. 387, Issue No. 10029, 
(2016), pp. 1743-1752. 
32
 Id.  
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 Nudge-theory, as a tool for governance, has its fair share of detractors. Nudging is not, however, 
suggested in this thesis as a tool for public policy or as a large scale public governance strategy. See, 
for Sunstein’s response to his critics. C. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, YALE JOURNAL ON 
REGULATION, Vol. 32, Issue No. 2, (2015) pp. 413-450; C. R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS 
OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (The Storrs Lectures Series), (Yale University Press, 2014); C. 
Sunstein, There's a backlash against nudging – but it was never meant to solve every problem, THE 
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https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/24/nudge-backlash-free-society-dignity-
coercion (last accessed on June 2, 2018); And here’s a list of articles criticising nudge as a tool for 
public policy - R. Baldwin, From Regulation to Behaviour Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree, 
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I am proposing that the research sponsors, the regulators, or the government could 
act as the choice architects for the researchers/practitioners. They could conduct tests 
on nudging researchers into acting more ethically by making use of the range of 
nudging tools. At this point, some might pose the objection that I am assuming that 
nudges would potentially work in India because they have worked in the US and UK, 
and that I am disregarding the vast differences in the contexts of these countries. The 
objection would be unfounded for two reasons: 1) nudges are designed based upon 
contextual research, and 2) nudges have proven to work in India.
34
   
It is important to note that nudges are psychological tools of behaviour 
regulation that are intended to influence the cognitive biases
35
 associated with 
behavioural tendencies which are dependent on cognitive factors that determine how 
most people (as opposed to all people) behave. Behavioural scientists design specific 
nudges bearing in mind a certain population groups’ cognitive biases. When I 
suggest that clinical research regulators in India could nudge research investigators 
into more ethical behaviour, I do not suggest simply transplanting similar nudges that 
have proven to work elsewhere. The kind of nudge that I am suggesting would have 
to be designed by behavioural researchers from scratch and would typically include a 
series of experiments.  
Take, for instance, the nudges employed to reduce water consumption in 
Costa Rica. Behavioural researchers in Costa Rica designed several interventions to 
test the ones that worked best for achieving the desired result of reduced water 
consumption. Comparisons of water consumption with more proximate peer groups 
than those with a larger community were determined to be more effective within the 
targeted group. Thus, telling people that they use more water than their neighbours 
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 This is particularly true for nudges designed to reduce electricity, water, and gas consumption, but 
most recently nudges are being designed to tackle the problem of open defecation in the country. See 
A. Tagat & H. Kapoor, “Sacred nudging” and sanitation decisions in India, INDIA REVIEW, Vol. 17, 
(2018).  
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 A cognitive bias is often defined as a systematic pattern of deviation from rationality in judgement 
or norm. An individual’s own subjective creation of social reality as opposed to the objective outlook 
determines their behaviour in the world, hence, leading to what is broadly called irrationality. see 
further A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, SCIENCE, 
Vol. 185, (1974), pp. 1124-1131.  
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was more effective in encouraging them to use less of it. However, telling them that 
they used more water than others in their city has negligible impact.
36
  
To find alternate ways of reducing electricity consumption, behavioural 
researchers in India found that employing nudging through school children was quite 
successful at influencing a family’s cognitive bias to discount future gains. Future 
gains that accrue through saving electricity are usually disregarded by most 
households. Researchers found that an intervention at a community level with posters 
put up at apartments telling people that they saved more by “turning off the [electric] 
switch” was less successful when compared to an intervention involving children 
[from the same test site] being informed at school that saving electricity at home was 
better for the world.
37
 Researchers found that when irrational needs or comforts are 




These examples show that in order to design nudges to achieve a desired 
result, behavioural scientists often formulate several interventions while considering 
the different variables that induce cognitive biases that make people act opposed to 
norms.
39
 Some interventions prove to be more effective than others. It would be 
impossible to determine whether a nudge designed in a different setting has a chance 
of succeeding in another without carrying out evaluations on effectiveness.  
Both incentives and nudging seem to offer the possibility of more effective 
regulation of informed consent procedures than the current ethical guidelines and 
stricter laws. Even so, I suggest the use of nudges only as a supplement to stricter 
implementation of guidelines and clearer remedial laws in order to achieve more 
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 S. Datta, et al., Saving Water With A Nudge (Or Two): Evidence from Costa Rica on the 
Effectiveness and Limits of Low-Cost Behavioral Interventions on Water Use, available at 
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long-term effects. Ascertaining the kind of nudge appropriate for this situation would 
require further psychological and behavioural research. Therefore, like incentives, I 
leave this open to further exploration.  
8.4. Conclusion 
The suggestions outlined in this chapter follow from the empirical data that suggests 
that researchers exhibit apathy towards the purpose of informed consent. Such apathy 
is one of the reasons why informed consent procedures have taken the problematic 
form that they have in India. To mitigate this apathy and to improve the informed 
consent procedures I have outlined a few suggestions that trail the possible 
motivations of the practitioner. If morality and ethics motivate a researcher then 
procedures followed by such researcher might become more efficient after rigorous 
ethics training. If the fear of legal sanctions is the sole motive then removing 
ambiguity from redress options, clarity in law, and efficient regulatory oversight of 
consent procedures might solve the problem of inadequate informed consent 
procedures. However, if neither of these are the motivating factors and there are 
other factors affecting researchers’ actions or inactions while acquiring consent from 
the participants, other behaviour regulating tools like incentives and nudging might 




This thesis shows how the perceptions of practitioners and other stakeholders in 
clinical research deviate from how informed consent appears in the academic 
literature, which is dominated by ethical concerns. My empirical research findings 
hint at apathy towards the purposes and processes of informed consent. In the last 
chapter, I make a distinction between people who are knowledgeable about ethical 
standards and people who actually follow the ethical standards. In qualitative 
research such as this one, it is easier to make conclusions about the former than the 
latter. The perspectives accumulated in this research show what a handful of people 
from a community of thousands think. The first two chapters showed that there have 
been serious problems with informed consent procedures in clinical research in India. 
There was little to no regulation of clinical research prior to 2005. Even though 
regulation emerged after 2005, it was a bare minimum. It was only after the SAM 
case in 2012 that the regulations were tightened, but were slowly relaxed again to 
pacify the clinical research industry. The time frame of my research falls within the 
period where there was a suspicious atmosphere surrounding clinical research in 
India. The defensive attitudes and up-to-date knowledge on ethical standards from 
those who I interviewed were to be expected. However, one often learns more from 
what is not said, than what is. As I noted in Chapter 8, the not much to say attitude 
over informed consent is not a sign of engagement with informed consent for the 
purpose of fulfilling its goals. It is better seen as a sign of people who are resigned to 
ticking some boxes because that is what is required to conduct research and get the 
job done.  
The Indian ethical guidelines on human subject research have existed since 
the 1980s, but violations have continued. The law has been slow to catch up to 
biomedical advancements. Most stakeholders (including regulators) that I 
interviewed seemed to think that stricter laws pertaining to informed consent were 
not necessary. Although they blamed poor law enforcement in India for their attitude, 
my research has suggested that this is also, partly, attributable to neither the 
researchers nor the regulators thinking much about the purpose of informed consent. 
In contrast to the stakeholder perspectives, the academic literature on informed 
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consent proposes a variety of ways to improve informed consent procedures, from 
mere tick-box-exercises to understood and real consent. However, most of the 
stakeholders that I interviewed, particularly the researchers, seem to be content with 
the procedures that they have been following and do not think much about informed 
consent in general.  
The reality is that India has a huge population that is vulnerable due to 
poverty and a lack of access to health care. And even though such conditions do not 
by themselves vitiate consent, they are harsh situations that are facts of life in India. 
These harsh situations when combined with the high cost of litigation and a lack of a 
well-defined legal remedy, as shown in Chapter 4, make is easier for researchers to 
operationalise informed consent as the barest of procedures. A focus on legal 
solutions is unlikely to be enough to tackle the apathy. Which is why, if the 
legislature and regulators are content (as they seem to be) with the legal status quo 
pertaining to informed consent in India but still desire intensive procedures to portray 
that clinical research in India adheres to high ethical standards, they could opt to be 
choice-architects and nudge, or incentivise, the researchers into making ethical 
choices.     
Beyond informed consent 
In Chapter 2, while placing this thesis within a more global context, I intentioned for 
some findings of this thesis to be used by critical scholars in their works on the 
political economy of clinical research. While the research question that I sought to 
address was narrowed for the purposes of this doctoral research project, the research 
findings of this thesis can be further interpreted using different frameworks that add 
to the scholarship on global health and give intimations on law and Indian society in 
general. In the paragraphs that follow I will outline additional research areas that 




Liberalisation and its negative consequences are central to the scholarly 
critiques of global clinical research. The pharmaceuticalisation of society,
1
 the quest 
for profit leading to structural violence for researchers and participants alike,
2
 and the 
marketability of ethics (where commercial interests trump ethical interests)
3
 are the 
primary problems identified by social scientists. Scholars argue that bioethical 
processes like taking informed consent legitimise exploitative power rather than 
ensuring autonomous decision-making which adds to the structural violence 
perpetrated by the pharmaceutical industry.
4
  
Scholars argue that following the spirit of neo-liberalisation the Indian 
government has shaped circumstances where sickness is being capitalised.
5
 There is 
plenty written about moving beyond informed consent as the hallmark of ethical 
clinical research and focusing on justice instead.
6
 Justice wherein drugs and vaccines 
are tried upon and made available to population that needs them.
7
 Justice for some 
Indian scholars would imply that clinical research in India should be carried out for 
                                                          
1
 Williams, et al. define pharmaceuticalisation as “the translation or transformation of human 
conditions, capabilities and capacities into opportunities for pharmaceutical intervention.” S. J. 
Williams, et al., The pharmaceuticalisation of society? A framework for analysis, SOCIOLOGY OF 
HEALTH & ILLNESS, Vol. 33, Issue No. 5, (2011), pp. 710–725 
2
 A. Prasad, Capitalizing disease: Biopolitics of drug trials in India, THEORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 
Vol. 26, Issue No. 5, (2009), pp. 1-29; K. Sunder Rajan, Subjects of speculation: Emergent life 
sciences and market logics in the United States and India, AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 107, 
Issue No. 1, (2005), pp. 19-30; K. Sunder Rajan, The experimental machinery of global clinical trials: 
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OF FATE, (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 1-55; K. SUNDER RAJAN, PHARMOCRACY: 
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 Id.  
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 See for example L. White, Difference in medicine, difference in ethics? Or: When is it research or 
when is it kidnapping or is that even the right question? in: P. W. GEISSLER & C. MOLYNEUX (EDS.), 
EVIDENCE, ETHOS AND EXPERIMENT: THE HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY OF MEDICAL RESEARCH IN 
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diseases that are prevalent in India.
8
 This would ensure that the drugs that are tested 
are relevant to the populations where the trials happen, as opposed to conducting 
trials for patients elsewhere. If we choose the framework of justice (if understood as 
conduct of and access to trialled drugs relevant to populations) for the findings of 
this thesis, the findings predominantly represent trials that were being done for 
products that were relevant to the Indian population. My interview data does not 
contain any information on whether the trial participants would have had access to 
the drug after the trial.  
There is little statistical information on post-trial access to drugs being tried 
in India but plenty of research has been conducted on whether clinical trials 
conducted in India match the health care needs of the nation. A recent study 
evaluated trials registered with the Clinical Trials Registry of India (CTRI) between 
2007 and 2015. In India’s list of disease burden, the first rank has been continuously 
held by infectious and parasitic diseases that have the highest disability-adjusted life 
years (DALYs),
9
 but they accounted for only 5% of the total trials conducted in India 
and were ranked 7th according to number of trials. Cancer, that is ranked 6
th
 on 
DALYs, ranks first in the number of trials conducted in India. With more such 
statistics, the authors of this study concluded that the greatest number of trials 
conducted in India pertain to non-communicable diseases which implies that “India 
is possibly contributing to global research but which may not entirely be necessary 
for the population and the health needs of the country.”
10
 This repeatedly came up in 
the discussions that I had with some regulators, health activists, and investigators; 
they insisted on the need for more private sector trials for “diseases that affect our 
people”.  
                                                          
8
 V. Kamat, Fast, cheap, and out of control? Speculations and ethical concerns in the conduct of 
outsourced clinical trials in India, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MEDICINE, (2014), pp. 48-55.  
9
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(YLL) due to premature mortality in the population and the Years Lost due to Disability (YLD) for 
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My findings show that most researchers whom I interviewed were aware of 
their roles as medical innovators and considered risks taken by research participants 
as risks taken for a better cause. This, however, must be understood within the larger 
pharmaceutical innovation context in India. Pharmaceutical innovation in India, as 
mentioned earlier, has not balanced out the public health needs of the nation. In fact 
the pharmaceutical innovation model has followed an “imitation to innovation” 
approach.
11
 There have been some key regulatory triggers that shaped how 
pharmaceutical innovation turned out in India. The 1971 Patent Laws were led by 
public health concerns that encouraged imitation of expensive imported drugs that 
were inaccessible to the masses. The US Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, that liberalised 
the US market for generics, provided an opportunity to the Indian generics producers 
to enter the global generics market. The manner in which Indian pharmaceutical 
innovation grew differs in many ways from the classic drug pipeline model of its 
Euro-American counterparts.
12
 It makes for a fascinating study for those who study 
innovation, but for the purposes of this project it tells us that innovation in India has 
very recently come out of its imitation mode. This means that it lags behind in 
pharmaceutical innovation and particularly where this innovation would matter the 
most - to reduce the disease burden at home. Keeping this in mind perhaps the 
question to ask would be “are the risks taken by participants really for the greater 
good?”. 
Coming to structural violence, a term coined by Galtung and supported by 
liberation theologians in the 1960s, which describes social structures, such as, 
economic, religious, legal, political, and cultural, that hinder individuals or societies 
(or groups) from reaching their full potential.
13
 Structural violence is usually 
“embedded in longstanding ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable 
                                                          
11
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institutions and regular experience” and because they seem so unremarkable or 
ordinary in terms of how we understand the world, they are almost invisible.
14
 If we 
choose a framework of structural violence for the findings of this thesis, the 
complaints about time constraints, the pressure put on researchers for positive results, 
and the disgruntlement regarding more responsibilities “thrust” upon them, 
demonstrate that research investigators are arguably also victims of structural 
violence.  
Commercialisation in clinical research has been supported by the Indian 
Government since 2005 and those with a Marxist or social ethos have been vocal 
about the ills of it.
15
 Sunder Rajan and Prasad have lamented the movement of 
biomedical research in India towards commercial testing, which has damaged a semi-
socialist Indian pharmaceutical sector which once boasted of a vibrant generics 
industry that provided inexpensive drugs for the masses.
16
 For Sunder Rajan the bio-
politics
17
 of commercialised clinical research is evident in the:  
…violence of top-down, artifact-driven, technocratic imaginaries of 
public health that posed solutions to public health problems purely in 
terms of vaccines, without attending to epidemiological or 




The commercialisation of research has put in place oppressive structures within 
which researchers/investigators have to conduct research. Clinical research is no 
longer wholly altruistic and with an increasing number of CROs, research has 
                                                          
14
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Galtung, violence is the “avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs or…the impairment of 
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 The apathy towards the purpose of informed consent is 
possibly a by-product of working within structures which hinder the potential of the 
researchers to make ethical choices.  
Certainly the two trial subjects interviewed for this research were victims of 
structural violence when they agreed to be part of a trial for money or medicine 
which they ought not to have needed in a society free from structural violence. But, 
as has been noted earlier, the sample size for this thesis was quite limited. The 
critical scholars who have worked on Indian clinical research issues have conducted 
ethnographic fieldwork for several years (a decade of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Sunder Rajan’s case); and with the data they possess they are in more authoritative 
positions to explore issues of structural violence within the Indian clinical research 
paradigm.  
Another aspect of critical scholarship that goes beyond informed consent 
pertains to the disenchantment with normative ethics. The critics of globalised 
clinical research have denounced normative ethics as having naturalised the 
consequential use of the experimental subject for capitalist value generation.
20
 They 
argue that ICH GCP and GMP standards were methods through which the hegemony 
of Euro-American pharmaceutical industry was consolidated.
21
 All the research 
investigators and other stakeholders interviewed for this research were well-aware of 
the GCP and GMP standards, which shows that if the purpose of harmonisation of 
ethical standards was to consolidate such hegemony, it seems to have worked.  
Sunder Rajan has charted the different ways (ICH GCP standards being one) 
through which the Euro-American pharmaceutical industry “operates to institute 
forms of governance across the world that are beneficial to its own interests”.
22
 But it 
is not only instituting forms of governance, but also implanting the idea that a 
country’s pharmaceutical progress depends on their support is what really 
                                                          
19
 See also I. R. Baker, Has the commercialisation of medical research gone too far, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN MEDICAL SCIENCES, Vol. 3, Issue No. 10, (2015).  
20
 SUNDER RAJAN (2017), p. 106, supra note 2. 
21
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22
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consolidates the hegemony. Some investigators I interviewed were worried about the 
“data scandals” that have hit Indian CROs wherein some CROs were found to have 
falsified data for the purposes of regulatory approval by the Euro-American 
authorities.
23
 They worried that “if trust is broken with the foreign regulators and 
companies…who will come here?”. While some other investigators wanted to have 
clinical research experience with Euro-American sponsors because that would help 
their research profile “greater than working on India-specific trials”. 
If we were to contextualise the findings of this thesis within the more general 
field of law and society, the apathy shown by researchers towards the ethical aspect 
of informed consent (or to the purpose of it) could resonate beyond just informed 
consent. Of course, the apathy shown to informed consent could also stem from 
reasons beyond the ones that I have identified. Here I address the complaints of the 
researchers which hint at over-commercialisation of biomedical research as a 
potential reason for the apathy. It could also be that similar apathy is found in other 
fields towards other legal and ethical principles. The interview excerpts calling court 
decisions as pyrrhic victories, regulators being wary of legal solutions, a general 
acceptance that legal enforcement in India is patchy, the industry complaints of 
overregulation hindering innovation, could perhaps be replicated in other fields using 
a similar multi-stakeholder approach to data collection. There are indeed insinuations 
to the relationship between law and the Indian society in this thesis, but it could be 
taken further in future research with a different research question and a larger sample 
size.  
All the frameworks discussed afore are vital to acquiring a comprehensive 
picture of clinical research in India and also more globally. In essence, the 
pharmaceutical industry and people who are a part of it, in this case the researchers/ 
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available at http://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2016/01/07/getting-the-indian-drug-
scandals-straight (all links last accessed August 15, 2018) 
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investigators, are caught between two often opposing forces – legal and ethical 
regulations and the market. For investigators, this means that on the one hand they 
have the ethics of medical research and on the other hand they have the market 
imperatives of efficiency and effectiveness. In order to perform a balancing act 
between the two, we have principles like informed consent that allow research to be 
conducted, but only with the free choice of a research participant. Therefore, 
assuming that the current commercialised structure of clinical research will remain in 
place for a long time to come, informed consent (if done right) is our best bet to 
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Appendix II.  
Variables considered in the 2010 study conducted by Shah and colleagues 
 
The favourable factors included the following variables in the participant responses: 
Note: these have been grouped as such by the authors of the study (Shah et al., 2010) 
Personal Health Benefits: Less chance of getting infected with HIV; Protection from HIV; 
HIV vaccine is very important for self; HIV vaccine is somewhat important for self; If they 
had a terminal illness; If they thought the drug would cure them; If an active drug is received 
instead of placebo; If the drug/treatment would help me; If there were no other medical 
options available to me; May help themselves with the condition; Relief from pain; Level of 
protection from dose. 
Altruism: Somewhat likely belief in the success of AIDS vaccine; Vaccine for control of 
AIDS epidemic in India; If the drug/treatment would help someone else in the future; Help 
advance science and find a cure for diseases/conditions; May help save lives; Allows helping 
others with the condition; Allow medical team to find an effective treatment; Help medical 
community. Participation is important for the common good of India; Help researchers 
prevent HIV/AIDS; There will be an effective HIV vaccine in a few years; HIV will become 
preventable like polio; Even if the vaccine does not work, help researchers find an effective 
vaccine; Help researchers prevent HIV/AIDS. 
Methods for motivating participation: Where was the information about trial given? 
Whether information was provided through government owned television channels; whether 
information given during healthcare camps, whether personal physician gave the information 
about the trial; information received through family, friends, relatives, or awareness 
programs such as AIDS leaflets. Whether the trial participant relied on research institutes for 
providing information regarding safety; Email notifications; Internet; Harris interactive; 
Awareness of the HIV Vaccine Trials Preparations in India; Awareness of Vaccination 
Priorities. 
Source of Extra Income/Benefits: Insurance; If money is received for participation; Free 
medication is provided. 
Detailed knowledge about trials: Included complete and detailed information about risks, 
knowledge of vaccines, technical terminologies explained and knowledge of HIV 
vaccinations (for HIV related trials).  
Trust in Physicians: Preferred to rely on specific health care providers (family doctors, 
counsellors) for providing information regarding safety; Belief that doctors only do good. 
Appendix II.  
Variables considered in the 2010 study conducted by Shah and colleagues 
 
The factors acting as barriers included the following variables in the participant 
responses: 
Note: these have been grouped as such by the authors of the study (Shah et al., 2010) 
Mistrust in trial organisations: Worry about mode of treatment i.e. whether given vaccine 
or placebo; Do not want to take drugs without treating doctor’s permission; Are like guinea 
pigs; Are taking a gamble with their health.  
Concerns about efficacy and safety of trials: Side effects of vaccine/not sure of safety; 
Long-term effect of vaccine; Concern about safety procedure; Unknown efficacy of vaccine; 
Concern about effects of a HIV vaccine on participant's lives; Possible unknown long-term 
side effects of vaccine; Possible side effects; Health risks; Unproven therapy. 
Dependency Issues: Difficult to decide in anticipation; Lack of privacy at home; Lack of 
supportive network/family commitments; Peer family pressure; Social support; Not able to 
make independent decision. 
Loss of confidentiality/ Privacy Concerns: Effect on insurance, marriage or getting a job; 
Privacy concerns. 
Trial Burden: Time constraint; Effect on travel; Did not want to take new drugs; 
Unnecessary tablets; Wanted to go home. 
Psychological Reasons: Fear of injection; Afraid of tests; Fear of stigma, General disinterest 
in volunteering. 
Language: Do not understand the language. 
 
Informed Consent Form (Hindi) 
 

















INFORMED CONSENT FORM -A 
GENERAL INFORMATION OF A BIOAVAILABILITY/BIOEQUIVALENCE 
STUDY IN HEALTHY, ADULT, HUMAN SUBJECTS CONDUCTED AT 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY UNIT, RANBAXY LABS LTD.  
Dear Volunteer,   
This document has been prepared to provide information required for your 
participation in a bioavailability/bioequivalence study. Please read this information 
and clarify if you have any queries before you decide to participate in the study.  
 This is a research based study. You are being asked to participate in this 
research study. 
 Take all the time you need to read and understand the information, before 
agreeing to participate in this study. 
 If you are not able to understand any part of this document, please feel free to 
get your doubts clarified. An oral presentation of this document will also be 
held in the language you understand. 
 Please sign the informed consent forms (A and B) and submit it for our 
records. You will be provided a copy of the same for your reference and 
record. 
 During your participation in the clinical study, you will act as an independent 
individual, and not as an agent, partner or an employee of Ranbaxy 
Laboratories Limited. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Bioavailability is the amount of a drug that becomes available in the body (eg: blood, 
urine) after consuming the drug. Two drugs are said to be bioequivalent if the amount of 
drug in the body (eg: blood, urine) are similar after consuming the drugs. 
Signature of Volunteer_____________________ 
APPENDIX III.
ANNEXURE III 
Bioequivalence has to be proven between the marketed drug named reference and the 
generic drug (to be marketed) named test. Government agencies check the details of the 
results from the bioequivalence studies. When they are convinced that the two drugs are 
similar (bioequivalent), the test drug may be approved for marketing 
GENERAL PROCEDURE OF A BIOAVAILABILITY/BIOEQUIVALENCE 
STUDY 
Given below is a general explanation of how a bioavailability/bioequivalence study is 
conducted.  
You will be admitted to the study if you pass the screening tests and provide a written 
informed consent. On day of admission, breath test for alcohol, drug of abuse in urine and 
or other tests if required by the protocol will be done in each period. Baggage and 
pocket(s) will be checked prior to admission and you are not allowed to carry alcohol, 
xanthine, tobacco, cigarette, illicit drug, medicine in any form, any eatables (solid and 
liquid) and any electrical or battery operated appliances other than wrist watch and 
mobile phone without camera. You will be provided with Ranbaxy volunteer uniform(s) 
during your in-house stay. During your participation in this study, you will be provided 
lockers to keep your belongings and an identity card which will be required to be 
displayed during in-house stay. You may be monitored (e.g. through Close Circuit TV-
camera) during your stay at CPU. 
During the stay in the unit you will be provided standardized meal. (For detailed meal 
plan refer to study summary in INFORMED CONSENT FORM - B). 
You will be required to consume one of the study drugs (either the test or reference) in 
each period.  
As per protocol, blood samples will be collected at pre-determined time intervals in 
vacutainers (tubes) through a disposable needle and cannula which will be inserted into a 
blood vessel and kept fixed at the site. To prevent the needle from getting blocked, 
solution of heparin (which is a normal body constituent) will be added. Half milliliter of 
heparinised blood will be discarded before sample collection. Alternatively, blood 
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samples may also be collected, directly with a sterile disposable needle and syringe. The 
collected samples will be processed and stored appropriately for further analysis. (Please 
refer to INFORMED CONSENT FORM - B for Sample collection time points.) 
As per the study requirement other biological specimen (e.g.: Urine, Stool, Sputum 
samples etc) may be collected at predetermined time intervals. 
Pain, swelling and/or numbness of the arm may occasionally result from the blood 
collections during the study. This procedure may also occasionally cause light 
headedness or fainting. These reactions are usually of short duration and are reversible. 
After the completion of in-house stay, you will be discharged, with information to return 
on a specific date at a specific time for the subsequent period(s) of the study or for walk-
in samples (ambulatory samples or for end of study safety sample), vital signs 
measurement and adverse event monitoring, if required.  
Similar procedures will be followed in the subsequent period(s) except for the informed 
consent procedure.  
RESTRICTIONS TO BE FOLLOWED 
If you participate in this study as a subject, you will be required to follow certain 
restrictions: 
You will not be allowed to have tea, coffee, chocolates and cola during your stay in the 
unit. For 48 hours prior to admission and during the course of the study till last sample 
collection for pharmacokinetic analysis, you must not consume any alcohol or any 
products that contain alcohol (beverages, marinades, medicines, etc), grapefruit juice and 
/ or grapefruit supplements. You must not have taken any medication including over the 
counter (OTC) medications 30 days before and throughout the study. Drinking water will 
be restricted before and after consuming the drug. Posture restriction will also be 
enforced after dosing. (For specific details of restrictions related to drinking water and 
posture, refer ICF - B). 
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BENEFITS 
Since you do not require treatment with the study drug(s), you will receive no medical 
benefit from this study, other than the benefit of a free health check-up and the 
satisfaction of serving the interests of human beings in poor health. 
NEW FINDINGS 
Any new and important information which may be discovered during the study which 
may influence your willingness to continue in the study will be made available to you as 
soon as possible. 
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT 
Since this study is for research only and the alternative would be not to participate. 
INSURANCE POLICY 
You are insured under the insurance policy no. OG-11-1113-3306-00000009 of Bajaj 
Allianz and you will be compensated in case of a trial related injury. 
MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE 
You are expected to follow certain rules of the CPU and maintain discipline during your 
stay in the unit.  In case you do not behave properly in the CPU you will be withdrawn 
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DETERMINATION OF FINANCIAL COMPENSATION DUE IN CASES NOT 
COMPLETING THE STUDY 
1 
Withdrawn from the study by the Investigator on objective 
medical grounds to safeguard your health, before 
administration of study drug 
 
On pro-rata basis 
2 
Withdrawn from the study by the Investigator on objective 
medical grounds to safeguard your health, after administration 
of study drug 
 Full payment on 
completion of study/ 
follow-up visits 
3 
Dropped-out of the study, on your own accord, after 
administration of  study drug 
 
On pro-rata basis 
4 
Dropped from the study on compassionate grounds, with the 
permission of Investigator 
 
On pro-rata basis 
5 
Withdrawn from the study by the Investigator due to your 
failure to comply with the requirements of the study  
 
On pro-rata basis 
6 
Withdrawn from the study by the Investigator because of your 
wilful withholding of information regarding your past or 
present medical illness(es) relevant to the study and your 




Non-compliance with the prescribed time-schedule for the 
follow-up visit (where applicable) 
 50% of the payment 
due for that visit 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Records of your participation in this study will be confidential so far as permitted by law. 
However, the confidential data which identifies you by name will be available to the 
study personnel, Corporate Quality Assurance Auditor during audits and to the 
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Institutional Review Board (IRB) & various regulatory agencies, as it becomes necessary. 
Any publication of the data will not identify you by name. Investigator’s representatives/ 
designates shall act as data custodian for this study till it is sent for archiving.  
MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR INJURY 
In case of study related side effect(s), medical care will be offered at the Clinical 
Pharmacology Unit and treatment of side effect or event requiring hospitalization will be 
carried out at a nearby hospital and the expenses will be borne by Ranbaxy Laboratories 
Limited 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this study is entirely your choice. Whether you choose to participate 
or not will not involve any penalty or affect your selection for any future studies. You 
may also stop participating in the research at any time you wish. It is your choice and all 
your rights will be respected.  
Note: The Investigator can stop your participation in the study if the following are 
known- it appears to be harmful to your health; you fail to fulfill study requirements; you 
have withheld information related to your health record; the study is cancelled.  
In case of emergency you can also call the study personnel by pressing the emergency 
bell which is available in the ward and toilet areas. 
CONTACT DETAILS  
At any time before, during or after the study, you can obtain further information about 
this study.  In case of medical emergencies during the study, or if you have any urgent 
questions or queries concerning discomfort or injury associated with the study, please 
contact, Investigator at Ranbaxy Clinical Pharmacology Unit, Majeedia Hospital 2nd 
Floor, Hamdard Nagar, New Delhi 110 062, Telephone:  2995-6721. 
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If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may call Dr. Farhan 
Jalees Ahmad, Convener/Member Secretary, Jamia Hamdard Institutional Review Board 
(Telephone number 9810720387).  
Note: You may also consult your family doctor at any time during the study 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM- B (STUDY INFORMATION) 
 
Single dose three-way crossover bioavailability study on Amoxicillin extended 
release tablets 775 mg in healthy adult human subjects under fed condition 
 
Version No.            : 01 
Supersedes : Not Applicable 
 
This document provides information regarding this bioavailability study. Please read this 
information and clarify if you have any queries before you decide to participate in this 
study. If you agree to participate please sign the document and submit for our records. 
 
This study involves research to evaluate the amount of drug in the blood after 
administration of extended release tablet formulation containing Amoxcillin 775 mg. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Amoxicillin is a semi-synthetic antibiotic, an analog of ampicillin, with bactericidal 
activity against gram-positive and gram-negative microorganisms. Amoxicillin exerts its 
bactericidal action against susceptible organisms during the stage of multiplication. It acts 
through the inhibition of biosynthesis of cell wall mucopeptide. Amoxicillin is a 
penicillin-class antibacterial indicated for the treatment of tonsillitis and/or pharyngitis 
secondary to Streptococcus pyogenes (S. pyogenes) in adults and pediatric patients 12 yrs 
and older. 
In this three period study two batches of Amoxicillin extended release tablets 775 mg of 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, India will be compared with MOXATAGTM (Amoxicillin 
extended release tablets) 775 mg of MiddleBrook Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Germantown, 
Maryland 20876 USA in 15 healthy, adult, human subjects under fed condition. 
Dosage 
The recommended dose of amoxicillin extended release tablets is 775 mg once daily 
taken within 1 hour of finishing a meal for 10 days. The full 10-day course of therapy 
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should be completed for effective treatment of tonsillitis and/or pharyngitis secondary to 
S. pyogenes. 
ADVERSE EVENTS 
The most frequently reported adverse reactions (≥ 1%) which were suspected or probably 
related to amoxicillin extended release tablets in patients are diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain and headache.  
In a single and multiple dose pharmacokinetics study conducted on 20 healthy male and 
female subjects with amoxicillin extended release tablet 775 mg, the most common 
adverse event was headache, reported by 6 (30%) of subjects. The majority of adverse 
events were mild in severity.  There were no clinically significant laboratory 
abnormalities.  
In a Phase I bioequivalence study conducted on 26 healthy male and female subjects with 
single dose of amoxicillin extended release tablet 775 mg, the adverse events reported 
were pain, diarrhea, nausea, headache and dizziness. 
Note: 
You can participate in this study if you: 
- Have hemoglobin level ≥13.0 g/dL (for males) and ≥12.0 g/dL (for females). 
You cannot participate in this study if you  
- Have history of hypersensitivity to Amoxicillin or related group of drugs. 
- Have history of recurrent headache.  
- Have history of nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain and/or diarrhea in the week 
preceding the study. 
- Have history of drug-induced rash and/or pruritis. 
Note: (For female volunteer only): 
You can participate in this study if you are 
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 Of childbearing potential, is practicing or willing to practice an acceptable method of 
birth control for the duration of the study as judged by the investigator(s), such as 
condoms, foams, jellies, diaphragm, intrauterine device (IUD), or abstinence; or 
 Are postmenopausal for at least 1 year; or 
 Are surgically sterile (bilateral tubal ligation, bilateral oophorectomy / hysterectomy). 
 
You cannot participate in this study if you are 
- Demonstrating a positive urine pregnancy test prior to admission of period I. 
- Currently breast-feeding mother. 
Caution: 
• Avoid operating machines or driving vehicles during the entire conduct of the 
study. 
• If you feel unwell or experience any uneasiness, please bring to the notice of the 
Medical Officer/Nurse/staff on duty immediately.  
• Female volunteers are advised to use acceptable method of birth control for the 
duration of the study, such as condoms, foams, jellies, diaphragm, intrauterine 
device (IUD), or abstinence. 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS: Fifteen (15) 
INSURANCE POLICY 
 
You are insured under the insurance policy no. OG-11-1113-3306-00000009 of Bajaj 
Allianz and you will be compensated in case of a trial related injury. 
 
CONTACT DETAILS  
At any time before, during or after the study, you can obtain further information about 
this study.  In case of medical emergencies during the study, or if you have any urgent 
questions or queries concerning discomfort or injury associated with the study, please 
contact Principal Investigator/medical officer at Clinical Pharmacology Unit, Ranbaxy 
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Laboratories Limited, Majeedia Hospital 2nd Floor, Hamdard Nagar, Delhi, India. 
Telephone no.: (011-2995-6721) (office). 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may call Dr. Farhan 
Jalees Ahmad, Convener/Member Secretary, Jamia Hamdard Institutional Review Board 
(JHIRB), Telephone number 9810720387 
Note: You may also consult your family doctor at any time during the study. 
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
You shall be adequately compensated on account of your participation in the study as per 
the guidelines issued by the JHIRB. The compensation in this study will be Rs. 4500/- 
(Rupees four thousand five hundred) per subject, which will be paid proportionately for 
participation at the end of each period of the study. This is to compensate you for your 
discomfort and inconvenience. From the period I payment, a sum of Rs. 500/- will be 
deducted and given to you after satisfactory resolution of the end of the study safety 
assessment. 
In addition, as a token of appreciation- a sum of Rs 1800/- (Rupees one thousand eight 
hundred only) will be paid to only those subjects who complete the study successfully or 
are withdrawn from the study by the Investigator for reasons other than protocol violation 




















: Each blood sample of 4 ml 
Predose (duplicate) and at 0.500, 1.000, 1.333, 1.667, 2.000, 2.250, 2.500, 2.750, 3.000, 
3.250, 3.500, 3.750, 4.000, 4.333, 4.667, 5.000, 5.500, 6.000,  8.000, 10.000, 12.000, 
16.000, 20.000 and 24.000 hours post-dose in each period. 
Total blood 
volume 
: Total of 372 ml (Note: extra blood 
sample may be collected if 
required for safety). The volume of 
blood collected from pre-dose 
blood sample till first 24 hours 








Approximately 11 hours prior to 
dose until 24 hours post-dose. 
Washout 
Period 
: At least seven (07) days 
Meal 
schedule 
: You will be served dinner on 
admission night at approximately  
-10.5 hours of dosing. You will be 
served high-fat breakfast 
[consisting of White Bread 84 gms 
with butter 10 gms,  Paneer Bhurji 
(Paneer 100 gms, Onion 20 gms, 
Tomato 20 gms and Oil 5 gms), 
Salted Peanut 15 gms  and 200 mL 
of whole milk with 5 gms of sugar; 
Total 930 K calories] 45 minutes 
before dosing in each period.  
Lunch, snacks and dinner will be 
provided at 4, 9 and 13 hours post 
dose respectively. 
Restrictions 
: You shall be required to fast at least 
10 hr before starting the high-fat 
breakfast. 
  
You will be dosed while seated and 
will be remain seated or ambulatory 
for the first 2 hours following each 
drug administration.  
 
Drinking water will not be allowed 
from 1 hour before dosing until 2 
hours post dose except 240 ml of 
water given during administration 
of the dose. Thereafter, drinking 





: Vital signs – Vital signs (oral temperature, sitting BP and radial pulse) measurement will be 
performed after admission, prior to dosing (within 2.0 hours) and at 2, 6 and 24 hours post 
dose (within ±2.0 hours) in each period. 
Adverse event monitoring will be done after admission, prior to dosing and at 
approximately 2, 6, and 24 hours post dose in each period. 
Brief Clinical examination: will be done after admission and before discharge in each 
period. 
Laboratory parameters of biochemistry and hematology will be repeated at the end of the 
study at 24 hours post dose of Period III in case you have been administered study drug. 
Additionally, urine pregnancy test (for female volunteers only) will be carried out at this 
time point. However, in case the subject does not report at the scheduled visit or if it is 
deemed necessary to delay the assessment of lab parameters for medical reasons, the 
laboratory parameters will be repeated at any subsequent visit. In case laboratory 
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parameter(s) is (are) outside the acceptable limits, you will have to come for follow up until 
the results are normal / clinically not significant. 
Treatments 
: Reference (R): MOXATAGTM (Amoxicillin extended release tablets) 775 mg of 
MiddleBrook Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Germantown, Maryland 20876 USA. 
Test (A and B): Amoxicillin extended release tablets 775 mg of Ranbaxy Laboratories 
Limited, India. 
Dose 
: Either of test (A or B) or reference (R) products containing Amoxicillin extended release 
tablets 775 mg will be administered with 240 mL of drinking water, 45 minutes after the 
start of a high fat breakfast, at an ambient temperature under supervision of trained study 
personnel in each period. 
 
DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that: 
- My participation in this study is voluntary. 
- This study is a research project and provides me no medical benefits. 
- I have the right to be provided with answers to questions arising during the course of 
the study. 
- I will be provided any significant new findings coming to light during the research 
investigation. 
- I can withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice to future medical care or 
selection for future studies. 
- I can be withdrawn from the study at any time if I violate the study protocols or to 
protect my health. 
- I have read and understood the Informed consent form and have no problem(s) in 
complying with the study protocol. 
- My reference number with respect to volunteer enrolment of Ranbaxy Laboratories 
Ltd. is RLL_MAJ_______________________________ 
- I currently require no medical treatment or care. 
- I have withheld no information regarding my past medical history and current drug 
intake. 
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- I have read the consent form and any questions I had about the study, possible side 
effects or the consent form, have been answered to my satisfaction. 
- I voluntarily give my consent for my personal data related to any information relating 
to me, as I have provided in the enrollment form, or as it is generated during 
screening and study procedures, including identification number, or factors specific to 
my physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity, to be 
processed as required for the study requirements. I also voluntarily give my consent 
for the processing of data. 
- I am aware that my biological samples shall be anonymized or destroyed as per the 
requirements of the procedures of the study. 
- It is my right to obtain information at reasonable intervals and without excessive 
delay regarding whether or not data relating to me are being processed. 
- It is my right that, unless required by law, or while fulfilling a contract, with suitable 
measures to safeguard my legitimate interests: “No automated processing of my 
personal data shall be done which makes me subject to a automated decision, 
produces legal effects concerning me or significantly affects me.”                                                         
- “No automated processing of my personal data shall be done to evaluate certain 
personal aspects relating to me, such as my performance at work, creditworthiness, 
reliability, conduct, etc.”  
- During the past 90 days I have not participated in any experimental studies conducted 
here or elsewhere. 
- I will maintain discipline during my stay at the Jamia Hamdard campus. 
- If I have any further questions regarding this research study or in the event of 
research related injury, I may contact Investigator (011-2995-6721) or Dr. Tausif 
Monif, Study Director (91-124- 4231001).  I may contact Dr. Farhan Jalees Ahmad, 
Convener/Member Secretary, Jamia Hamdard Institutional Review Board (Telephone 
number 9810720387), if I have any questions regarding my rights as a volunteer. 
- My signature confirms that consent is based on information provided and that I had 
freely chosen to participate without prejudice. 
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Volunteer’s Signature & Date/ Thumb 
impression* 
:  
Impartial witness’s Signature & Date*
  
:  
Impartial witness’s Name and his/her 
relation with Volunteer 
:  
I hereby declare that I have no relation 
with Ranbaxy 
:  
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent & 
Date 
:  
Investigator’s Signature & Date : 
 
* In case of illiterate volunteer 
 
 
Declaration: I have received the signed copy of this ICF (FORM A and FORM B) 
 




Researcher: Himani Bhakuni 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of Research: Socio-ethico-legal dilemmas of 'informed consent' as applicable to human subject 
research in India 
 
Introduction and Purpose  
My name is Himani Bhakuni, I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 
working with my faculty advisor, Professor Anne Griffiths, in the School of Law. I would like to 
invite you to take part in my research study, which concerns understanding the dynamics and the 
process through which the legal and ethical right of informed consent is realised within the paradigm 
of biomedical research in India. The principal research questions ask how the right to informed 
consent is operationalised within clinical trials in India. It seeks to understand how the bureaucrats, 
regulators, investigators and ethics committees responsible for bringing the principle of informed 
consent into practice view the principle in their respective roles and what the principle means to the 
trial participants and other stakeholders in clinical research. My lens is socio-legal; hence, the 
research looks at law’s interactions with individuals and institutional actors. It is about understanding 
the ‘practice’ of informed consent within the Indian context.  
 
Procedures 
If you agree to participate in my research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location 
of your choice. The interview will involve questions about your experiences and views on ethical 
issues in clinical research. It should last about 30 minutes, but could be less or more depending on 
how much time you are willing to share. With your permission, I will audiotape and take notes during 
the interview.  The recording is to accurately record the information you provide, and will be used for 
transcription purposes only. If you choose not to be audiotaped, I will take notes instead. If you agree 
to being audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, I can turn off the 
recorder at your request. If you do not wish to continue, you can stop the interview at any time.  
 
I expect to conduct only one interview; however, follow-ups may be needed for added clarification.  
If so, I will contact you by e-mail/phone to request this.  
 
Benefits 
There is no direct benefit to you from taking part in this study. It is hoped that the research will 
generate a better understanding of the concept of informed consent and what it means to the people 
involved in the process of giving and realising consent so that such an understanding may allow for 
better mechanisms for bringing it into being 
 
Risks 
There are no risks involved with participating in this study. Your confidentiality is of utmost 
importance and that will not be compromised in any manner. If there is any interview question that 




Your study data will be handled as confidentially as possible. If results of this study are published or 
presented, individual names and other personally identifiable information will not be used unless you 
give explicit permission for this below. 
 
To minimize the risks to confidentiality your data will be stored on password protected disk space on 
the personal laptop of the researcher and all the data will be coded and encrypted. There will be 
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Researcher: Himani Bhakuni 
limited access to my study records. If you do not want to sign an informed consent form, I will 
take your consent orally and will hand you a copy of this form for your records. 
 
When the research is completed, I may save the tapes and notes for use in future research done by 
myself or others.  I will retain these records for up to 10 years after the study is over. The same 
measures described above will be taken to protect confidentiality of this study data.  
 
Compensation 
You will not be paid in cash or kind for taking part in this study. 
 
Rights 
Participation in research is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to take part in the research.  
You can decline to answer any questions and are free to stop taking part in the research at any time. 
You have the right to request to withdraw the use of your data after the interview but only up to the 
time the results of the study are ready to be disseminated.    
 
Questions 
If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me. I can be reached at 
Mobile: +91 9910771685 (India) +4407778292855 (UK) or at himani.bhakuni@ed.ac.uk  
 
If you have any questions about your rights or treatment as a research participant in this study, please 
contact the University of Edinburgh, School of Law, Research and Ethics Integrity Committee 






If you agree to participate, please say so or sign the form below. You will be given a copy of this 
consent form to keep for your own records. 
 
If you wish to participate in this study, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ 
Participant's Name (please print) 
 
_____________________________ _______________ 




If you agree to allow your name or other identifying information to be included in all final reports, 
publications, and/or presentations resulting from this research, please sign and date below. 
 
_____________________________ _______________  
Participant's Signature   Date 
 
 
4/2/2018 Mail – Himani.Bhakuni@ed.ac.uk
https://outlook.office365.com/owa/?realm=ed.ac.uk&path=/mail/search 1/1
Regarding an appointment with Dr. Prof. Jagdish Prasad
Dear Mr. Singh, 
 
In pursuance to my call to you here is the email seeking an appointment with Dr. Jagdish Prasad on any day as
per his schedule.  
 
My name is Himani Bhakuni, I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, working with
my faculty advisor, Professor Anne Griffiths, in the School of Law. My research concerns understanding the
dynamics and the process through which the ethical and legal right of informed consent is realised within the
paradigm of biomedical research in India. The principal research ques ons ask how the right to informed
consent is opera onalised within clinical trials in India and whether informed consent is a right without a
remedy in that context. It seeks to understand how the various ins tu onal actors, prac  oners, researchers,
bureaucrats, regulators, inves gators, and ethics commi ees responsible for bringing the principle of
informed consent into prac ce view the principle in their respec ve roles and what the principle means to
other stakeholders in clinical research. My lens is socio-legal; hence, the research looks at law’s interac ons
with individuals and ins tu onal actors. It is about understanding the ‘prac ce’ of informed consent within
the Indian context.  
 
For this, I would like to speak with Dr. (Prof.) Jagdish Prasad, as being an academic himself, he would definitely
realize the importance of research being done on this topic. The purpose of my study is to understand how
ins tu ons work within their capaci es and why we need to stop making these ins tu ons the so  targets in
such areas.
Confiden ality is a major aspect of this research, individual names and other personally iden fiable
informa on will not be used in my resarch unless the par cipants give explicit permission to do so.
 
I am currently in New Delhi for the purpose of this research. I can be reached at the email address:
himani.bhakuni@ed.ac.uk or alterna vely at my mobile number: 9910771685.   
 
I am hoping you could get me an appointment to meet with the DGHS whenever he returns to New Delhi. 
 




Doctoral Researcher, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom
h p://www.law.ed.ac.uk/research/students/viewstudent?ref=324
European Joint Doctorate in Law and Development (EDOLAD) 
h p://www.edolad.eu/content/us 
BHAKUNI Himani
Thu 19/05/2016 05:34
Sent Items
To:dghs@nic.in <dghs@nic.in>;


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gyuygg_____
